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Abstract
This paper makes the case for why safety nets are an important tool 
for  managing  the  risk  of  natural  hazards. The  use  of  safety  nets  is 
advocated both ex ante, to prevent and mitigate the impact of natural 
disaster  and  ex  post,  to  cope  with  the  impacts  of  natural  shocks. 
Firstly, the paper explores the implications of contextual factors to be 
taken into account in the design of an effective safety net system to 
respond to the needs generated by natural disasters. Learning from the 
responses to a number of recent natural disasters, a typology of the 
different types of natural hazards which require different approaches 
to reduce their risk is introduced. Secondly, the paper considers some 
“guidelines” for improving the design and implementation of safety 
nets either to prevent and/or to recover from natural disasters. Finally, 
some conclusions and recommendations for more effective safety net 
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Summary 
This paper aims to achieve several different objectives, each of which is addressed through a number 
of standalone chapters. As a whole, the purpose of this paper is to make the case for why safety nets 
are an important tool for managing the risk of natural hazards. We advocate the use of safety nets, 
both ex ante, to prevent and mitigate the impact of a disaster and ex post, to cope with the impacts of 
natural shocks. The paper also considers how to improve the design and implementation of safety nets 
for natural hazards. Learning from the responses to a number of recent natural disasters, we firstly 
distinguish the different types of natural hazards, which require different approaches to reduce their 
risk. We then consider some of the key issues to take into account in the design of ex ante safety nets. 
Thirdly through the use of several case studies, we argue that the contextual situation needs to be 
better incorporated into safety net design. Finally we outline some of the design choices for a safety 
net. 
 
The multitude of people affected by dramatic natural shocks is evidence of our inadequacy at dealing 
with such events and signals that we must find new ways to decrease the scale of these disasters. 
Empirically, poor areas are more prone to natural disasters than wealthy areas (this does not mean 
they are more prone to natural hazards) meaning similar shocks in France and Peru can have vastly 
different impacts. Hence there is a link between disaster risk and poverty, one that can lead the poor to 
become trapped in a cycle of poverty and exposure to natural shocks. 
 
Given this assertion that similar shocks can affect people differently, the premise is that a major 
hazard may not lead to disaster, if a community or vulnerable groups are well-prepared. The risk of a 
disaster is therefore defined by both the probability of the hazard and the vulnerability of the 
household and community. As vulnerability is the endogenous factor, by implication, it must be 
controlled in order to reduce a community or nation’s risk of natural disaster. Therefore we can look 
to the typical mechanisms to reducing vulnerability – social protection and social risk management. 
This is a suitable lens through which to approach disasters because it focuses on how society manages 
risk at a community and household level. This contrasts with disaster risk management, which puts 
the disaster itself at the center of its management strategy. 
 
Safety nets are not a panacea for disaster prevention and management. Not only must they work in 
conjunction with other program and policies to be effective, but they are not equally suited to all types 
of natural hazards. A typology of disasters and disaster risk can help determine if they are appropriate. 
Accurate classification is difficult due to poor information and monitoring systems and changing 
socio-economic and climatic conditions, so that the frequency of events cannot be estimated with 
certainty.  This typology confirms that high income countries are not prone to high risk and relatively 
more frequent ‘hydrometeorological’ hazards such as droughts and rainfall-related floods, so 
supporting the thesis that with the appropriate management, these types of hazards are controllable 
events and could be prevented with the support of ex ante safety nets. This approach to disasters sees 
natural hazards as inherent to poverty and therefore must be integrated into the development and 
poverty reduction process. For medium and low-frequency, high impact ‘geophysical’ events (for 
example the 2004 Tsunami, or Pakistan’s earthquake in 2005), ex ante safety nets will be less 
applicable although safety nets could still help mitigate the impacts of the shocks, ex post.  Disaster 
Risk Management (DRM) has been the traditional approach to disasters. DRM focuses on mitigating 
impacts by strengthening infrastructure, which is more suited to guard against these high impact 
infrequent disasters.  Safety nets and social protection can therefore be useful against covariate shocks 
and, increasingly over time, as a tool to protect households from idiosyncratic shocks. 
 
Until now, social protection responses to natural disaster have been ad hoc. The approach of this 
paper is to integrate natural hazards into the development process, not see such shocks as exogenous 
to it. Bangladesh and Ethiopia have begun to use this approach and are here as case studies to help the   9
design of future ex ante safety nets. Bangladesh’s flood and cyclone response is pre-planned and 
shows how the policy and economic structure are an important part of managing risk – and are 
integral to laying the groundwork for a good safety net. Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program 
illustrates the importance of scalable safety nets which are in place to protect the poorest on a regular 
basis but can be scaled up, when and where shocks occur. 
 
Assessing the context for establishing a safety net is paramount and the case studies reveal that in the 
past this is all too frequently overlooked nor fully understood. Seven key areas are identified 
including the type of natural hazard; demographics; geographic and demographic spread of event; 
political, economic and social conditions; infrastructure and management capacity;  resource 
availability, policy and international context; and effective EWS to grant data availability. The case 
studies provided examples of how understanding the context positively and negatively affected 
different areas of safety net design and how the design may have been adapted if they had been fully 
considered. 
 
This lays the groundwork for designing safety nets. Aspects of safety net design are discussed from 
institutional management, targeting, selecting an appropriate safety net and setting the quantity and 
frequency of payment, all aspects of delivery from timeliness, security and coordination, funding and 
donors. What emerged is that safety nets cannot conform to a blueprint, but must be molded to the 
local context – from the national down to community level. Yet the community is paramount in all 
aspects of the safety net from design to implementation, monitoring and evaluation, including catering 
to the needs of specific vulnerable groups – particularly in a post-shock context; and political buy-in 
is essential to the process, so that safety nets are embedded in the policy framework to ensure their 
sustainability and enable a smooth transition from pre- to post- shock, or relief to recovery and 
rehabilitation. 
 
There are still many areas that require research and are improperly understood. More resources need 
to be channeled into monitoring, evaluation and data collection about the impacts of different safety 
nets. More safety net ‘champions’ need to be identified and lessons learned from success stories. And 
there needs to be a better understanding of the role that both the informal and private sectors can play 
in providing and complementing safety nets. 
 
But what primarily emerges from the case studies is that safety nets for disaster prevention or impact 
mitigation are only possible with political will. Governments respond reactively, to media attention on 
crisis situations but the focus needs to shift to publicize situations where disasters have been avoided. 
Donors and implementing governments both need to become more accountable to program recipients 
as well as held to account by the tax-paying public and the media. With such commitment, it could be 
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1  Introduction 
 
The frequency of dramatic natural shocks around the world is a reminder that governments and the 
international community need to do more to prevent and mitigate the human misery and economic 
costs that result from such calamities. Relief may come increasingly rapidly in best case situations but 
what is achieved in the rehabilitation and recovery phase is typically inadequate.  
 
The human ‘cost’ in terms of deaths, injuries, slights to health and loss of human capital are now 
widely recognized and natural hazards are cited as one of the key reasons for failing to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals
3.  The number of people affected by large natural shocks has been 
rising with three times more people affected by disasters in the 1990s compared with the 1970s and a 
fivefold increase in terms of economic losses (Figure 1).
4 In South Asia alone, between 1990 and 
2007, 682 natural disasters occurred causing the death of an estimated 400,000 people, and affecting 
many more (Heltberg, 2007). Poor households are the most exposed to negative shocks. There is 
empirical evidence than the poor are less able to respond to crisis than the non-poor (Vakis et al. 
2004). While the most evident impacts are in lost assets, the impacts can permeate further, into social 
structure and psychological well-being (Benson and Clay, 2004).  
 
Figure 1. Number of reported disasters and people affected over the past 30 years and economic losses 
from 1950-50 until 1992-2001. 
 
 
Source: IMF (2003). 
 
Disasters can also have severe short term impacts upon public finances: loss of revenue, rise in 
expenditure, and indirectly through publicly owned utilities, with longer term consequences for 
                                                      
 
3 Atkinson, R. ed. (2007) Humanitarian Exchange 38 (6), 1-2. See also DFID, 2004. 
4 Red Cross (2002) World Disasters Report   11
economic growth, development and poverty reduction (Benson and Clay, 2004).  A World Bank 
report estimated that over 1990 - 2000, the economic loss caused by natural disasters represented 2 to 
15 percent the GDP of an exposed country (IEG 2007).  Figure 2 provides estimates of the potential 
impact that natural disasters can have on the economic performance of several countries in Europe 
and Central Asia. Even if the national economy recovers relatively quickly, national level indicators 
can be misleading, failing to reflect what may be a more disturbing reality for the local economy and 
thereby hiding the need for and/or the effectiveness of an ongoing response in the affected area, 
rendering exposed groups even more vulnerable (DFID, 2004). For example, the 2004 tsunami 
reduced Indonesia’s GDP growth by 0.6 per cent, but caused about 30 per cent fall in the regional 
product of the most heavily hit province of Aceh.
5 Indeed it is localized hazards that account for “the 
greatest share in the absolute increase in economic losses”.
6  The size of an economy is also a key 
factor in determining the magnitude of the economic losses. Four years after hurricane Mitch hit 
Honduras, the GDP was 6% lower than the projections done before the disaster (Vakis, 2006). 
 
Figure 2.  Economic Loss Potential in Europe and Central Asia 
 
Source: Pusch, Christoph (2004) 
 
The financial costs of natural disasters in terms of relief and recovery assistance are also escalating. 
Humanitarian spending by the DAC rose from $2.3 billion in 1990 to $8.2 billion in 2005.  And these 
                                                      
 
5 Armas, Enrique Blanco, Wolfgang Fengler and Ahya Ihsan. 2008. ‘The impact of the tsunami and the reconstruction effort 
on Aceh's economy.’ Jakarta, World Bank, draft. 
6Maxwell D, Webb P, Coates J, Wirth J. (2008) Rethinking Food Security in Humanitarian response. Paper presented to the 
Food Security Forum, Rome, April 16-18, 2008.    12




The link between high exposure to disaster risk and poverty is now widely accepted. Environmental 
degradation, migration, lack of land rights, and lack of access to basic services are just some of the 
factors which have a direct adverse effect on the poor and also exacerbate the risk of, or difficulty in 
recovering from natural hazards. 98% of those killed and affected by natural disaster are from 
developing countries, and it is estimated that by 2025, over half of all people living in developing 
countries will be highly vulnerable to floods and storms (Tearfund, 2005).  
 
Measures to mitigate the risk of disaster can be effective: if a community struck by a major hazard is 
well-prepared, then it need not lead to disaster. Earthquakes of similar magnitude affect Japan and 
Peru, but in Japan the death toll averages 63 people each year, whereas in Peru, it is 2,900. Cuba, 
repeatedly hit by hurricanes has an excellent record of mitigating risks, just one of many examples 
being in1998, when Hurricane Georges killed 589 in the Dominican Republic and Haiti but only 6 
people in Cuba (Oxfam America, 2004). While the West invests large sums of money in risk 
prevention, very little official development assistance (ODA) is contributed to ensure poorer countries 
have the same defenses, even though prevention costs less than cure. The Government of 
Mozambique appealed to the international community for $2.7 million to prepare for the floods 
forecast in 2000. Less than half of this was forthcoming, but the donor community was able to 
provide $100 million once disaster had struck. In Bangladesh, preventive mechanisms to protect cattle 
from the floods, saved on the cost of recovery efforts by a factor of 17 (DFID, 2004). Typically, aid 
money has been used to ‘bandage the wounds, rather than prevent the injuries’ (Tearfund, 2005, 5) 
and shortsightedly, the crisis itself is seen as the starting point rather than in the broader context of a 
poverty and vulnerability (Maxwell et al, 2008).  
 
Yet there is convincing evidence that investments in prevention reduce the severe costs of 
humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance. The Red Cross spent US$1.1 million spent building 12,000 
hectares creating a buffer of mangrove to protect Thai Binh province in Vietnam from typhoons. This 
has reduced annual costs of sea dyke maintenance by $7.3 million each year, as well as stimulated 
fishing livelihoods and contributed to prosperity in the area to further help people the poor manage 
future shocks (IFRC, 2002). 
                                                      
 
7 Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (2007). Good Humanitarian Donorship and Disaster Risk Reduction: A Concept 
Paper. July 2007. Mimeo. In Maxwell et al, 2008.   13
This paper sets out a case firstly for taking a longer-term perspective in our response to these 
calamities. Secondly, it argues that these events should be seen not as isolated incidents but must be 
embedded within the broader issues of poverty and development in both their political and economic 
contexts. This perspective should shape the approach of vulnerable countries and the international 
community to natural hazards – as something that can and should be planned for - and consequently 
this will determine the types of interventions to undertake. This longer-term view shifts the focus 
beyond the immediate relief phase to helping vulnerable people and communities to withstand shocks 
and to rebuild livelihoods - hence the need for social protection. This paper advocates safety nets as 
one useful tool both to prevent and mitigate the effects of poverty generally and more specifically to 
address the impacts of natural disasters. 
1.1  The objective of the paper and the target audience 
On a day-to-day basis, most of the poor in developing countries deal with idiosyncratic shocks 
through informal arrangements but these systems are often inadequate, particularly when the 
community at large is affected, as is the case in the event of a severe natural shock. In the past, these 
covariant natural disaster shocks have been seen as uncontrollable and unexpected, to be dealt with ex 
post through emergency relief. Yet as elaborated below, repeated experience is showing that such 
relief response is inadequate. Instead, an approach incorporating short-to-long term mitigation and 
recovery is needed, one that can allow sound protection instruments to begin to play an expanded role 
as soon as a disaster occurs.  Furthermore, a Social Risk Management (SRM) framework provides a 
process for planning the response strategy, which can draw upon existing implementation and 
monitoring systems.  
 
There is no blueprint for implementing any specific type of safety net. One of the central themes of 
this paper is that each aspect of social protection must be dealt with in light of a thorough 
comprehension of the context, hence the identification in section three, of key contextual issues that 
must be understood prior to designing or implementing a safety net.  However, some common issues 
arise during natural disasters and this paper examines the lessons that can be learned from recent 
experiences, for improving the effective use of safety nets in emergencies. It justifies the use of 
existing safety nets – either ex ante, in order to mitigate the impacts of a potential shock or to be 
scaled up once a disaster occurs, depending upon the situation. While this paper advocates ex ante 
safety nets, the reality is that they will continue to be designed more haphazardly in response to either 
slow or rapid-onset shocks. The paper is also a primer to guide the design and implementation of 
safety nets in such pressured situations. 
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The paper is aimed at a broad audience interested in the ‘why and how’ of using social safety nets to 
prevent, mitigate and cope with the impacts of natural hazards. Section 2 discusses the ‘why’, making 
the case for safety nets as a key tool in disaster risk management. Sections 4 and 5 go into the detail of 
how to organize and “operationalize” social safety nets in a disaster mitigation framework. It is 
therefore, directed more towards designers and implementers of safety nets. 
1.2  Contribution to the literature  
Thinking within a social risk management (SRM) framework, this paper sees a key role for social 
safety nets in the response to high-risk (frequent) natural shocks in two ways.  
(i)  A preventive approach, which should be explicitly concerned with enhancing the structural 
capacity of the economy and society to withstand shocks. Safety nets for disasters should be 
designed ex ante, that is, well in advance of potential hazards. This implies manuals, time plans, 
assigning responsibilities to appropriate departments and ministries, ensuring sufficient capacity 
and human resources, preparations for an appeal, etc. so that they are ready to launch as soon as 
called upon. This social protection planning needs to be complemented by a range of regulatory 
measures such as land rights, labor standards, employment benefits, privatization reforms, 
trading and investment policies, construction codes for infrastructure commercial and domestic 
buildings and environmental policies, such as preventing and reversing land degradation. That 
is, the broader framework also necessary for poverty reduction is essential for effective disaster 
risk management. While these measures may affect the individual’s ability to cope with risk, 
they fall outside the domain of social protection and safety nets and so are only briefly 
discussed in section 5.  
(ii)  Implementation of safety nets (ex-post) concerns the adjustments that need to be made with 
respect to deciding the type of safety net to administer and at what level, targeting procedures, 
an appeals process, a distribution mechanism and a monitoring and evaluation system. The 
simplest and easiest approach would be to scale up pre-existing safety nets. This reinforces why 
a general mechanism of social assistance through safety nets is ideal.  
 
SRM is an analytical instrument and is the diagnostic framework used in this paper. Decisions will 
depend upon five contextual factors: (i) the type of disaster, (ii) the categories of affected people, 
distinguished by income group, livelihoods and capabilities; (iii) the social, political and economic 
situation of the affected area and country; (iv) the infrastructure and human capacity for coping with 
natural shocks; and lastly, (v) availability of resources and the international community. Three 
influences on resource availability to be explored are (a) commitment (b) flexibility to adapt financing   15
and programming; and (c) foresight and vision. The design of safety net arrangements should take 
these considerations into account, at least implicitly. 
 
Most of the disasters and safety nets literature tends to focus on one or two particular mechanisms in 
order to respond to the impact of specific hazards.  This paper seeks to set the discussion in the 
broader context of social risks. It considers the different characteristics of various recent disasters and 
then attempts to determine guidelines, or a checklist, of what decisions to take, when and how. As the 
discussion becomes detailed and technical, the exercise of designing a safety net for high impact 
natural disasters is intended to remain consistent with the objective of SRM. Specifically, the paper 
aims to answer the following questions: 
  What adaptations to usual safety net targeting and delivery mechanisms are needed? 
  When conceptually and how in practice is the transition made from humanitarian assistance to 
disaster-related safety net assistance and then to a long run safety net program or policy? 
  For how long should these programs be implemented? 
  Who should be the primary targeted beneficiaries: those that have suffered larger losses 
(usually covered by the initial compensation packages) or those who have lost critical assets 
and income earning opportunities and may become critically poor? 
  How can programs be scaled up and down rapidly and efficiently?  
  Which programs work best in which circumstances and how should they be adapted to local 
circumstances? 
  How to integrate donor responses with domestic responses. 
 
This is a practical look at questions that need to be asked when coping with post-disaster situations. 
This combines with an essential diagnosis of the situation, which will be a prelude to any decisions 
about the characteristics of designing a safety net. 
 
The paper draws on a set of desk-based case studies of recent disasters in low income countries: 
‘droughts’ in Malawi in 2002-2003 and in Ethiopia in 2007-2008, the Asian Tsunami in December 
2004, the earthquake in Pakistan in September 2005, the severe droughts in Niger associated to food 
crises in 1997-98 and 2005, and in Bangladesh the extreme river floods in 1998, 2004 and 2007 and 
the cyclone in November 2007.  The case studies were partly derived from previous and ongoing 
research by the authors (e.g. Benson and Clay, 2004) and from an ongoing study by Aker and del 
Ninno (2008).  There were two fresh investigations into the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and the   16
Pakistan earthquake, which involved construction of chronologies for the response to these disasters 
and a review of what information was actually available on impacts of the SSN response. 
1.3  Structure of the paper  
Chapter 2 provides a definition of natural disasters leading to a discussion of risk management and the 
role of social protection.  Chapter 3 explores the implications of contextual factors to be taken into 
account in the design of a effective safety net systems to respond to the needs of natural disasters.  
Chapter 4 makes the case for ex ante preparation of safety nets, comparing experiences from several 
countries such as Bangladesh and Ethiopia. Chapter 5 describes detailed implementation issues that 
are critical to the success of a safety net intervention. Finally Chapter 6 provides a summary of 
conclusions and offers suggestions for addressing the key issues. Checklists at the end of each chapter 
highlight critical questions that should be posed in the design of a safety net. These lists are intended 
as useful reminders and also to assist those reading at speed. 
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2  The role of social protection in responding to natural disasters 
“Disasters do not just happen – to a large extent, they result from failures of development which 
increase vulnerability to hazard events.” (DFID, 2004,3).  
 
Natural disasters typically affect the poorer parts of the world which are more vulnerable to the 
negative impacts of natural hazards.  There is also growing concern that climate change has already, 
or will, increase the severity and frequency of some forms of natural hazard. At the same time there is 
a discernible trend in both policy discussion and in the research literature away from seeing natural 
catastrophic events as literally uncontrollable ‘disasters’ to recognizing them in part as a product of 
more complex socio-economic processes, including vulnerability and the collapse of livelihoods 
(DFID, 2004, Grosh et al. 2008; Maxwell 2008, Vakis, 2006; World Bank 2007).  
 
Conventionally, disaster response has been largely the preserve of those professionals concerned with 
emergency, life saving assistance and disaster risk management (DRM). DRM focuses on reducing 
exposure to covariate risk to minimize loss of life and reduce the damage and economic losses from 
such events. Less attention is given to ‘indirect’ impacts on livelihoods and the developmental 
trajectory of potentially affected societies (Benson & Clay, 2004).  
 
DRM takes the crisis as the starting point. It has led to emphasizing the need for ‘developmental 
relief’, for ‘post-disaster rehabilitation’ to ‘build back better’ and to ‘save lives and livelihoods’ 
(Maxwell et al, 2008). The shift of focus from management of disaster risks to social risks is a more 
contextualized approach and which also views prevention and mitigation in terms of enabling 
potentially affected people to cope with natural events. This more nuanced understanding has opened 
the door to the contribution of social risk management (SRM) and social protection and with it, a 
whole realm of other programs that can be useful in reducing the appalling impacts of some of these 
events.  
 
This section begins by defining natural hazards and proposes that these events should be categorized 
in terms of risks. It then lays out the two approaches mentioned above and how they overlap in 
responding to the threat posed by natural hazards. Finally it considers social safety nets, a particular 
mechanism of social protection and the contribution that this can make to prevent and mitigate the 
impact of natural hazards.   18
2.1  Risk and natural events 
There are two broad categories of natural ‘hazard’ that cause disasters: geophysical and hydro-
meteorological events. Geophysical hazards include volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and resulting 
tsunamis. These ‘events’ are highly destructive outcomes of geophysical processes but are recognized 
as infrequent - commonly termed ‘low risk’ or low probability in the literature.
8  Hazard risk should 
not be confused with disaster risk, which incorporates measures of vulnerability 
 
Hydro-meteorological hazards are a more complex category.  There are extreme and relatively rapid 
weather-related events such as tropical storms (hurricanes and cyclones) and related storm surges.  
Abnormal flooding is a broad category closely related to specifics of geo-hydrology. Disaster risk 
management has focused on one-time events leaving the drought and rainfall variability to be 
addressed as food security and water supply issues. There are also slower onset climatic events such 
as drought episodes that differ significantly from ‘normal’ conditions in terms of mean levels or 
distribution of rainfall.  Such slow onset events may occur over months within a single annual cycle, 
or even extend over years. Conditions do not necessarily worsen steadily, but may progress 
erratically. Figure 3 shows that between 1996 and 2005 in Sub-Saharan Africa countries the most 
frequent natural disasters were droughts and floods, where droughts affected the highest number of 
people. 
 
Thinking about this second group of events is divided as to whether these are always ‘natural’ hazards 
or sometimes man-made. The frequency of reported episodes such as food shortages in the Horn of 
Africa, or monsoon river flooding in Bangladesh, has led some such as De Waal and Devereux (De 
Waal, 1997 and Devereux, 2002) to identify a structural problem consisting of a complex set of 
interconnected dynamics at play, focusing on politics and interests, rather than on naturally occurring 
forces.  
 
Projects tend to downplay these structural and political causes and instead accept the ‘natural’ role of 
these hazards
9.  Although the event may be ‘naturally’ occurring, its impact depends on several socio-
economic and political conditions  so that response can have very different consequences for those 
that are affected. Niger’s food crisis in 2005 is an example of how the occurrence of natural hazards 
                                                      
 
8 For example, earth tremors of low magnitude are widespread and often quite frequent of occurrence.  Only events high on 
the Richter Scale and uncommon (e.g. probability of annual occurrence of 1 in 100 or less in a specific location) are likely to 
be dangerous or highly damaging. Only a few professional alarmists like Bill McGuire of UCL foresee an increase the 
frequency of geophysical hazards (McGuire et al, 2002). 
9 See for example, the Project Appraisal Document for the World Bank Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Program 
(Washington, World Bank, 2004).   19
(drought and locust infestation) and economic shocks on top of conditions of chronic food insecurity 
can quickly lead to large-scale loss of human life (Aker and del Ninno 2008; Bailey 2008, Maxwell et 
al, 2008). 
 
Figure 3.  Types of disasters and number of people affected in the most exposed African countries, 1996-
2005. 
 
Source: IEG 2007. 
 
These two approaches can be unified in the risk formula, R=f(H,V), where the risk of disaster (R) is 
measured by the risk of hazard (H) and vulnerability (V). This acknowledges that a hazard can be an 
exogenous trigger for disaster, but vulnerability is an endogenous and therefore controllable factor of 
disaster.  Instead, by differentiating events by frequency, as we have sought to do here, the risk of 
occurrence then becomes the basis for determining the need and type of response, which in this case, 
focuses on social protection. 
 
Categorizing hazards in terms of risk is seemingly tautological.
10  It is a difficult exercise but can be 
useful for deciding the appropriate response to invest in, to cope with a potential natural hazard. In 
                                                      
 
10 In 2004, UNDP developed a risk index, which was a measured risk in terms of mortality, as factors of hazard, 
vulnerability and population. But its purpose was largely to motivate global action and advocate the need for disaster risk 
policies – it was not attempting to analyze how particular programs could contribute to reducing disaster risk. See UNDP 
(2004) www.undp.org/bcpr.    20
reality, a country’s financial capacity as well as political support will determine the options. 
Classifying the risk of the hazard will help evaluate the comparative economic value and political-
economic viability of a proposed response, as well as determine the need for which type and duration 
of safety net. 
 
This exercise is difficult because scientific understanding of the likelihood of particular hazards in 
different areas is still relatively inaccurate, especially when in areas of rapid environmental change. 
Similarly the outcomes of hazard events are often poorly characterized, due to insufficient monitoring, 
little recent experience, or rapidly changing socio-economic conditions. These two variables are 
captured in the Sterling Matrix, which categorizes what is known in terms of policy implications.  
 
Table 1. Sterling matrix of knowledge and policy 
  Knowledge about outcomes





Firm basis for 
probabilities 
Risk (e.g. Indian and Pacific 
Ocean Tsunami post 2004) 
Ambiguity (e.g. Food 
Crises in Malawi: 2001-06) 
No firm basis 
for probabilities 
Uncertainty (e.g. Tropical 
storms in era of climate change) 
Ignorance (We don’t know 
what we don’t know?) 
Note: Workshop Report on a workshop for the ESRC Science in Society Program, 11-12 March, 2004 at Minster Lovell 
Mill, Oxfordshire - Page 35 - Sterling’s four cell Matrix: distinguishes situations of risk, ambiguity, uncertainty and 
ignorance.) www.sci-soc.net. The area in the middle of the table is the area of incertitude, where assertions by scientists, 
interests groups, and political actors take place. 
 
The logic of this framework is to isolate the circumstances in which it is possible to ground the 
analysis in an assessment of risks. However, accurately gauging the probability of specific hazards is 
extremely difficult. It seems more useful to categorize natural disaster risks into three broader types of 
risk situations.   
  High risk: vulnerability to events with an annual probability of one in ten or less (P ≥ 0.1); 
  Medium risk: vulnerability to events is in the range (0.02 <  P  ≤ 0.05) annually; 
  Low risk:  vulnerability to events with a probability of less than 1 in fifty (P < 0.02) annually. 
 
These broad bands of risk with an explicitly uncategorized ‘gray area’ between them (i.e. events with 
a probability of 0.1 to 0.05) are intended to reflect the difficulty of quantifying non-stationary risk and 
uncertainty – such as the influence of climate change and direct human impact on local environments 
which means that there is no firm basis for probabilities. The relationship between the level of 
economic development and vulnerability to different types of disaster is set out in Table 2, with the 
hypothesis that the probability of specific types of hazard results in a national or economy-wide 
disaster (IMF 2004 definition) differs for low, middle income and high-income countries. These 
different probabilities reflect the varying level of infrastructure and investments countries undertake   21
in disaster protection, such as disaster-proofing public infrastructure, regulations and access to public 
or private insurance mechanisms. High income, industrialized countries are more likely to have 
established complex systems of social protection and social welfare that quickly adapt to provide for 
disasters as a special case. Nevertheless it is worth noting that the need for the ex-post relief measures 
is still likely to arise.  
 
Table 2.  Disaster risk and development framework 
Economic 
development 
Status of country 
High risk 
P ≥ 0.1 
Medium risk 
0.02 ≤ P ≤ 0.1 
Low risk 





WR and WF; 
Eg. Bangladesh: River 
Floods 1998,2000, 2004, 
2007; Malawi: ‘drought’ 
2002,2003, 2005 




 GE  GTS  GV  
Eg. Aceh: Tsunami 2004; 
Pakistan: Earthquake 2005 
Middle income 
    
 W F, WD WH  
Eg.Hurricane Mitch, 
1998 
 GE, GV, GTS WT  





 W H    
Eg. Hurricane 
Katrina 
 GE, GV, GTS;  WF, WD, WT 
Eg. Kobe Earthquake 
Germany: Floods 
Events:   Climatic (weather) events – WR - erratic rainfall; WH – hurricane; WD drought – extreme rainfall 
event; WF – flood; WT - extreme temperature; Geophysical events: GE – earthquake, GTS – tsunami, GV – 
volcanic eruption;  
 
High risk (P ≥ 0.1) disaster events are effectively confined to in Low Income Countries and conflict-
affected countries with a high level of poverty and vulnerability.  These events require social safety 
nets and social protection organized on a continuing basis with a capacity to expand and contract. 
This is the situation in much of sub-Saharan Africa and a few other countries, especially those 
affected by conflict, e.g. Afghanistan, Haiti, Nepal.  Other low-income countries often classified as 
high disaster risk including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea and some provinces 
of Pakistan, India and Indonesia are not at risk of a national disaster to such high probability climatic 
variability. Some countries have made considerable progress in preventing such events becoming 
disasters e.g. Bangladesh, India and in Africa, Botswana and South Africa.  
 
Very high levels of risk make financially viable insurance difficult, because the combination of some 
hedge in the premium against uncertainty and transaction costs makes risk transfer through market 
insurance instruments appear prohibitively expensive even to commercial organizations.
11 The poor 
who are extremely sensitive to climatic variability are vulnerable to such high risks for example, 
                                                      
 
11 For example the recent high incidence of tropical storms was reported as resulting in premium quotations of more than 
12% or more of the value insured of many offshore structures in the Gulf Oil industry in 2006 following Hurricane Katrina 
(Private communication, Jonathan Smythe).    22
much of the Ethiopian Highlands. Other poor people live in exposed locations where ex ante risk 
reduction is difficult or prohibitively expensive, such as the unprotected flood plains of the lower 
Shire valley in Malawi or on chars (unstable river islands) in the Brahmaputra in Bangladesh. 
 
Low risk situations: we suggest less than an annual one in fifty year risk as a cut-off. In reality, 
precise estimates of probabilities are becoming difficult to establish with any confidence. A one in a 
hundred year flood is sometimes quoted with confidence as a low-risk event (e.g. Bangladesh in 
1998).  Extreme geophysical hazards, an earthquake, tsunami or volcanic eruption, are likely to have 
an even lower but uncertain probability.  The combination of lack of awareness, unless there has been 
a recent event, and high rates of time preference in the poorest countries typically lead to low levels of 
ex ante disaster reduction measures. 
 
The case studies selected for detailed consideration, Pakistan, Aceh, Malawi, Niger and Ethiopia 
include these extreme situations of both low and extremely high risk. Examples of problems and good 
practice are also drawn from the wider literature. Given the uncertainties about probabilities it seems 
accurate to define the current situation, to borrow from Sterling’s Matrix, as an area of “uncertitude”. 
This suggests that a ‘precautionary principle’ may be the most appropriate policy response rather than 
designing social protection strategies strictly on the basis of best available estimates of risks (EU, 
2001).  
2.2  SRM and social policy
12 
According to many accounts, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Pakistan have coped relatively well with 
recent disasters, and were able to avert severe famine, diseases or increase in mortality following the 
disaster.  However, the massive death toll from the events themselves, the increase in poverty, and 
regressive impact on development begs the question: could more have been done? The social risk 
management (SRM) framework looks at how society manages risk, with the view that all people, 
households and communities are exposed to risk at various times from a variety of sources and aims 
to provide instruments to allow them to minimize the impact of exposure to risk and change their 
behavior in a way that helps them exit poverty and lower their vulnerability (Holzmann and Jorgensen 
2000).  SRM covers a range of mechanisms to prevent and mitigate risk (ex-ante strategy) or cope 
with its impacts after it has occurred (ex-post coping strategies), in a way which integrates risk as part 
of a response to vulnerability and poverty reduction overall.  This expands the range of options for 
                                                      
 
12 Vakis (2006) discusses the complementary role that Social Protection can play in the formation of an effective strategy for 
natural disasters management.   23
preventing and responding to risk, which focus more on restoring livelihoods, rebuilding assets and 
beyond the immediate relief phase to long term recovery. This contrasts with DRM, which puts the 
disaster itself at the center of its management strategy. The contribution of SRM is that it provides a 
more nuanced, holistic understanding and therefore can affect a more appropriate and better-targeted 
response to managing natural hazards.  
 
Social protection which focuses on idiosyncratic shocks and social risk management responses to 
natural shocks have tended to be ad hoc. The role of safety nets in helping households to cope with 
and recover from covariate disaster has seldom been considered. “In general, disaster responses have 
tended toward the reactive and tactical rather than proactive and strategic. Countries affected by 
disaster as well as the donors that try to help them, including the [World] Bank, have generally treated 
disasters as interruptions to development rather than as a risk that is integral to development” (World 
Bank, 2005, ix). Social protection and livelihood support have already been an important part of Bank 
response to the reconstruction phases following disasters but its involvement has been slight in ex 
ante planning of disaster interventions, a toolkit of best practices for donors and governments, 
streamlining and accelerating the procurement process for delivering resources and technical 
assistance and embedding income support and safety nets within hazard management plans (Heltberg, 
2007).  
 
The types of mechanisms available may be public, which would include legislation on standards and 
codes, social transfers, public works programs, etc.; informal such as remittances and burial societies; 
or market-based instruments such as insurance and credit schemes. This paper concentrates only on a 
narrower range of public mechanisms, social safety nets. Social safety nets (social assistance 
programs) are one type of program within the broader range of social protection. They refer to non-
contributory transfers (in cash or kind), targeted at the poor and vulnerable to catch those falling 
towards economic destitution, or at the permanently poor above a minimum income level. In this 
paper we consider almost exclusively, government-provided programs, although the design section 
can be relevant to implementers of non-national programs. We do not cover other instruments of 
social protection and social policy such as labor market policies or pension schemes.  
 
Different types of social safety nets can have a preventive and mitigating (ex ante) role as wells a 
coping (ex post) function to help manage the impact of natural hazards. Ex ante mechanisms aim to 
reduce people’s vulnerability to a shock and increase their resilience.  
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To be effective, it is necessary that safety net and livelihood responses are scalable, that is they can 
expand and contract to deliver at scale when required. In order to be activated at short notice, safety 
nets would need to work through existing channels. An example of this is the risk financing 
mechanism under the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) in Ethiopia.  Safety nets also typically 
have an established monitoring and evaluation system, which can track progress and so help be 
responsive to changes in need, as well as evaluate impact. 
 
In conjunction with this, safety nets by definition have a longer term vision than relief programs, 
even if they are accessed only temporarily by participants. They therefore make the transition to the 
rehabilitation and recovery phases, whereas conventional response to natural disasters has 
traditionally concentrated primarily on relief and not on integrating into long term development. 
 
Finally, safety nets do not stand alone but must be complemented by a broader system of preventive 
and coping strategies within the public, informal and market-based spheres.  Safety nets often work in 
conjunction with early warning systems, which are critical to anticipating shocks and early 
intervention - an essential part of managing natural hazards.  Also necessary are pre-planned hazard 
risk management programs that are immediately activated in the event of a shock warning, as with 
Bangladesh’s Cyclone Preparedness Program.  
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3  The importance of understanding the pre-existing context: Lessons 
learned 
This section uses the disaster and safety net case studies to demonstrate how their contexts 
significantly shaped their implementation and outcome. A more comprehensive chronology of the 
case studies is annexed. 
 
Two stark observations became clear during this research. Firstly, that the underlying political, social 
and economic conditions determine the impact of natural disaster and therefore require thorough 
analysis in any decision-taking on the design and implementation of safety nets. Yet there is an 
absence of thorough understanding of the political, economic and social underpinnings, when 
designing a safety net. Frequently, safety nets are implemented as a crisis response, when time is 
acutely scarce. Consequently, highly pressured program designers and task team leaders give less 
attention to a detailed situation analysis and instead look for quick solutions. This inevitably means 
turning to the narrow set of examples from the current ‘trend’ of well-known safety nets, as well as 
creating rigid programs which are inflexible to changing conditions, or newly available information. 
Personal communication during this research revealed that task team leaders tend to ‘latch on’ to 
certain types of safety nets to deal with the food crises, without considering their full range of options. 
In reality there are multiple options in safety nets and designers should use them creatively to 
overcome hurdles in each individual case, rather than falling back on a few standard practices. Table 3 
is to encourage safety net designers to work from the bottom up in planning safety nets to ensure that 
the unique context for each safety net is adequately incorporated. A similar table could be used as a 
monitoring tool: as the contextual issues in column one change, it indicates that modifications to the 
corresponding aspect of the safety net might be needed. But this is fluid, as indicated by the arrows 
which show that even as on ‘contextual issue’ triggers changes in the corresponding design feature, it 
may activate subsequent changes across other aspects of the safety net. 
 
The second observation that this research drew attention to was the inadequacy of both analyses both 
prior to and after implementation for the questions we were trying to answer. The case studies were 
very unclear as to why particular decisions were taken: why were transfers set at a particular rate? 
How did program designers decide the length of time over which to provide transfers? The fact that 
safety net programs are frequently extended far beyond their initial period of activity, partly reflects 
this lack of thorough assessment of the depth of a problem (as well as the difficulty of securing 
resources for extended time periods). Post analysis is weak too, which among other things inhibits 
lesson-learning and gathering sound data on best practice in order to improve future performance.   26
Table 3.  How context impacts safety net design 
Contextual Issue  Safety  net  design 
feature 
Examples 
 Type of natural event 
(slow/rapid onset) 
Duration of assistance  Short term safety nets for situations to help people 
get ‘back on track’ after a shock, e.g. the Pakistan 
earthquake; extended safety nets in situations with 
entrenched chronic poverty, e.g. Malawi and Niger in 
order to overcome the underlying vulnerability for 
people to be prone to even slight shocks. 
 Understanding the 
demographics 
Type  of  safety  net  Labor-intensive public works for able-bodied 
unemployed; direct cash or kind transfers for disabled 
or labor poor, grants and loans for lost livelihoods . 
 Geographic & 
demographic spread of 
event 
Targeting  Universal coverage for widespread impacts; 







Avoiding use of the army in politically tense 
situations; paying attention to the social hierarchies if 
using community targeting. 
 Infrastructure & 
human capacity 
Implementation &  
Delivery  
 
Delivering transfers through banking system with a 
relatively good infrastructure or where banking 
access can be expanded, e.g. Kenya’s Hunger Safety 
Net. 
 Resource availability 
& international 
context 
Size, type & duration   A high level of international donor support will allow 
more scope in the design of the safety net; the impact 
of other international crises may impact on 
willingness of donors to invest in other safety nets). 
 Good data 
availability, effective 
EWS 
Monitoring  & lesson-
learning 
In a general, the availability and accuracy of pre-
existing data will affect all aspects of safety net 
design. Making better use of existing information can 
save resources and can help in establishing a baseline 
and designing an M& E system. 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to encourage greater consideration of the specific context for which the 
safety net is being designed, firstly in order to escape resorting to ‘blueprints’; and secondly to 
encourage designers to build flexibility into the safety net design so that the safety net can adapt to 
changing conditions. This is set out as a series of observations and lessons gathered from the case 
studies, which are used to illustrate the relevance of contextual issues to the design of the safety net   27
and how these issues have influenced both faults and successes of program implementation. A 
summary of the lessons learned from the analysis below are provided in the Annex. In section 5, 
lessons drawn from this analysis are translated into general operational guidelines for coping with a 
variety of natural events. 
3.1  Defining the narrative 
As the following examples demonstrate, interpretation of the situation frames the policy response 
and defines the range of available options. If the prevailing narrative is framed in terms of food 
availability for example, it overlooks the non-food related dynamics of a crisis and consequently 
possible advantages of non-food responses. Christopolos (2004) observed of the response to the 
Afghan famine in 2001-2 that the provision of seed distribution was “a misplaced narrative which saw 
livelihoods as dominated by subsistence agriculture”. Mis-diagnosis can have implications for the 
effectiveness of a program, and its impact on relieving vulnerability, as the examples in Malawi, 
Goma, Niger and Ethiopia illustrate. Further, in analyzing and designing solutions to an event, 
program designers must be careful not to crowd out other issues (such as conflict or the possibility of 
different environmental events in subsequent years) (Kennedy et al, 2007).  
Traditional institutional setup means food is seen as the primary response Although in the last few 
years, cash transfers conditional or unconditional, are becoming de rigueur for safety nets in non-
crisis times, the case studies show that emergency situations still tend to be framed in terms of 
resource mobilization, hence prompting a response in the specific resources required, rather than 
considering cash. Even recently, some WFP policy documents still dealt solely with food response to 
an emergency.
13 While this may (or not) be necessary as a relief response, such an exclusive approach 
in practitioners’ documents makes it even harder to consider alternatives types of transfer during 
design. 
  Malawi’s crisis was due in part, to dependence on maize in the diet, coupled with the rising 
consumer price of maize. Since the 1990s, government and donors have centered aid on providing 
maize, which is the predominant seed provided in  a key safety net, the Starter Pack and Targeted 
Inputs Program. Rubey (2003), labels this the “maize trap” – policies which reinforce the 
importance of maize, even though in the current structure, it is no longer viable.  “The implication 
is that the Malawi food crisis is a continuing, structural problem, not a transitory event caused by 
unusual weather or corrupt management of the national grain reserve. Thus, without efforts to 
                                                      
 
13 See WFP, 2006. This is a generic paper on targeting for emergencies, but it focuses on food as the only resource for 
transfers.   28
attack the structural causes of the decline in rural purchasing power, food crises will be a recurrent 
phenomenon in Malawi.” 
  In Niger, although a variety of governmental and non-governmental institutions have been 
established to prepare for and respond to food crises in Niger since the 1970s, Niger’s strategic 
grain reserves were much lower in 2004-2005. Between 1992 and 2007, for example, the country 
reduced its strategic grain reserves, previously an important part of the country’s emergency 
response strategy.  In 2004/2005, the government response to the food crisis, with support of non-
governmental agencies and international organizations, consisted mainly of a range of emergency 
schemes which relied upon both imported and local food aid, with some local purchases occurring 
within Niger (Niamey and Maradi) and in northern Nigeria.  
  In Goma, provision of food aid went against recipients’ preferences as well as market buoyancy. 
After the volcano in Goma, DRC in 2002, recipients stated a preference for cash and markets were 
active and well-supplied with food, but materials and food were provided instead. The food and in-
kind kits given to families had the effect of depressing prices. The kits were soon being sold on the 
markets and became a parallel, debased currency, which also contributed to impoverishing those 
that previously had been trading and selling the same goods.  
  After decades of food aid, donors and government have begun a structural shift in their 
management of recurrent drought and food insecurity – an acknowledgement at the policy level, 
that food insecurity is not necessarily characterized by unavailability of food. Following the 2003 
drought in Ethiopia, Lautze (Laitze et al. 2009) argued that agencies’ response to disasters still 
had a food-first bias, because that was the historical norm. This drought led to establishing the 
PSNP with a cash-first principle. The current trend towards cash-first responses once again risks 
inattention to the reality of the situation as well as beneficiaries’ preferences – which strongly 
suggests that a cash-only response is not sufficient. 
  The focus on the Tsunami distracted from sources of vulnerability connected with other sources of 
risk, such as conflict. It also imposed a restricted view of the other types of recovery that were 
required. For example, recovery focused on mitigating future Tsunami risks, rather than the risk of 
more likely seismic events.  
Yet the focus should be an integrated response towards livelihood recovery and medium-long term 
support. Taking a longer term perspective and looking to recover livelihoods following severe natural 
shocks, will influence  how needs are prioritized, the length of time it will take to rebuild assets and 
consequently, the choices made in designing a safety net. Yet these choices need not be absolute and 
the need for varying characteristics such as different types of transfer may change between the 
medium and longer term, as other programs come and go, or for example, as market accessibility   29
alters over time. The experiences below suggest that either a combination or a phasing-in of an 
alternate transfer may be optimal in some circumstances. Of course, preferences for these decisions 
must be balanced with the logistical capacity to implement such a program. 
  In Aceh, the fishing industry was the most severely affected of all economic sectors after the 
Tsunami. Two thirds of boats were damaged, destroyed or lost and over a quarter of ports and 
landing sites could not be used
14. Approximately 300,000 fishers lost their entire income source 
following the destruction of the boats
15, a total loss to the sector of $400 million.
16 In order to 
restore the means of livelihoods as rapidly as possible, it was decided to replace the fishing boats 
and equipment in kind. In fact, this proved to be slow due to low availability of legal timber and 
often of inappropriate size/type, which emphasizes the necessity of looking pragmatically beyond 
the ideal solution to the logistical feasibility of the preferred choice.  
  Contrastingly, in India, Oxfam effectively provided widows and female-headed households with 
cash grants to re-establish small businesses, plant vegetable gardens and purchase fishing nets.  
  Pakistan mostly adopted a broadly comprehensive approach to livelihood recovery following the 
earthquake: Transfers were in-kind and agriculture-based: distributing seeds, tools, livestock and 
providing agricultural extension services. Non-agricultural programs particularly concentrated on 
skills training, such as sewing and some of these were directed at women and the livelihood 
approach supplemented other food, voucher and cash programs. Workfare activities utilized 
unskilled (rubble-clearing), to more skilled labor. This enabled people with a wide range of 
livelihoods to be assisted as well as provide opportunities to build their skills (training), improve 
their traditional practices (extension services), as well as to take advantage of the range of 
available skills of the affected population in the clearing-up process. 
3.2  The political and institutional context 
The strong impact that the political context can have on the effective implementation of safety nets 
often seems to be downplayed in project design, perhaps for diplomatic reasons. In Indonesia and Sri 
Lanka, deep political unrest complicated coordination, management and organization of activities. 
Projects do not just need to be protected from severe political struggles, but more mundanely, require 
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understanding political institutions and more everyday civil service relations. We draw on these two 
different types of political friction to emphasize the impact of political factors.  
 
Political unrest can delay and even lead to termination of activities.  
  In Pakistan, such instability led to a withdrawal of international staff during the rehabilitation 
phase in a situation where recovery was already delayed and slow. The second rehabilitation phase 
in 2007 was behind schedule:  the LSCG had been extended for an additional six months, although 
almost one quarter of livelihood projects were still waiting to start. Housing construction was 
extremely overdue. However, by the summer of 2007, security had deteriorated so that 
international agencies withdrew all their expatriate staff from the earthquake-affected areas.  
 
Understanding principals and agents relations within institutions. Day-to-day political relationships 
need to be well-understood, to avoid hindering program implementation. A realistic evaluation of the 
capacity of the implementing institutions is also essential. 
  In Ethiopia’s PSNP, there has been an ongoing struggle between the implementing department, the 
Food Security Coordination Bureau (under the Ministry of Agriculture) with the Ministry of 
Finance and the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA, recently re-named) who are 
heavily involved in distributing cash and food transfers respectively. The lack of solidarity, 
particularly in the initial phases permeated down to local level, delayed transfers and inhibited the 
responsiveness of the program. In crises times it required that the FSCB which currently holds 
entire responsibility for the program to relinquish resources to the DPPA, an undertaking that the 
FSCB has already shown an unwillingness to do. In 2008, the Government brought the FSCB and 
DPPA, under a single state minister. The hope is that this will help the coordination of the two 
departments. 
  In India, the process of decentralization meant that the implementation responsibility for public 
works programs now rests with the locally elected bodies known as Panchayat Raj institutions 
(PRIs). Unfortunately most PRIs lacked the capacity to implement programs. As a result line 
department officials continue to have a strong influence in program implementation, which often 
generate opportunities for leakages. Political influence as well as bureaucratic meddling often led 
to selection of projects which have no benefit to the local community (del Ninno, Subbarao and 
Milazzo 2009). 
  This type of log-jam can occur particularly in decentralized settings, between the federal and sub-
national levels. In Ethiopia, while the federal level acts as overall coordinator, the regions are the 
agents, or implementers of the program. Yet, the federal government has very little administrative 
authority over the largely autonomous regions, which makes it hard to enforce even basic   31
directives such as reporting standards. However, in Indonesia, working with a decentralized safety 
net structure, gave control over to local authorities and allowed the distribution and 
implementation to be adapted to the local situation The principal-agent problem may be universal 
for safety nets in any decentralized context, but it is even more acute in emergency and disaster 
situations, where the humanitarian objective compounds the external and internal pressures to 
deliver transfers, yet the central government holds very little bargaining power.  
 
Ensure capacity to deliver resources. Harvey (2007) argues that the government is the most 
appropriate conduit for delivering cash transfers “where they have the capacity”, but this gives 
freedom for bi/multi-lateral agencies to adopt alternative channels. This may be necessary for 
emergency unplanned safety nets implemented following a disaster, but in our discussion of 
implementing safety nets ex ante, or planning them in order to implement ex post when needed, it is 
critical to invest in building government capacity to deliver safety nets, in order to strengthen the 
country’s resilience to hazards. 
  The PSNP was the first time that the government had delivered cash transfers over such a 
widespread and frequent basis. It demanded installing a completely new supply chain within the 
government structure. At the start of the program, this was unwieldy, inefficient and harmfully 
slow, particularly compared with the delivery of food transfers, which had been the modus 
operandi in the country for decades. Four years into the program and the delivery record for cash 
transfers has overtaken that of food transfers. Of course, imposing such a dramatic change would 
not be feasible in an emergency, but it illustrates the need and success in building capacity. 
  In Sri Lanka, there was a failure to ensure good technical advice during rebuilding after the 
Tsunami. Approval was slow as there was only one technical officer per district who had to visit 
and approve thousands of houses. It was an infeasible task to monitor and control all construction 
at each state in a timely manner. Moreover, the officers were often not sufficiently skilled in the 
specific types of construction, i.e. in cyclone-resistant housing. 
  After Mozambique’s floods in 2000, USAID funded a project of cash grants of $92 for 
approximately 106,260 flood-affected rural households (half a million people). A private 
consulting firm was contracted to implement the program. Recipients were issued with checks at 
distribution sites, while commercial bank tellers were on site to cash the checks. Private local 
security firms were contracted to ensure security during distribution. In the immediate term 
contracting out other activities such as targeting could also be an option, in order to establish 
programs quickly and with minimal difficulty.  
  By contrast, the use of contractors can dissuade communities from being directly involved in the 
rehabilitation process. After the Tsunami, contractors were frequently turned to in order to rebuild   32
houses quickly, yet this discouraged beneficiaries to rebuild their own houses and circumvented 
the benefits that this brings such as investing in rebuilding one’s own livelihood (see below). 
 
Management & Coordination 
  After the 2004 Tsunami, in Indonesia alone, in addition to the statutory government departments 
and district, province and central levels of administration, there were 125 INGOs, 430 local NGOs, 
thirty national and multilateral institutions and over twelve UN agencies in the clear-up and 
recovery phase. In the absence of either proper planning or coordination, it created competition 
and overlap. 
  In Sri Lanka, for job creation and vocational training for those affected alone there were nine 
government agencies and ministerial departments involved. “Just knowing who was doing what, 
and where, was difficult.” (McMahon et al, 2006). The problem was exacerbated by the 
rudimentary communications, due to destroyed infrastructure (McMahon et al, 2006). At the core 
of operations in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka were new agencies to plan, coordinate and 
administer the reconstruction work
17. 
  In the Maldives, cash transfers were delivered to 53,000 affected people within one month of the 
Tsunami with delays for an additional 5,000. This was possible in part because of the small 
geographic size of the country and proximity of affected areas to the central authorities. The other 
advantage was that the government used the army, which was a simple and clear distribution 
system. Although this may not be appropriate in all contexts and may not be feasible in the long 
term, it can work as a short term measure, beyond the relief phase. 
  In Pakistan, it took four months to identify beneficiaries, and transfers began in the fifth month 
after the earthquake. Pakistan was inhibited because a new government agency with no previous 
experience for delivering cash transfers was responsible for targeting, disbursing and monitoring, 
which inevitably led to delays. The problem was magnified because of the difficulty of delivering 
to remote locations and the effort of benchmarking in an area with a large informal economy.  
 
Draw on existing safety nets, crisis response mechanisms and delivery systems: A key determinant 
in selecting the type of safety net program depends upon whether there are any pre-existing safety 
nets and how well these are functioning or can be adapted.  
  Indonesia’s KUBE social fund program had been run by the Department of Social Welfare since 
2002. It targeted 40% of the population and it could have been a useful mechanism to build upon 
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after the Tsunami. However it was poorly operated, in this instance one of the problems being that 
it was led by volunteers.  
  In Pakistan, there were already several cash transfers through the state provided social welfare. 
These include Zakat and the Bait-ul-Mall (PBM) to help the poorest with food purchases, and a 
subsidized wheat scheme, which were administered through local committees.  
 
There was no clear indication of why neither Indonesia nor Pakistan drew on these existing 
mechanisms, although the research indicated that there were operational and corruption issues with 
each respectively.  
  More successfully, after the cyclone suffered in Madagascar in 2005, the World Bank responded 
by scaling up existing projects. Two components were added to the existing Community 
Development Project and an emergency and water relief component was added to the 
Supplemental Credit project.  
  A system such as the PSNP in Ethiopia could be a good example of how to build upon an existing 
program: the targeting, administrative and delivery system is in place and in the event of an 
emergency, it would be relatively simple to scale up. It would also provide an established and 
accountable mechanism for additional donors to contribute to, instead of the rather non-transparent 
‘black box’ of emergency appeals.  
 
Donor willingness to preempt rather than respond to crises 
Donors can be slow to respond to appeals for assistance prior to a humanitarian crisis, due to the 
political and media attention that they receive back at home. This means that warning signs can be 
ignored and preventable problems can escalate quickly (Maxwell et al, 2008). In some natural 
hazards, safety nets can circumvent this problem by providing underlying support to vulnerable 
households. 
  The Niger food crisis was anticipated from 2004 and the international community was approached 
that November and again in May 2005, with little assistance forthcoming. This allowed Niger to 
slip into crisis so that by July funding needs had risen exponentially.  The UN calculated that “it 
would have cost $1 a day to prevent malnutrition among children [in Niger] if the world had 
responded immediately. Now it will cost $80 to save a malnourished child’s life” (Alertnet quoted 
in Maxwell et al, 2008). 
Several other examples are referred to throughout the paper. See sections 5.7 and 5.9.   34
3.3  The economic context 
The case studies confirm that economic issues play a key role in making decisions about safety net 
design. They highlight at least three key economic factors that affect choices in deciding the type and 
the value of a safety net transfer. Care also needs to be taken that a ‘cash-first’ principle, which now 
guides many safety net transfer programs, does not remain exclusively cash when economic situations 
change and food becomes a preferred and more appropriate option. 
 
The size of the national economy does not prescribe the type, size or frequency of transfers…  
  Pakistan was one of the poorest countries affected by the Tsunami, but offered the most generous 
assistance, between 7%-48% of per capita GDP, whereas Sri Lanka provided 3% of per capita 
GDP and the Maldives from 1.4%-45%. In any case, they were all vastly higher than the (usually 
very low) regular benefit levels of the conventional safety nets these countries offered in non-
emergency situations. In non-disaster years, Pakistan provides cash transfers of $4-8 per household 
per month, Sri Lanka provides between $1-10 and the Maldives provides $40. Atypically, the Bait-
al-Mal food support program in Pakistan that could be rapidly mobilized following the earthquake 
only provides two payments annually. 
 
The vitality and configuration of local markets: Following an emergency, damaged infrastructure 
can block access to markets and delivery of supplies. In-kind transfers may well be the optimum 
response in situations where markets are not operating, whether due to supply constraints or 
inaccessibility from consumers, either physically or in entitlement terms. Conversely, providing cash 
transfers can also be an incentive to stimulate a sluggish supply side.  
  During the crisis in Malawi, the government tried to protect household food security by imposing a 
moratorium on the price of maize. Maize could be purchased from the national food stocks held by 
the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) at MK15/kg, but could not be sold onwards above 
MK17/kg. This aimed to undercut rising maize prices in the private sector. In fact, it acted as a 
disincentive to traders who until then had supplied grain to the remote areas where it was more 
expensive to deliver. According to the government, it also led to private traders purchasing maize 
from the NFRA at the fixed lower prices and reselling it at prices exceeding the fixed MK17/Kg.
18 
  Conversely, in Mozambique, after the floods in 2000, food price inflation was high due to scarcity 
of food. USAID’s response was to fund cash grants to 106,260 flood-affected rural families, with 
good results. Money was used diversely, but predominantly on basic consumption, on purchases 
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made locally and the impact evaluation concluded that the grants stimulated the local and national 
economy. 
 
Understanding labor market patterns and employment opportunities: The type of assistance will 
vary according to the needs of the people affected. Workfare schemes are applicable for those that 
have lost access to labor opportunities, in the short-term when livelihoods have been lost and they can 
also be valuable to aid the clearing up process, but this must be distinguished from other labor factors 
such as a decline in real wages. This may be applicable,  
  Workfare was used in the aftermath of the Tsunami. Without their boats and nets, fishermen and 
women had lost their means to fish, at the same time, there was a huge need to clear debris and 
rebuild houses, so workfare was a useful mechanism to roll out as needed, on a temporary basis.  
 
Fluctuating local economies can upset the real (and relative) value of transfers. Much of the 
literature focuses on recipients’ preference for cash on an assumption that it provides more choice. 
However, if markets and prices are volatile, cash transfers can provide less stability than in kind 
transfers and in times of inflation will have to be increased to maintain parity.  
  During the lifetime of Ethiopia’s PSNP, prices have consistently increased, but the level of cash 
transfer has not kept pace. Moreover, the level of the cash transfer was based on a provision of 
three kilograms of grain per day, whereas the food transfer provided the three kilograms, plus 
pulses and half a liter of oil monthly. This has caused a shift in recipient preferences and disturbed 
endeavors to move towards cash transfers. 
3.4  The social context 
Good understanding of the demographics and social composition of the affected population is 
crucial for targeting. A lack of understanding of the affected population - the proportion of elderly, 
disabled, women, children and orphans and the existing network of formal and informal safety nets - 
can lead to inappropriate design decisions. Natural disasters affect women and men differently. In 
Aceh, only one woman for every three men survived the Tsunami. Particular attention must be paid to 
the disabled, whose numbers tends to increase in the wake of a disaster, but who are still often 
overlooked (Vakis, 2006).  
  During the Bam (Iran) earthquake, a variety of safety nets were implemented to meet the range of 
needs among the affected population had access to a variety of safety nets: bereavement 
compensation (accessible by all), cash transfers to those on the Welfare Organization list (targeting 
the poor); and payments to orphans (targeting specific vulnerable groups). Such a comprehensive   36
approach was largely due to pre-existing channels: the local Welfare Organization had an effective 
registry system which began operating quickly after the disaster.  
 
Choosing who to prioritize for assistance: Target all the affected population, regardless of wealth, 
or to concentrate assistance on the poorest. As the following examples show, this need not necessarily 
be a trade-off – but it depends upon the objective of the program. 
  In Afghanistan, there was a repatriation effort in 1990/2 and 2002/3 to encourage displaced 
persons to return to Afghanistan. A cash grant was provided to cover the transport costs, regardless 
of wealth of the individual.  
  In Somalia an asset criterion was established to support those most at risk during drought. Only 
households with less than 60 goats and/or without water tanks and/or without access to social 
capital were included.  
  Oxfam’s response to the Tsunami in Sri Lanka targeted three different groups in helping to recover 
livelihoods: small business owners, farmers, people engaged in the lace-making and coir industry. 
However, in Sri Lanka, although exclusion errors were low, inclusion errors were high. According 
to the Government, approximately 25% of beneficiaries were ineligible (65% according to the 
World Bank). Over successive rounds, targeting was improved with a far smaller number 
qualifying, although phasing in such targeting approach was sensitive. 
 
Overcoming social dislocation and rebuilding social capital. In the rush to provide basic needs and 
build back shelter, attention to social capital can be marginalized and yet with a more integrated view 
of the short and long term, it is possible to help overcome the social dislocation which can result from 
conflict-related as well as other types of disasters  
  Although a case related to conflict, this example also illustrates the ability to and value of building 
social capital: Those that fled conflict in Kosovo between 1999 and 2004 were given financial and 
technical support to rebuild their own homes. Evaluations reported that the repairs and 
reconstruction were completed more rapidly than other projects, to a high standard and moreover, 
had helped consolidate social ties. Involvement in the task of the construction work itself, 
contributes to the “best possible results” as it provides a psychological boost to post-disaster 
mental health recovery (Kennedy et al, 2007).  
  A reliable safety net structure can build social capital and make it possible to avoid social 
breakdown in the aftermath of natural disaster. In Cuba which has strong welfare protection 
against disasters, “social cohesion tends to be reinforced rather than damaged by hurricanes.” 
Solidarity improves because of massive participation in the clearing up process. One local   37
government official remarked “We are educated to think of other people, and we think of 
everybody. This is what protects people…Solidarity is the key to all of this” (Oxfam, p40) 
 
Consulting the community is paramount. Several of the above examples have shown that those 
participating in the transfer program may have a number of reasons for preferring a type, level or 
delivery method for transfers..  
  During the Tsunami, Oxfam found that aid workers consulted the community but barely engaged 
them in program activities. Programs that are well-aligned with the long term priorities of the 
community reduces demands on their time, cultivates local ownership, capacity and sustainability. 
“If you want to know if a meal is tasty, you ask the diners, not the cook.” (Oxfam, 2008). 
  At the same time, these expectations have to be carefully managed In Aceh and Sri Lanka, 
community consultations gave rise to unrealistic expectations. Western style housing was 
demanded because it was viewed as more sophisticated, even though such houses were less suited 
to the local environmental and climatic hazards (Kennedy et al, 2007). 
3.5  Full information: data collection and early warning systems 
As mentioned in 3.1 above, safety net responses have failed because of misanalysis of the situation, 
which focused too narrowly on the sources of risk and vulnerability. At an operational level, a poor 
understanding of the characteristics of the situation can lead to inappropriate decisions in the design 
of the safety net. Good data can be hard to come by so consequently greater attention needs to be 
given to collecting data and utilizing information from early warning systems. The following 
examples illustrate some implementation problems and delays that could have been avoided had the 
groundwork for the safety nets been better prepared. Of course, over-preparation and over-
concentration on needs assessment can also lead to delays: inevitably, a balance between the two must 
be found. 
  During the southern African food crises from 2002 to 2005, food insecure households were 
initially identified based on social criteria such as orphans, elderly and chronically ill people. At a 
later date, following in-depth reviews, WFP and NGOs decided that asset-ownership was a more 
appropriate indicator of vulnerability and this became part of targeting criteria (WFP, 2006). 
  In Pakistan, earthquake resilience standards for re-building accommodation were re-set twice, to 
make better use of available materials. This caused delays and confusion in the recovery process. 
Housing reconstruction was extremely slow: of 236,673 houses under construction, only around 
7.6% had been completed by spring/summer 2007. Oxfam reported that by the second winter 
(December 2006), only seventeen percent had even begun to build permanent homes. By January   38
2007, 35,000 people were still residing in well-supplied official camps with an unidentified 
number in ‘spontaneous’ camps.  
  In Colombia, WFP initially assisted only those officially registered as internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) although these lists proved to be an inadequate for targeting the most vulnerable: many 
IDPs feared registering, or lacked information to register for assistance. Moreover, in some highly 
food-insecure areas such as Chocó in western Colombia, the resident populations were often in a 
condition as bad or worse than that of the IDPs, or in a condition that deteriorated rapidly when 
they took in IDPs. Following a joint WFP/IRC assessment findings community-based 
interventions, relying on the strong church network, were designed to benefit all those who 
required support. WFP conducted post-distribution monitoring to ensure that food-insecure 
families are being reached and that the targeting is perceived as fair.
19 
3.6  The policy arena and international institutional context 
The short term commitments of international donors jeopardize success of safety nets. The 
discussion has already emphasized that the recovery and rehabilitation process is a long term 
commitment for both government and donors. The World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group 
observed that the time needed to carry out disaster-related lending has been consistently 
underestimated. “The development community should engage with disaster-stricken borrowers earlier 
and stay engaged longer.” (IEG, 2007) After the initial humanitarian phase and once a disaster has left 
the public eye, pledges are frequently dropped and long term resources are not forthcoming, severely 
inhibiting the recovery process. This is particularly true in politically volatile situations. Indeed, the 
knowledge that funding may only be available for a short time gives an incentive for government 
departments and NGOs to access as much money as they can before it dries up, which could lead to 
higher inclusion errors and greater risks..If fears of this were assuaged and governments, 
implementers and recipients could feel secure that there was access to funding, it may reduce some of 
the moral hazard that hinders funding.  
 
The timing of procurement and funding procedures effects implementation. The release of funds is 
often delayed due to disbursement and contracting procedural rules. Safety nets need to be designed 
with specific plans as to how to supply resources in an emergency. A successful example of this was 
the World Bank’s response to Hurricane Mitch (through a social fund).  
  Following Hurricane Mitch in October 1998, the Honduran Social Fund simplified its project 
cycle. The required procedures were reduced from fifty to eight and procurement procedures were 
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simplified also. At the same time, safeguards could be maintained in order to ensure 
accountability and transparency. Within 100 days, 2,100 projects had been approved by the Fund, 
a total of $40 million. Within 14 months around 3,400 emergency subprojects had been financed, 
an implementation rate four times higher than the average before the Hurricane. (Grosh et al, 
2008). 
 
International response to natural hazards needs better coordination. Current international disaster 
risk strategies such as the Global Facility for Disaster Risk and Recovery (GFDRR) focus on a DRM 
framework and so concentrate on infrastructure and coordination activities. As social protection and 
safety nets become integrated into a broader understanding of disaster risk management, so could 
multi –donor initiatives be valuable in helping secure international commitment. 
 
Program implementers need to educate the political arena, where negative connotations with cash 
transfers still persist and limit the scope of safety net programs. While practitioners and academia 
seem convinced by a ‘cash-first’ principle for safety nets, policy-makers and appropriations offices 
tend to remain suspicious that cash may be ‘mis-spent’, particularly if put into the hands of men. 
Donors too, can still have difficulty with their reduced control over beneficiaries if they provide cash 
rather than in-kind transfers. In the past, donors often had a preference for distributing food, because 
it intuitively seemed more appropriate and particularly because they had ready access to excess food 
stocks. These reasons have sometimes superseded what would be most beneficial for the target group. 
In the recent climate of high food and fuel prices, food transfers may be decreasingly attractive to 
governments and donors, although with the current lack of liquidity, food-aid may again look 
preferable.   40
4  Ex ante preparedness  
Disaster Risk Management conventionally focuses on ex ante measures that are primarily 
infrastructural prevention mechanisms, such as construction regulations of infrastructures, such as 
dams. Social protection and safety nets on the other hand, are mechanisms employed both ex post, to 
help cope with the aftermath of a shock, but also ex ante, to improve households’ resilience to shocks, 
in addition to reducing poverty more generally.  
 
A two-pronged approach needs to be taken.  
(i) To provide safety nets which reduce poverty as well as build longer-term resilience to withstand 
the most frequent natural hazards. This impact on decreasing vulnerability to natural hazards is rarely 
considered in the literature or in programming. de Janvry et al. (2006a and 2006b) show that 
conditional cash transfer programs in Mexico, Nicaragua and Honduras have been effective in 
preventing the loss of child human capital (i.e. children being taken out of school) after households 
are hit by uninsured shocks. The provision of social welfare for poverty reduction/household asset 
building and protection against shocks ex ante, are not mutually exclusive. 
(ii) To strengthen existent systems that can roll out safety nets in response to emergencies. This is still 
not conventional in safety net design, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where provision of state-run 
safety nets is patchy. It results in reactive responses, which waste time and resources setting up 
emergency programs, rather than capitalizing on improving existing implementation chains, ready if 
the need occurs.  
 
Building political will for preventive (ex ante) safety nets is difficult and may even seem politically 
risky. As hazards continue to be measured in terms of disaster that have occurred, not been averted 
and as disasters are measured in the lives lost, not saved, there is limited conclusive proof of the 
effectiveness of safety nets when they have been instituted ex ante, to help people cope with natural 
hazards. Furthermore, using limited resources to finance preventive measures can have a lesser 
priority compared with the daunting task of reducing chronic poverty.  
 
However, there are ways to justify to policy makers that such investments are necessary.  
(i)  Reducing poverty and building resilience to natural hazards are complementary processes, 
particularly if policy makers come to understand natural hazards as embedded within the problem 
of poverty and as manageable, rather than exogenous, uncontrollable events.  
(ii) There are numerous examples that prevention is cheaper than cure (relief activities), in reducing 
the impact of disasters (IPS and Oxfam, 2006, IFRC, 2002, DFID, 2004).   41
(iii) Further attention to climate change and to erratic weather patterns validates at the very least, an 
assessment of whether putting an ex ante mechanism in place is justified.  The following table 
summarizes how preventive safety nets can be used with the hazard risk framework. 
 
Table 4.  Disaster risk and ex ante social safety nets 
Hazard Risk  Use of social safety net, ex ante 
Slow onset disasters  High use: on a continual basis to counteract poverty. Scale up 
when more are exposed to shock 
Medium risk events  As part of contingency planning, in conjunction with preventive 
measures 
Low-risk,  high  impact  events  Lower use: although may be part of a national contingency 
strategy. 
 
Two examples of ex ante mechanisms are Bangladesh’s National Disaster Management prevention 
strategy, and Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP). The effectiveness of both has been 
tested in recent years. The Bangladesh case includes a sequence of five rapid-onset hydro-
meteorological disasters, from the floods of 1998, to Cyclone Sidr in November 2007.  The Ethiopian 
case illustrates the benefits of an ex ante plan to mitigate the risk of a slow-onset event, when 
vulnerability and chronic poverty had become so protracted that the poor could no longer withstand 
even minor shocks. A chronology of events and description of these programs is provided in Annex 1. 
4.1  Flood and cyclone response in Bangladesh: the importance of an ex ante disaster 
risk response strategy 
The Bangladesh case illustrates the importance of how the policy and economic framework are a 
significant part of managing risk. The government had already made two critical longer-term policy 
changes which fortuitously helped in flood management. Firstly, as part of its production growth 
strategy, it encouraged the private sector thereby sustaining supply, stabilizing prices and maintaining 
households’ purchasing power. Secondly, it promoted the production of winter crops, which 
decreased dependence on flood-sensitive monsoon season crops.  Concurrently, it provides safety net 
support to affected households through two already established programs, Vulnerable Group Feeding 
(VGF) and Gratuitous Relief (GR). VGF provided assistance to chronically poor female households. 
GR is an ex ante arrangement for disaster response assistance originating like the Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) in the Indian Famine Code.  
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Despite huge floods in September 1998 and the loss of ten percent of annual food consumption, these 
safety nets combined with the longer-term changes in economic structure meant that recovery from 
the floods was relatively rapid. By April 1999, income for flood-affected households had increased 
45% on that of the previous December following the floods and a further 50% by the following 
November. The openness to private markets helped stabilize prices and maintain households’ 
purchasing power. Regression analysis indicates that the impacts of the food transfers combined with 
trade liberalization contributed between 64 and 133 kilocalories to each persons’ daily consumption. 
Without these changes in trade policy, it is estimated that targeted transfers would have had to be 3-5 
times higher to make the same calorific contribution (del Ninno, Dorosh and Smith, 2003; Dorosh, 
Ninno and Shahabuddin, 2004.).
20  
 
By 2007, Bangladesh had developed an integrated policy towards natural disaster, which began with 
the Cyclone Preparedness Program, effectively an alert and evacuation plan. When the Cyclone, hit 
the mainland in mid-November 2007, the National Disaster Management Strategy which was 
primarily intended as a national response to river floods, provided assistance. Management of the 
event was carefully prepared and authorities could tap into existing risk management plans. The Early 
Warning System (EWS) triggered the safety nets which began distributing cash, rice and house-
building grants, even before the main impact of the cyclone was felt. While results were by no means 
adequate – there were still a tragic number of deaths, cyclone shelters were of a sub-optimum 
standard, and NGOs concentrated even in the post-relief phase, on in-kind relief – a mass evacuation 
and re-accommodation of 4.5 million  citizens within five days
21 is a staggering achievement. In 
section 4.3 below, we outline some of the factors that made this possible. 
4.2  Scaling up safety nets in Ethiopia 
The second example is the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) in Ethiopia, which was established 
partly in recognition of the high number of chronically poor that face the increasing frequency of 
droughts which Ethiopia now experiences at approximately three yearly intervals (World Bank, 
2004).  This situation (or that of Malawi from 2002 onwards) is an example of the disagreement in 
classification between a slow-onset natural shock – which may be more politically acceptable - and 
what may be more accurately characterized as conditions of chronic vulnerability whereby the poor 
are unable to withstand any climatic variability. Despite the disagreement, the hazard is a trigger. 
                                                      
 
20 This did not avoid considerable socioeconomic disparities. While it was relatively easy for some flood-affected 
households to recover, for the poorest it was far more difficult. Household borrowing was extremely high and averaged 
146% of one month’s consumption for the 64% poorest of flood-affected households. 
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The PSNP targets two groups. Its primary target group is the chronically poor that need ongoing 
support to maintain consumption levels and prevent asset sales when faced with shocks. They are 
provided with food and/or cash to support the household and contribute to public works in order to 
build community assets. Many of these activities involve protecting and rehabilitating the 
environment so that the communities become less vulnerable to adverse weather. The second target is 
the transient poor. In addition, those that require assistance when faced with idiosyncratic or localized 
shocks are funded through a contingency of 20% of program resources.  
 
To cope with larger scale, covariate shocks, there is a second component of $25 million to scale up 
the program to reach additional people. This is triggered by an early warning system of weather-
related indices (Box 1). These aspects combined, makes Ethiopia better placed to withstand shocks. 
The process is still in transition, but building a new government supply chain of cash to the rural areas 
has marked a shift from the previous ad hoc emergency appeal system to a more predictable and 
established system, as well as from food only towards cash-based transfers.  
 
Box 1.  Weather-based risk financing under the PSNP 
“The index proposed for Component II [the drought-risk financing component] is an upgraded version 
of the Ethiopia Drought Index (EDI) developed and piloted in Ethiopia in 2005 to trigger insurance 
payouts in the event of contractually specified shortfalls in precipitation. The EDI was based on rainfall 
data taken form 26 of the best weather stations distribute throughout the agricultural areas of Ethiopia. 
The EDI was designed to proxy total drought-related agricultural livelihood losses (in US$) 
experienced by the ‘at-risk’ population living in areas that could be associated with these 26 weather 
stations in sever and catastrophic drought years. The historical EDI shows an 8- percent correlation 
with the total number of historical food aid beneficiaries from 1994 to 2004, but more critically it picks 
up the well documented catastrophic drought events that have occurred in the past 5 years, specifically 
1965, 1984 and 2002. For the APL II period, the EDI for agricultural areas will be improved with 
localized agro-meteorological coefficients, more weather stations and satellite-based rainfall estimates 
which will allow regional index triggers to be established.” 
Source: PSNP Project Appraisal Document, paragraph 238, pp58-59, 2006 
  
The system was seriously tested during 2008’s failed rains, food shortages and unexpected food price 
inflation. In May 2008, with the failure of the small rains and the upward trend in food prices, 
UNOCHA announced a food deficit for 3.44 million Ethiopians, a number that increased to 8.6 
million, in subsequent UN assessments. Rather than providing an example of an adequate response, 
the experience in 2008 raises further questions as to how to improve assistance in ‘drought’ years.   44
Without PSNP support, the situation would have been even more critical.  The alert was first raised in 
November 2007, but not until June 2008 was the matter acknowledged and seriously discussed 
between donors and government. What has accounted for such a slow response?  The problems were 
both practical and political and are identified below in section 4.3. 
4.3  Implementing social safety nets ex ante: Lessons learned  
Bangladesh and Ethiopia contribute to the substantial body of evidence, to suggest that safety nets can 
make a valuable contribution to prevent disaster. Safety nets need to be incorporated as part of a 
country’s disaster management plan, rather than in reaction to an event. Bangladesh is an example of 
an administration that was prepared for Cyclone Sidr. Conversely, in Malawi, Niger and during the 
Tsunami, their insufficient early warning systems were one of the contributing factors to the disasters.  
 
Until now, risk reduction strategies have tended to be imposed in response to a major disaster, rather 
than protect the vulnerable from an impending shock. For example the risk reduction components of 
Malawi’s Social Action Fund (MASAF) arose in response to the drought of 2004/5, and Ethiopia’s 
PSNP came about after years of inadequate emergency response to repeated food crises due to 
inclement weather and exacerbating vulnerability. In Malawi, MASAF has been integrated into the 
government’s overall disaster response, a step which Ethiopia has yet to take.  In Niger, donors have 
made attempts to improve the early warning monitoring system and developed new response 
mechanism policies. 
 
In summary, the adequacy of an ex ante response depends upon: a) prepared prevention and 
response plans; b) effective early warning systems; and c) the capacity to implement the plans. 
A number of important lessons about ex ante decision-making can be drawn from these two examples 
and a summary of the issues to consider for when incorporating existing safety nets into emergency 
plans is summarized in the Annex. 
1.  A national emergency plan is necessary to respond to shocks anywhere in the country. 
While the PSNP is an ongoing program with the means to scale up during small shocks 
and a risk-mitigation component to scale up during larger emergencies in select areas, 
unlike in Bangladesh, Ethiopia has nothing that operates at a fully national level. Instead, 
the government is still reliant on emergency appeals as a last resort. National emergency 
plans need to lay out clear lines of responsibility and be able to draw upon existing 
systems of targeting, delivery and reporting. The examples highlight the need for the   45
support and cooperation of all stakeholders to help implement a disaster management 
plan, including the private sector, construction companies and local administration 
2.  Establishing effective safety nets takes time. In the two examples, there was a long term 
commitment to institute safety nets that could mitigate the impact of shocks. In the 
Bangladesh case, this was supported by a number of years of policy reform. Both recent 
crises illustrates that the impact of safety nets can be effective, as long as the foundations 
are well-laid. Such commitment often arises as a response to crises. 
3.  Early warning systems must be responsive to various types of shocks and different 
levels of vulnerability. Ethiopia’s current early warning system (EWS) is a weather-based 
index which proved to be inadequate in 2007/8. Like Malawi in 2001, the EWS in 
Ethiopia failed to predict the food crisis in time because the indicators were not sensitive 
enough to the changing levels of vulnerability in both countries. Developing a more 
appropriate EWS, beyond the standard harvest and weather indicators to include poverty, 
vulnerability and population indicators has been more difficult, although they are coming 
to the fore, and Malawi’s Vulnerability Assessment Committee uses a wider set of 
economic, agricultural and weather-related indicators to measure food needs. 
Problematically the PSNP EWS is based solely on weather-related indices (Box 1), 
whereas as the food and price events of 2008 exemplified, people are vulnerable to 
numerous types of shock. If the PSNP is going to continue to aim to meet the 
consumption needs of the chronically and transitorily food insecure, then a risk 
management strategy based on one group of shocks is clearly inadequate. Different 
groups will have varying response to a type and level of shock and early warning systems 
must be sensitive to this and be able to disperse information effectively to different 
vulnerable groups (Oxfam, 2006). In Niger, despite efforts and available climatic, 
production, and food security data, the national, regional and international early warning 
systems were not able to predict in an accurate and timely manner the magnitude, scope 
and location of the drought in 2005 which determined the devastating food crisis. While 
some institutions warned of a food crisis in drought-affected regions as early as 
December 2004, these predictions were based primarily on data concerning drought and 
production shocks.  In addition, once the most vulnerable regions were identified in May 
2005, this process was not without problems (Aker and del Ninno 2008).    
4.  The EWS must trigger a clear course of action. Bangladesh’s emergency response came 
into action as soon as the storm warning for the cyclone was issued and resources were 
already available without a need to launch an appeal. Potential victims already started 
receiving support even prior to the event. By contrast, in Ethiopia the current crisis only   46
began to be addressed in June 2008 instead of pre-empting the crisis when it was first 
identified in late 2007. Ethiopia’s new EWS should help overcome this problem. An 
effective EWS must trigger a disaster management strategy including scaling up safety 
nets and activating other mitigating mechanisms. 
5.  Ensure that procedures can be modified and simplified in the event of a crisis. To speed 
up response times, both donor and implementing agents need to find shortcuts in 
processing and funding and to relax or simplify targeting and payment procedures.   
Ethiopia’s disaster prevention strategy reduces procurement and contracting regulations 
in order to have food transported rapidly to affected areas. This was employed, under the 
PSNP during the food crisis in mid-2008. The World Bank enabled rapid disbursements 
under the Honduran Social Fund, following Hurricane Mitch (Grosh et al, 2008).  
6.  Safety nets must be scalable, to cope with future shocks. In recognition of this, the PSNP 
was re-designed to be scalable, under a $25 million risk-financing plan which can 
disburse rapidly when triggered by a weather-related early warning system. If it had been 
operational in 2008, it could have avoided the delay in acknowledging that there was a 
crisis situation. It is expected to be up and running in time to estimate effectiveness of the 
first rains in 2009. In terms of human capacity, under MASAF, the infrastructure is built 
at community (rather than national) level therefore there is little need for extra personnel 
when a shock occurs. 
7.  Establish reliable funding sources. In Ethiopia there is no secure, planned mode of 
financing that can be accessed outside of PSNP resources to cover people suffering from 
shocks and still retains the Emergency Appeal as a last resort. Yet this process is less 
reliable, transparent, or accountable and more vulnerable to the whims of donors, than the 
structured PSNP system - which has helped build trust between government and donors 
and between government and its citizens. A multilateral mechanism like the Global 
Facility for Disaster Risk and Recovery (GFDRR), which predominantly focuses on 
infrastructure and coordination projects, might be worth exploring for safety net and 
social protection responses to natural hazards. 
8.  Shocks affect different socioeconomic and livelihood groups differently. There is a need 
to better understand these nuances in order to adapt programs to better meet the variations 
in need of different groups of people. 
9.  Monitoring and regularly updating information is vital. The first priority of the PSNP is 
to protect those registered on its program within sub-regions identified as food insecure. 
Yet the list of food insecure districts has not been revised in a number of years, and there   47
are consistent reports of chronic food insecurity in new areas. This jeopardizes the ability 
to either accurately plan or achieve the goals of the program. 
10. Maintaining food reserves for emergency needs. Reminiscent of Malawi in 2002, the 
Ethiopian government food reserves were drained and not replenished.  In 2008 a year 
when double the food resources were sought compared with a non-drought year, this 
forced the government to purchase on higher-priced international markets, which 
enormously delayed the supply of emergency food.  
11. Confidence in the SSN response assessments: In Bangladesh in 2007 donors and NGOs 
were unwilling to support the national SSN response.  Instead many did their own 
assessments and organized parallel ‘partial’ response programs creating a complex 
confusing post-cyclone relief and rehabilitation effort.  This was difficult to coordinate 
and made public financial management of funding more difficult. 
12. Protective safety nets complement a preventive approach: Construction Standards, 
regulations and policy structure. Safety nets operate best in tandem with other 
complementary activities and policies. Questions need to be asked as to what can be done 
to both infrastructure and the policy environment to help safeguard against disasters. The 
success of Bangladesh’s safety net was helped by the previous policy reforms of 
privatization and boosting non-monsoon crops, to ensure food supply and avoid price 
hikes when people were most susceptible. The importance of standards and regulations 
was tragically exposed during the Chinese earthquake in May 2008, when the collapse of 
so many schools was found to be due to sub-par construction. Even before the 
earthquake, it was observed that this was a country with “outstanding building codes, 
[yet] the constructions, even new ones, are still often substandard.” (Demeter, 2007, 5),  
One of the criticisms leveled at the reconstruction work following the floods in southern 
England in 2007, is that houses have been rebuilt to poor standards that will not be able to 
withstand similar calamities in the future. Standards can also be used to protect the 
natural environment: impeding land degradation, overgrazing and deforestation, which 
can exacerbate the impact of a natural calamity. Ex ante public works safety nets can help 
this. 
13. Awareness of where internal political dimensions may impede progress.  There is a 
political tussle for resources, as government departments want to protect their resources 
and territory. This needs to be anticipated in program design and areas of responsibility 
and accountability need to be clearly defined. In Ethiopia it hindered delivery of transfers, 
even in the emergency situation as departments traditionally responsible for responding to 
emergencies were answerable to the department managing the PSNP, which was seen as a   48
general, ‘non-crisis’ food security program.  Poorly planned safety nets can lead to 
additional risks for participants. It is necessary to consider and mitigate other issues that 
may arise as a consequence of participating in a safety net. For example, it can lead to an 
increase in private debt or in school dropout rates.   49
5  Design and implementation of Safety Net Programs 
This section explores ways of operationalizing the observations in the previous chapter. Good safety 
net design does not automatically translate into high quality implementation. From inclusive targeting 
practices to ensuring that cash payments are provided in easily dividable denominations, the 
effectiveness of a safety net is in the capacity to deliver and the implementation detail. 
 
In their recent book, Grosh et al (2008) outline the hallmarks of a good safety net program. It should 
be: appropriate and well –balanced with the country’s other policies; coverage should be adequate 
to include those most in need; it should be fair and equitable; it should maximize the benefit to the 
target group by being cost-effective; if it is incentive compatible, it will encourage positive changes 
in household behavior; it should be fiscally and politically sustainable; and dynamic, in that it 
evolves over time. These are useful guiding principles although in designing short run safety nets in 
an emergency, some of these characteristics may be relaxed (Grosh et al, 2008). Numerous processes 
have to be considered in the design of a safety net. Initially, this involves identifying the sources of 
informants and the stakeholders (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4.  Stakeholders and processes involved in the design of a safety net 
 
Source: Arribas-Baños, Maria, and Cesar Baldeón. 2007.  
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Recalling the SRM framework, safety nets can be used in different ways depending upon the type of 
shock and while they may be combined in numerous permutations, the core structure of the design is 
constant. In Section 3, we defined six contextual areas to determine the parameters of a safety net. 
Each of these impacts at least one feature in designing a safety net, this is summarized in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 Summary of safety net context and design issues  
Contextual Issue  Safety net design feature 
1.  Defining the narrative & determining the type 
of natural event (slow/rapid onset) 
Framing objectives and goals; deciding transfer type; 
duration of assistance 
2.  Defining the narrative & knowledge of the 
demographics 
Type of transfer, targeting 
3. Geographic & demographic spread of event  Targeting 
4. Socio/politico/economic circumstances  Assistance, targeting, delivery 
5. Infrastructure & human capacity  Implementation & delivery 
6. Resource availability & international context  Size, type & duration  
 
Of course, the above factors are not discrete. In practice, designing safety nets will involve balancing 
the interests of three sets of stakeholders: the target group; government, including its varying 
institutions; and donors and/or other external bodies. In decentralized contexts this can give rise to a 
principal-agent problem, where the central government is the main coordinator of the program, with 
specific ideas about how to administrate it, without the authority to regulate the main implementers of 
the program, at sub-national level (Grosh et al, 2008). This problem is starkly visible in the case of 
Ethiopia’s PSNP (section 3.2).   
 
The primary focus should be to capitalize on existing effective mechanisms as much as possible, 
adapting them to the situation as necessary and to consider how safety net activities will need to 
transition from the short to long term. It will require contingency plans to scale-up existing 
mechanisms in the event of disaster and plans to deal with the ways that existing mechanisms might 
become disrupted. Many of the issues discussed here apply to safety nets in general and so will be 
familiar but are equally important to consider in designing safety nets for emergencies. 
 
Ultimately, the success of a safety net program is in the implementation.  If the transfers are delayed, 
if it is unsafe or costs too much for a recipient to collect, if there is insufficient recording of the 
distribution, or registering for the transfer itself has too many limitations (possible problems are 
requiring photos, birth date identification, etc.), then regardless of the appropriateness of the program, 
the objectives will not be met.    51
The main design features discussed in this chapter as outlined above are program selection, targeting, 
implementation/delivery and monitoring and evaluation.  This section sets down the guiding 
principles for decision-making in each of these areas which need to be considered in conjunction with 
the contextual issues discussed in section 3. It does not attempt to be a comprehensive toolkit – a 
number of which exist already
22, but it does aim to approach the design from a contextual perspective 
adopted in the previous chapter.  Each section concludes with a checklist of the questions that need to 
be asked and points to consider.   
5.1  Selecting the implementing agent 
As one of the tools the state can employ to protect its citizens as part of a social risk management 
strategy, this section concentrates on government implemented safety nets, although in reality they 
may be hybrids, with aid agencies playing an implementing and some activities being contracted out 
to third parties that can handle the workload more deftly (see Subbarao et al 1997 on the institutional 
framework and implementing agencies in public works programs).  Other actors that can implement 
safety net programs include civil society, local and international non-governmental organizations, 
multi-national financial institutions, the United Nations and other donors. Within government, safety 
nets are typically, housed within ministries or departments of welfare. In some cases they are 
accommodated within the agricultural ministry (the United States’ Food Stamp Program) or ministries 
of finance (in SADC countries, this is more usually reserved for employment-related transfers or even 
pensions).  While there is no norm for where a government safety net should be housed, the following 
provides some general guidelines on how to make the decision and to manage it. 
  Awareness of government commitment to the program at all levels. Proximity to the treasury 
can be indicative of the importance the government attaches to a program and be a better guarantee 
that it will remain funded.  Buy-in is needed not just at the highest level, but it may be necessary to 
strengthen the commitment of the implementing department and down to the lowest level 
administering the program.  
  Assess the adequacy of human  resources to manage the quantity of work and to provide 
monitoring and quality control and capitalize on the skills of different departments. 
  Coordination between departments is paramount, even though competition for resources and 
for recognition can make these relationships difficult. 
                                                      
 
22 Among others see, on institutional home for safety nets: Mathauer (2004) Institutional analysis toolkit for safety net 
interventions. Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 418, August (Washington, D.C.: World Bank); on targeting: WFP 
(2006) Targeting in emergencies. Policy Issues Agenda item 5. WFP/EB.1/2006/5￿A. First regular session of the Executive 
Board, 20-23 February, 2006. Rome. (Rome: WFP); and on monitoring and evaluation: Oxfam GB (2007) The Good 
Enough Guide: Impact measurement and accountability in emergencies. February (Oxford: Oxfam GB); A guide to 
programming in emergencies: Care International Emergency Toolkit http://careemergencytoolkit.org/home/   52
  Consider where and how the community can contribute to knowledge and management of the 
safety net at the local level. Although this will require monitoring, it can ease some of the pressure 
on the government, tailor the program to local needs as well as transfer responsibility into the 
hands of the community. There is wide scope for drawing on the community. Most usually they 
contribute in targeting, appeals and local-level planning. Further involvement could be in aspects 
of transfer distribution, program design and monitoring activities. 
  There is a tenuous equilibrium in balancing the different and at times conflicting interests of 
stakeholders. Tacit awareness of the tensions between government departments, central and local 
administration, between the government and communities and government with donor/technical 
assistance is critical in assigning functions and responsibilities when designing the program.   
  The implementing agent of a safety net must have the capacity to deliver the program, the political 
standing within government and good relations with other stakeholders. This requires an 
institutional analysis prior to safety net design, with an ongoing training program for 
implementers.  To give a sense of frequency, in Somalia, implementing organizations were 
required to attend a 2-3 day training every 6-7 weeks, to discuss problems and share experiences 
(Majiid, 2007). 
5.2  Choosing the type of instrument  
There are three options as to the type of transfer that can be given. Transfers may be in cash, or in 
kind (including food), (or a combination of both), or via a voucher system. As previously discussed, 
determining the type of safety net will depend upon the context: the types of need; the appropriateness 
of the desired safety net, given the prevailing context, and any pre-existing safety nets. In addition, 
designers may decide to impose conditionality on the transfer – either by enrolling able-bodied adults 
to participate in public works, or by attaching a health or education condition to receiving the transfer.  
 
5.2.1  Cash, in-kind or vouchers? 
This section outlines some of the major arguments for and against the three different types of transfer, 
mainly as they relate to natural disasters and the major contextual issues outlined above: it is not 
meant to be a comprehensive list of the pros and cons of different transfers which have been well 
documented elsewhere, as well as in toolkits for implementation
23.  
 
                                                      
 
23 Analysis: Bailey and Savage, 2008; Harvey 2007, 2005; Peppiatt et al, 2001. Toolkits: SCUK/Food Economy Group 
2008, ICRC, 2007, Oxfam 2006, WFP 2006, CRS 2004, Mercy Corps 2006.   53
In general, a cash-first principle is becoming increasingly commonplace and a growing evaluative 
literature advocates the use of cash rather than in-kind transfers, but for emergencies arguably a cash-
first approach is still underutilized (Harvey, 2005 and 2007). Partly this is due to a lack of thorough 
understanding about the impacts of transfers on the local economy and livelihoods, leading to 
insufficient attention to market assessments during emergencies (World Vision, 2008), hence transfers 
in-kind can seem a safer option. Yet there is evidence, most recently from Somalia and Swaziland, of 
the positive impact that cash can have in emergencies.
24 Even during conflict in Somalia, cash could 
be delivered and distributed safely and was less prone to diversion than food transfers. This gives 
weight to the argument that cash transfers need to be mainstreamed in disaster preparedness 
systems (Devereux and De Jere, 2008). Several NGOs are currently developing a market-mapping 
tool to overcome this problem.
 25 As cash has come back into vogue, the literature has tended to 
become polarized, defending cash and kind transfers as a discrete ‘either/or’ decision. Yet 
expectations should be modest as to what cash transfers can achieve. (Bailey, 2008) and a successful 
program can only really work in conjunction with other programs. A fluid system which either 
provides a mixed package of cash and in-kind transfers, or that can respond to changes in need during 
the program may be more suitable. Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence from safety net 
programs to suggest that beneficiaries prefer this hybrid approach (Devereux and Jere, 2008; Pelham, 
2007; Peppiatt, 2001). 
 
In industrialized high-income countries, cash has an extensive history in social welfare payments as 
well as in emergency response, both as insurance and as relief. In developing countries, providing 
cash transfers may take time and determination to put in place, but this is no reason for not 
persisting. As Ethiopia, which practiced food distribution since the 1970s, has done. Despite teething 
difficulties and severe delays in providing cash transfers, within several years, under the PSNP, cash 
distributions were out-performing food transfers in both delivery speed, and timeliness. This need for 
substantial preparation strengthens the argument for providing and planning safety nets, ex ante, to 
protect against natural disasters.  
 
Ultimately the choice for type/types of transfer will require triangulating recipients’ preferences, the 
economic appropriateness and the practical reality of implementing a particular transfer. Whatever the 
transfer type, increasingly there is a call for transfers to be complemented with nutritional 
supplements for children. 
                                                      
 
24 See Majiid 2007, on Somalia and Devereux and De Jere, 2008 on Swaziland 
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Economic issues 
In order to decide the appropriate transfer, ICRC guidelines ask three main questions about the local 
economy: (i) Are markets functioning or likely to recover quickly? (ii) Will people be able to buy 
what they need locally at reasonable prices? (iii) Is there a risk of inflation and could cash transfers 
cause inflation? (World Vision, 2008). Of course, these questions must be asked both of program 
participants, as well as those outside the target group. The advantages of cash transfers are largely due 
to the potential for positive externalities with cash rather than in-kind transfers, all things being 
equal. On the negative side, cash is particularly susceptible to changes in the market and some 
program administrators have less experience with cash over other transfers, which can be difficult if 
being administered in haste, during an emergency.  
  Benefits to the local economy:  Both cash and vouchers can help stimulate local markets, whereas 
in kind transfers involve more interference in markets - although this can be advantageous in the 
short term, if there is poor supply in the markets. Vouchers can also help stimulate local markets, 
as long as enough sellers can register to accept vouchers. Vouchers can be somewhat less 
interfering as they let the market take responsibility for distribution, although there must be 
confidence that there is sufficient supply. Moreover, vouchers are typically used to purchase seeds, 
which in a post-disaster situation can be particularly useful as it can aid in linking farmers with the 
commercial sector and stimulating the re-emergence of a seed market, particularly where it has 
weakened after a crisis. Imported in-kind transfers can negatively affect producers by depressing 
local/national prices of the good, although local purchase can help mitigate this. They can 
“undermine private traders, market recovery and local producer incentives” (World Bank, 2007).  
  Transfers in times of inflation prices, or cash or commodity scarcity. Vouchers and in kind 
transfers are useful when there is a lack of cash in circulation or a lack of supply to local markets. 
In times of inflation, a cash transfer will rapidly devalue . This was the case in Ethiopia where 
PSNP cash recipients saw their purchasing power more than halve between February and July 
2008 (Save the Children, 2008). However, food and in-kind transfers are more likely to retain an 
intrinsic value – hence Save the Children have found that irrespective of price, PSNP participants 
do not trust that cash can meet their needs (Save the Children UK, 2008). Vouchers can also be 
useful in times of rapid inflation, as long as they are specified in terms of ration quantities rather 
than as a cash value. While transfers in kind are less affected by inflation for the recipient, the 
provider is still susceptible to the price of the transfer increases. During the food crisis, WFP 
experienced a 55% increase in the cost of food purchases between June 2007 and late February 
2008, followed by a further 20% increase in costs in the first half of March (WFP, 2008). The   55
more the market bears these costs, the lower should be the expenditure for the implementing 
agency.
26 
  Transfers can lead to price fluctuation on local markets. A large cash injection can cause price 
inflation - which could be particularly harmful for non-recipients, although this has not generally 
been observed in reality. In northern Somalia, cash recipients in a program run by Horn Relief, 
gave their transfers to local shopkeepers to open lines of credit, so that there was no sudden 
increase of cash in the local economy. Inflation can also be guarded against by ‘tweaking’ the 
amount and frequency of the cash transfer. Conversely, in-kind transfers can cause rapid price 
deflation. This has negative impacts on local producers/sellers and would offset the benefits of the 
program. Vouchers can help mitigate the problem of deflation, but they can be exploited by traders 
who provide only smaller quantity or inferior value goods. One way to overcome the problem of 
price fluctuation is to combine transfers. Malawi’s MASAF combined a cash wage for 
participation in public works programs, with a greater value grant in vouchers, for the purchase of 
agricultural inputs. 
Questions about the target group 
In general, participants’ preferences are most likely to be determined by economic factors. But they 
may not have full market information and will also be influenced by other non-market decisions, such 
as the ease of collecting a particular transfer, household composition, etc. 
   Flexibility for consumers: In normal circumstances where markets are functioning and well-
stocked, cash provides unsurpassed choice and flexibility to recipients whereas transfers in kind 
can be utilized in fewer ways and are therefore more rigid. Food has a more direct impact on 
consumption, whereas cash has a more direct impact on asset accumulation (SCUK, 2008). 
  Cash can maximize household choice, because it is more fungible than other transfers. Therefore 
cash allows the household to decide how best to allocate their money and meet other urgent needs, 
although consequently it can be more difficult to be confident of meeting the program objective. In 
kind transfers do not necessarily assuage these concerns For example households may still ration 
their consumption and sell food transfers in exchange for other preferred goods. Yet both in-kind 
transfers and vouchers (which usually stipulate more precisely what may be purchased), can be 
more specifically directed at the objective of the safety net transfer, (such as nutritional and 
consumption objectives). Therefore it is important to balance providing the right type of good to 
meet program objectives with what goods are desired by recipients. 
                                                      
 
26 This was the case in Cambodia, in 2003. Cash grants alternative to a transport and food aid package were provided to 
encourage families to return from refugee camps in Thailand. This cash grant reduced costs for UNHCR, as they did not 
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  Cash is seen as less paternalistic and more empowering as decision-making power is transferred 
to households, rather than retained with the donors/program implementers. This benefit may be 
even more pronounced if it is disadvantaged groups, such as women and the elderly that receive 
the cash directly. Swaziland is just one example where women have been found to benefit from 
cash transfers (Devereux and de Jere, 2008). Vouchers can enable program providers to keep 
control over the program in a slightly more hands-off fashion than with in-kind transfers and so 
can provide a little more independence to recipients.  
  Consulting beneficiaries’ preferences Recipient have justified reasons for preferring particular 
transfers, affected by travel costs, safety, time costs etc., hence the imperative of asking recipients 
directly about the preferences, and to frequently review this for longer term programs. Nor can 
preferences be accepted at face value as recipients may request the type of transfer they believe 
they are most likely to receive.  This exemplifies Peppiatt’s argument that communities are more 
than capable of “determining their best needs and interests. But they rarely have the economic 
power to do so.” (Peppiatt, 2001). It may require building trust around cash: Save UK observed 
that “there was a general lack of trust by PSNP participants in the ability of cash to meet their 
needs” after they saw their purchasing power decrease by more than 50% between January and 
June 2008 (SCUK, 2008, 36). Alternatively, food may be a better option, if this confidence will 
enable them to take risks and opportunities to improve their livelihoods. 
Implementation and resource issues 
  Efficiency in distribution: Cash should be more efficient to distribute than bulky in-kind 
transfers, if the administrative capacity exists to do so.  For a temporary program with a well 
established in kind transfer distribution system, this may not be true.. This might be appropriate in 
a short term, emergency situation, but is not a justified argument for planning longer-term safety 
nets. Vouchers require more planning:  registering shop owners, establishing seed fairs and 
agreements with traders. This can bring additional administration costs for some stakeholders such 
as shop owners, although it may also bring additional custom.  
  Discrimination, political manipulation, fraud and diversion. Vouchers, cash and food transfers 
have different corruption risks which require different preventive mechanisms. With voucher 
schemes, care must be taken that the registration process for businesses to accept vouchers is fair 
to maintain competition.  
  It has not been proved that cash is more prone to adverse effects and moral hazard, because it is 
usually believed to be more desirable, compared with other types of transfer. Adverse effects 
became problematic after the Tsunami where there were cases of families wrecking their houses 
entirely in order to benefit from full compensation for destroyed houses. In such circumstances 
where there is a need to rebuild or replenish substantial assets, in kind assistance rather than large   57
amounts of cash, may limit adverse effects.  But such problems have only been reported 
anecdotally after many disasters. 
  The ‘fungibility’ of cash means it is often believed to be more susceptible to corruption by 
administrators and distributors – although this problem is by no means avoided with in kind 
transfers or vouchers which are also susceptible to corruption and diversion in the supply chain. 
There is no evidence that there have been more cases of large scale corruption with cash compared 
with other types of transfer (World Bank, 2007). The opportunities for fraud and corruption with 
cash transfers equally hold with food transfers (Peppiatt, 2001). It can be transported more 
discreetly than bulky food transfers and the distribution of cash is more transparent than vouchers, 
which when exchanged can be diluted with lesser value goods. The Malawi case showed that 
diverted food transfers are not necessarily detrimental, as it ended up in the local markets and 
helped stimulate the markets.  
  Standards, regulations and the environment. Two requirements that cash transfers should meet 
to ensure that the environment is not negatively impacted for safeguarding the local area against 
future natural disasters, are (i) the transfer should not pose an additional risk to the environment. 
E.g. Improving shelters by providing wood in-kind means it can be sourced from environmentally 
sustainable sources; and (ii) the provision of a particular transfer should not lower the standards of 
safety or quality. For example, earthquake-proof building standards can be enforced if the agency 
provides the materials and sub-contracts the work (adapted from Adams, 2005). 
  Cost effectiveness, donor and/or government preferences. Harvey (2007) warns that surpluses 
in donor countries can influence the choice of transfer, rather than the needs and demands of 
recipients. A recent WFP market study to look at ways to re-energize the trading sector in Aceh, 
did not even consider market-based alternatives and hence the provision of food continued for a 
further year, despite the strength of local markets. (Adams, 2005). More sympathetically, it is 
donors/government financers of transfers who often have to foot the cost of deliveries. In Ethiopia, 
food prices had increased so much that, in order to maintain coverage, it was cheaper to provide a 
full food basket, than the cash equivalent.
27 For donors, deciding the type of transfer is a more 
basic choice about minimizing costs. For this reason, it is even more important to keep in touch 
with beneficiaries’ preferences, which can easily become sidelined. 
                                                      
 
27 The cost of providing food to PSNP participants increased 34% between 2002 and late 2008. The cost of providing 
sufficient cash to equal the food transfers had increased 298%.Save the Children (2008). Note that prices were not being 
compared across the same woredas regarding cash delivery costs.   58
5.2.2  Public works/workfare and other conditional transfers 
The primary purpose of public works schemes is to provide short-term employment opportunities in 
circumstances where there are few. 
 Ex ante public works programs can help prevent the impacts of a natural disaster through 
building skills and community assets. Ethiopia’s PSNP, employs around six million people in 
workfare activities predominantly in environmental rehabilitation, reversing the severe land 
degradation, which renders Ethiopia more vulnerable during the heavy rainfall season and the onset 
of drought. In Malawi, MASAF introduced a public works component as a risk reduction strategy in 
reaction to the 2004/5 drought. In one area, Bua-Dwangwa, the local authority also provided 
training in crop and irrigation management, savings and investments, cooperatives and group 
dynamics. This led to local savings and investment groups run by the farmers and the creation of 
cooperatives, which are now producing commercial crops.  
 Ex post workfare can provide unskilled manual employment for affected households that have 
lost access to labor opportunities, in the longer term. India and Bangladesh have a long history 
of public workfare and operate continuing cash and/or food-for-work programs that can respond to 
disasters. These countries have a number of safety net mechanisms prepared in the event of a 
disaster. Bangladesh’ Vulnerable Group Development, Vulnerable Group Feeding, Food-for-Work, 
Test Relief and Gratuitous Relief are well-established programs that can be expanded and 
contracted as required (See Heltberg 2007; Heltberg and Lund 2009). 
  Ex post public works may be particularly useful in a post-disaster clearing-up process to help 
restore infrastructure and repair/rebuild houses (as after the Tsunami) and can be an interim 
measure to provide employment to those that had lost their livelihoods, such as fishing, until these 
are restored.  
 Public works must not distract from other livelihood opportunities. Workfare may be alright in 
the immediate aftermath, if there are few labor opportunities but can be inappropriate in the post-
relief context, when demands on labor are often high. The focus must remain on the value of the 
public works for the community and participants. 
 Vulnerable groups must continue to receive direct support. Attention must be paid to those 
without labor to participate in public works (the elderly, the disabled, the sick and pregnant/nursing 
women and children) and labor-poor households to ensure they receive unconditional or other 
support. In the PSNP, this is estimated to be 20 percent of participants. Even if these groups cannot 
undertake labor-intensive public works, program designers can still think creatively about other 
community activities they can participate in, such as running a crèche or assisting with distributions.   59
Conditional transfers that are tied to health and education projects require substantial set up time 
and investment in these services, and so are more applicable to long term development plans rather 
than the short-to-long term time horizon covered here. They would most likely be used coincidentally 
for a natural disaster response, if such programs are already in place. There is evidence showing that  
beneficiaries of conditional cash transfer programs in Central America have been able to protect their 
child human capital from being used as a risk coping strategy after a shock, as opposed to a large 
number of households not covered by the CCT who responded taking children out of school (de 
Janvry et al. 2006a and 2006b). In Pakistan, cash was provided on the condition that IDPs returned to 
their villages and could be used as a short to medium-term measure.  
 
Other programs such as fee waivers and subsidies could also be considered.  Fee waivers could be 
used to encourage uptake of health and sustain school attendance, or temporary suspension of taxes, 
for example on livestock in pastoral areas – an alternative which is infrequently considered. Subsidies 
can be easy to implement, but are vulnerable to political manipulation and can suffer from targeting 
problems – both inclusion, and exclusion errors. 
5.3  Especially vulnerable groups and the community 
Protecting and rebuilding livelihoods requires special attention to the most vulnerable groups at all 
levels of design, implementation, appeals and monitoring. These groups include the disabled, sick, 
elderly, orphans and other vulnerable children and women headed households. Particularly after a 
severe shock in particular, it may include psychologically traumatized people.  
 
Community work alternatives and direct support. In the case of workfare, especially vulnerable 
groups need to be provided with alternatives – or unconditional transfers (direct support). At worst, 
protecting vulnerable groups – such as children from working - can often lead to ‘banning’ them 
without seeking more innovative alternatives (Bailey, 2008) and may be essential. Yet direct transfers 
should not necessarily be the default option, as the elderly and disabled may be able to contribute to 
the community in numerous ways, (such as childcare, or possibly overseeing transfers) in ways that 
can increase their social capital in the community. 
 
Rebalancing social relations and empowerment. Post-shock safety nets and associated livelihood 
support can be an opportunity to not only “reestablish livelihoods, but also renegotiate them.” Women 
can be encouraged to have a stronger voice in the community, to be involved in village committees, to 
register land and assets jointly in the names of both husband and wife (Oxfam, 2008). 
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Community ownership. One of the principal recommendations of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 
was that the affected communities should be given ownership over their aid to direct their own relief 
and recover strategies (Houghton, 2007). Integrating the community into the program requires not just 
consultations, but involvement throughout the process itself. This builds a program that is relevant for 
the community, it builds local capacity, as well as a stronger, community owned and more sustainable 
program. 
5.4  Targeting 
The importance of targeting is to maximize the benefits for those in need of support and to minimize 
wastage and program costs. Achieving perfect targeting has to be offset by the costs of carrying out 
extensive targeting exercises. Despite its importance, targeting remains a highly problematic aspect of 
implementing a safety net. The fine line between different levels of poverty and vulnerability make it 
a difficult and moral issue, in the face of limited resources. 
 
A World Bank study concluded in a study of 122 targeted programs in 48 countries around the world, 
that the best targeted program was Argentina’s Trabajar workfare program, which was able to transfer 
80 percent of program benefits to the poorest quintile, or four times the share they would have 
received in a random allocation (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2004). Among our case studies, the 
Maldives was successful at targeting safety nets after the Tsunami. Over 75% of the affected 
population received grants. It was also geographically accurate with the worst-hit islands receiving 
more in-kind and financial aid. But little information was available about their targeting strategy and 
how and what they got right. 
 
As with targeting in non-crisis times, there are three issues to resolve: (i) who to target; (ii) how to 
target and (iii) what to target. This section begins with a discussion on how to identify the target 
group, how to include particularly vulnerable groups and the need for frequent re-targeting exercises. 
It continues with an exploration of how to target for disaster situations including targeting errors and 
which targeting mechanisms should be employed for which types of situation. It concludes with an 
overview of a number of additional issues to consider. 
5.4.1  Identifying the target group  
This will largely depend upon the program objective and the needs assessment following the disaster: 
Is it a short-term intervention to meet basic needs, or longer-term to rehabilitate livelihoods? The 
target group can either be all those affected by the crisis or the poorest and those left most destitute, so   61
they can range from whole communities, to households within affected communities, or specific 
population groups (such as displaced persons, the elderly, etc.).  
 
There are three common criteria for eligibility in post disaster situations: (i) Death or injury of a 
household member (ii) Loss of assets, house and work tools (iii) vulnerability and poverty. The 
advantages and disadvantages of each are compared in Table 6 below. 
 
Table 6.  Selecting the targeting criteria: advantages and disadvantages 
Compensation 
group 
Advantages  Disadvantages 
Death/injury 
compensation 
Government life insurance 
Simple  
Quick 
Can encourage inflated mortality/injury 
figures if registration and administrative 




Small-medium sized disaster, 
where all will be helped, 
regardless of wealth status 
Those in the rental market or without 
property may be excluded; numbers may be 
inflated if administrative systems are weak 
Poverty  Useful in large disasters; Good 
for the medium term where aim is 
to prevent those at risk of 
becoming chronically poor 
Costly & time-consuming; Requires heavy 
use of management, which may be time-
scarce; Must be transparent, especially to 
avoid conflict; given limited resources, 
exclusion errors may be high 
Source: Heltberg, 2007 
 
Drawing lessons from the examples laid out in Section 0 above,  
  Ideally, there should be access to a variety of different safety nets that can meet different 
affected groups and for different lengths of time. This will be more viable in situations with pre-
existing safety nets. 
  Also,  programs can be multi-tiered, in order to target different wealth groups, as with 
Oxfam’s experience in Sri Lanka after the Tsunami (Section 3.4). 
  Beyond the core target, which additional groups can the safety net assist? For example, orphans 
and grandchildren can benefit from transfers to the elderly, the entire community can benefit from 
community assets built from public works, specific vulnerable households can profit from 
community work schemes that rebuild private assets. 
  An effective emergency/rapid needs assessment (ENA/RNA). Rapid assessment of the situation 
is an imperative, followed by continuous and rigorous tracking of the situation. This will help   62
advance response times to hazards. The monitoring mechanism of Ethiopia’s PSNP has been 
improved to reflect this. 
  Visibility of and coverage for the most vulnerable: Following a natural disaster, the most 
frequently targeted vulnerable groups are female-headed households, the elderly and orphans and 
other vulnerable children. Several other groups that require particular attention are the physically 
disabled, psychological trauma sufferers - an increasing concern for the longer-term rehabilitation 
process and which some donors are now addressing with post-trauma mental health programs,
28 
and hosting communities, when targeting migrants.
29 Planned safety nets need to be tailored to the 
specific needs of each of these groups. 
  Universal targeting may be appropriate in the immediate to short-term, but given limited 
resources, a more finely targeted approach may be necessary a) in the medium-long term and b) if 
the disaster is spread across a large geographic area.  
5.4.2  How to target: Timing and re-targeting 
Targeting processes will alter according to whether the situation is a slow-onset disaster (such as 
Malawi in 2002-2005), or an unexpected event, such as the Pakistan earthquake, 2005. Following a 
rapid-onset event targeting is likely to be particularly difficult in the initial stages, due to the loss of 
trained human capacity, damaged infrastructure, and destroyed records and data. Furthermore, 
targeting is an ongoing process and needs to adapt as post-emergency recovery progresses from the 
short to longer term, as needs and target groups change. Effective targeting relies on two key aspects: 
(i) Effective EWS; and (ii) having emergency plans in place and institutions on standby in order to 
implement targeting rapidly when required (this can also help swiftly implement the evaluation stage 
following a disaster). 
 
In Pakistan, Relief Committees were established to tour villages and adjudicate compensation claims. 
While they were supposed to visit every household, in some cases, village meetings were convened 
and assessments were conducted based on oral evidence. Save the Children estimates that the 
preparation phase for community-based targeting alone can take up to fourteen weeks. This may be 
possible if scaling up a safety net and targeting process that is already in place, but infeasible if trying 
to implement a safety net rapidly from scratch. Instead, it could be phased in over time, or planned in 
time for subsequent emergencies. 
 
                                                      
 
28 See for example, UNICEF’s response to the Peru earthquake in 2007. http://www.un.org/works/sub3.asp?lang=en&id=32 
29 In Colombia WFP targeted IDPs that had migrated as a result of the troubles. Yet resident hosting households were 
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Drawing on the case studies, some guidelines for executing the targeting exercise are as follows: 
  Re-targeting should take place relatively early on and on a recurring basis, particularly if the 
targeting mechanism has been the same one used during the relief period.  
  Targeting criteria should be flexible to change, particularly as the composition of vulnerable 
households and ownership of assets change 
  Targeting should improve over time, with a reduction in inclusion and exclusion errors. 
  Data collection for effective targeting is paramount. Some sources of information are listed 
below, in Box 2. 
 
Box 2.  Sources for data and information for targeting 
Data availability and assessments for targeting 
Pre-hazard data and information: 
  Household questionnaires 
  Population census, local administrative data and births/marriages/deaths registers 
  Food security monitoring systems: ongoing monitoring of food security situations 
Post-disaster 
  ENA/RNA: These estimate numbers of affected people and the level and type of need 
  Vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM):  a WFP framework for targeting comprising 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS), food security and vulnerability analyses and food-security 
monitoring systems 
  GIS - using before and after data to map affected areas through satellite technology 
  Informal networks, such as church networks and other social networks, can be useful for intra-
community targeting, especially triangulated to verify other information. 
 
5.4.3  Targeting mechanisms  
Deciding the targeting method will be a balance between cost, efficiency and effectiveness. In a 
disaster situation, the simplest targeting mechanisms are those which do not require a verification 
process (see Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott 2004 for a detailed treatment of different targeting 
methods). These are  
(i)  self-targeting mechanisms such as subsidizing goods that are mostly consumed by the 
poor and setting wage rates under the local daily wage on public works schemes; and 
(ii)  universal coverage of the affected population, although this will not specifically reach the 
poorest (and may even exclude them if wealthier groups dominate access to the resources). 
When this is directed at specific areas, it is more commonly referred to as geographic 
targeting.     64
 
The advantages and disadvantages of various targeting mechanisms as they apply to hazard situations 
are summarized in Table 7.  
 
Table 7.  Targeting mechanisms in emergencies: advantages and disadvantages 
Targeting Mechanism  Advantages  Disadvantages 
Self-targeting 
  costs    should be minimal 
compared with other 
targeting methods 
  it is redistributive 
  if tied to a public works 
program, it can also achieve 
other objectives, e.g. 
clearing up debris, 
rehabilitate small 
infrastructure, etc. 
  Yet there is a risk of over-
demand, where chronic poverty is 
widespread and employment 
opportunities are very scarce. 
  To counteract this, payments are 
therefore extremely low, maybe 
not enough to meet objectives or 
only meet basic needs (Dercon, 
2004) 
  Must be carefully designed to 
ensure the activities fit the target 
group (e.g. public works may 
achieve additional objectives but 
are not suitable for all target 
groups. 
Hazard situation: Longer –term or recurring emergencies – although recurrent emergencies also 
give opportunities for refining eligibility criteria and beneficiary lists necessary for community 
and household targeting (WFP, 2006) 
Universal/geographic 
targeting 
  It should be the least costly 
(zero cost) and most time 
efficient compared with other 
targeting processes 
  It avoids exclusion errors (as 
long as the scheme is 
accessible by those in need)  
  It is equitable – and it may be 
necessary to give support to all 
income levels in the short term. 
  By definition inclusion errors 
are likely to be higher 
  Care must be taken to ensure 
that it is poverty-focused and is 
not directed for political gain 
at economic elites, (such as 
gasoline subsidies). 
Hazard situation: Widespread emergencies, when all (or within a certain geographic area) need 
assistance to recover, regardless of income quintile. Depending upon the population size, this is 
usually for short term use, and small transfer amounts.  Situations where assistance needs to be 
given rapidly; where it is not possible to access data/take the time to do so. 
Community and 
household targeting 
  By using local knowledge to 
target participants, this can 
overcome a lack of 
demographic and income 
data which may not be 
accessible after a disaster 
  Giving the community 
responsibility for targeting can 
be  empowering and foster 
social capital. 
  Typically community targeting 
is carried out in the open, 
  It demands a high level of 
community preparation and 
training. (Save the Children 
estimate that this can take over 
three months).  
  It  can contribute to social 
disharmony  if local 
hierarchies are mis-used to 
manipulate and intimidate 
community members. 
  May not be feasible if there 
has been social disintegration,   65
which capitalizes on social 
mores to ensure transparency 
and prevent fraudulent claims 
  It may also save time for 
program administrators on 
conducting lengthy house-to-
house visits. 
such as due to migration and 
displacement.  
  It  requires an ongoing 
commitment: to implement in 
post-disaster situations, training 
and awareness-building needs 
to continue during ‘normal’ 
periods.
Hazard situation: Situations where there is good knowledge of households/availability of 
household data. Safety nets that are planned, to protect against disaster (ex ante) or are for longer 
term recovery (ex ante). typically more difficult in natural disasters and non-conflict emergencies 
(unless they are operational prior to the emergency). Such targeting takes time and requires 
training of communities and a good understanding of how to conduct the targeting. It may be 
easier than door-to-door household assessments, however. 
Means testing and 
proxy means testing 
  Means-testing is precise. 
  More  subjective, so useful 
when this requires an external 
decision-maker.  
  Proxy means testing requires 
less information than means 
testing and is usually based on 
observable characteristics, such 
as levels animal stocks, or the 
quality of or contents of a home 
– which may be appropriate in 
low income households or 
where income is difficult to 
measure. 
  Means testing requires a high 
level of administrative 
capacity, good data collection 
and access to documented 
information, which may be 
difficult after a sudden crisis. 
  Means testing relies on 
assessing levels of income 
(amongst other measurements), 
and therefore is more difficult 
where there is a wide 
informal economy or low 
levels of recording income and 
other welfare information. 
  Proxy means testing requires 
well-designed indicators. 
Hazard situation: Typically used in more developed countries, where there is access to reliable 
records, even after a shock. Assuming data, this can be useful in situations where the community 
lack knowledge about each other, where the community is fractured or where community 
targeting may lead to conflict. 
 
However, these mechanisms may also be combined. Horn Relief developed ‘Inclusive Community-
based Targeting (ICBT) for their work in northern Somalia. A Village Relief Committee was publicly 
elected to compile the preliminary list of participants, based on locally identified indicators of 
vulnerability (assets, household size, gender of household head, clan membership, etc.). Staff verified 
this through discussions with community organizations and religious leaders. Lists were read out in 
public, so that the community could participate in the targeting process, and opinions to this were then 
checked discreetly, because clans would not challenge each other in public. 
5.4.4  Targeting errors 
There is no accepted level of exclusion and inclusion errors (Grosh et al, 2008), although during a 
disaster, higher inclusion errors are likely to be tolerated. Some of this is unavoidable: there is   66
imperfect information between collectors of information and potential participants and dilution of 
transfers through food-sharing food is inevitable. However, it can be problematic for example, if there 
are nutritional objectives for a specific target group. Exclusion errors are unavoidable where safety 
nets are not fully funded, because there is a limit on the number of people that can be absorbed within 
the program (Grosh et al, 2008).  
 
To illustrate the problem, in Sri Lanka, following the Tsunami, 91 per cent of all households in the 
affected area were receiving grants, even though only 74 percent of households were affected. This 
led to more stringent application of the targeting criteria: only ‘strongly vulnerable’ households (those 
that had lost an income-earning household member or who had suffered partial or full housing 
damage) were eligible for subsequent grant tranches - despite that the broader ‘weak’ category 
included those that had lost a household member, lost business assets, lost their livelihood, or suffered 
a disability. It was acknowledged that disbanding the program after the fourth payment was 
problematic because of the absence of other opportunities, yet to continue payments raised the 
concern of creating dependency, acting as a disincentive to seeking employment and causing 
inflationary pressures over time (World Bank, 2005).  
 
Three options to help alleviate inclusion errors are:  
(i)  Factoring this in to calculations of need and increasing transfers accordingly; 
(ii)  Minimize possible leakage in the program design. For example targeting children through 
school-feeding, mothers and babies at health centers and the sick/injured in hospitals; 
(iii)  Thorough monitoring, frequent re-targeting and an effective, trusted appeals system. 
 
Some inclusion and exclusion errors may have to be tolerated (for the better good of the 
community). This may be particularly true in emergency situations. In Darfur, WFP observed that 
rural residents were more vulnerable to food insecurity than the incoming IDPs who were receiving 
assistance. This put strain on the community. The solution was to assist all the community where 
IDPs constituted over fifty percent of the population. Although some non-needy received assistance, 
this controlled the tensions in the communities (WFP, 2006). 
5.4.5  Designing the targeting process 
Important issues that the Tsunami response in Sri Lanka revealed about designing targeting are: 
  the need for ongoing targeting assessments in order to correct errors 
  the  limited endurance of donors to withstand high targeting errors and which could 
compromise their own project targets; and most importantly,    67
  there is an essential need to focus on restoring livelihoods (i.e. looking towards longer-term 
rehabilitation), but a relative lack of conviction and expertise in knowing how to do so. 
 
Other issues, applicable to hazard situations raised from the case studies, include: 
  Capitalize on pre-existing safety net targeting and appeals systems. This may require 
additional capacity needs to cope with the increased numbers. Clearly, this takes time and 
preparation and should be in place before the emergency, or as part of the emergency plan.  
  Match targeting exercises with the target group. Deciding how to carry out the targeting, should 
be based upon where the recipients will be most easily identified. For example, in order to provide 
injury compensation, it may be practical to conduct targeting in hospitals and clinics. It is also 
necessary to have an additional mechanism to capture outliers, who will slip through the system, 
for example qualifying people who did not make it to health facilities. In Pakistan, injury 
compensation assessments were carried out in medical camps and a secondary targeting phase was 
conducted by local community Relief Committees. 
  Strengthen the verification process: Some eligibility criteria may be easier to mis-report, or be 
prone to moral hazard. For example from the case studies, potential candidates can be tempted to 
damage their houses or underestimate income. Suitable targeting strategies to validate claims can 
include: to publicly display lists of participants and to conduct the targeting process openly in the 
community. As mentioned, an appeals process for unsuccessful applicants is critical to 
counterbalance inaccuracies. 
  Assess the capacity of targeting institutions: Targeting can place immense pressure on local 
authorities, particularly departments inexperienced with emergency situations. Local targeting may 
cause political tensions. This requires training: again, emphasizing the need for well-planned 
disaster preparations. High inclusion errors may be more acceptable in the short-term, with more 
stringent attention to the targeting criteria in the medium to long term. In Niger, explicit and 
transparent criteria for determining a food crisis and identifying vulnerable regions are not 
available. This was particularly problematic in 2005 when the initial list of vulnerable villages 
produced in May 2005  did not coincide with qualitative and quantitative evidence observed by 
international and non-governmental organizations.  This prompted considerable friction between 
the Government and the international community.  Although numerous institutions attempted to 
update this information by conducting additional food security assessments, to-date, a list 
identifying the most severely affected regions during the 2005 food crisis is still not available.   
  Involve the community, but manage expectations. Implementers should beware that the sound 
principles of community participation do not always translate into improved outcomes (Kennedy et 
al, 2007). It is essential to work with communities and manage their expectations for what, how   68
much and for whom the safety net will deliver. Unless handled carefully, community consultations 
can give rise to unrealistic hopes. Mis-managed community consultations can lead to unrealistic 
‘wish lists’, as was observed in community consultations following the Tsunami. Targeting 
mechanisms and criteria must be agreed amongst the affected population (The Sphere Project, 
2004) (which also should likely include non-target groups). To avoid confusion, it is of utmost 
importance that targeting criteria are well-defined and disseminated widely (The Sphere Project, 
2004). 
5.4.6  The costs of targeting 
Even in the post-relief phase, there is likely to be little time for targeting and the more accurate the 
targeting, then the more costly and time-consuming the process can be. Typically it is only the 
administrative costs of targeting that are calculated for, while there are in fact a number of different 
costs to factor in, all of which will reduce the cost-benefit ratio of a particular targeting type. There 
are the administrative costs of collecting information about participants. Individuals incur private 
costs of applying to a program: these can include traveling to registration sites, providing photos, 
collecting proof of personal information such as birth certificates. Incentive costs may be negative for 
example discouraging earning other sources of income, to fall within the target group, or positive such 
as encouraging school enrollment. Social costs may be the result of stigma associated with 
participating in a program. Finally, political costs may result from concentrating too much spending 
on targeting (Grosh et al, 2008). Some of these apply to safety nets more generally, not just those 
implemented in response to natural hazards, such as the political costs. In addition to these, WFP 
identifies two further types: recurrent and implicit costs, summarized in Table 8 (WFP, 2006, 19).  
 
Table 8.  Planning the costs of targeting (drawn from WFP, 2006) 




Baseline Assessments [WFP rapid ENA for one million recipients, after Pakistan 
earthquake in 2005 cost $22,000. An ENA for 400,000 participants in Niger in 
2005 cost $58,000. WFP estimate that VAM are typically $50,000- $100,000] 
Fieldwork to develop criteria 
Staff/partners/ community training 
Information campaigns 
Establishing registration and distribution systems 
Recurring costs 
Updating registration systems; 
Monitoring of distribution/post-distribution; 
Evaluations/ reassessments; 
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between emergencies  
Monitoring system for emergencies; 
Implementing monitoring and field evaluations for each emergency 
Retraining of staff 
Implicit costs 
Costs of risks inherent to access, negotiations, staff security. 
In emergency situations, staff are more likely to be exposed to security risks 
Incentive costs 
Positive: Encouraging school enrollment 
Negative: Discouraging income-seeking 





Costs for recipients of assistance 
Participation in targeting meetings/ household surveys,  
Collecting information eg birth certificates;  
Other registration costs, e.g. providing a photo 
 
 
To conclude, targeting is always difficult, but particularly so when there is an imperative to act 
quickly and this makes it even more important not to overlook the balance between non-partisanship, 
local knowledge and pragmatism. The very concept of targeting risks being seen as a top-down 
exercise, and the agency of affected communities must be explicitly recognized in program design. A 
checklist for targeting is in Annex VII. 
5.5  Size, frequency of the transfer and delivery
30 
Setting the appropriate size and frequency of a transfer remains a grey area. There is considerable 
variation in the size of transfers offered following different natural disasters but no standard 
proportion of assistance, and little literature calibrating the impacts of different levels of transfer. The 
lack of knowledge about the ideal (proportional) level of transfer, leaves it largely up to donors’ 
whims. Smaller disasters attract less money, which is yet another argument why it is so important that 
countries have planned access to financing. Measurable objectives and monitoring and evaluation 
plans will have to be revised if the required financing is not forthcoming. Establishing the quantity, 





                                                      
 
30 For more details, see Grosh et al, (2008) chapter 5.   70
Endogenous factors: 
  Type of natural disaster and need     Program objectives    Recipient preferences 
Exogenous factors  
  Availability of foreign 
assistance 
  Implementation 
concerns (e.g. misuse) 
  Ability to determine 
eligibility 
 
There are no reports in the case studies as to what is preferable; and the literature and practice is 
sometimes at odds here. The most recent research used here, comes from studies with focus groups 
for a disaster risk reduction cash transfer in Niger (see Bailey, 2008). However, several principles and 
observations can help guide decision-making on the most favorable level of transfers to provide. 
These are suggested guardedly, as all decisions must be specific to the country and circumstances. 
Refer to ANNEX IV for a summary of size, regularity and coverage of transfers for natural disasters. 
In general 
  Maintain a balance between incentives to enter and exit from the program (SCUK, 2008). 
There is a delicate balance between providing grants large enough for people to draw maximum 
benefit while providing sufficient continuity in transfers to make a sustained impact, and 
minimizing adverse incentives and double dipping. 
  Match transfers to the program objective. This will initially determine the approximate duration 
and size of the program. Consumption smoothing objectives and asset rebuilding may need 
different size transfers. Slow onset disasters where the aim is to smooth consumption and halt asset 
loss, rather than repair or replace assets, typically seem to provide lower transfers.  
  Consider market prices (including fluctuation). 
  Be aware of households’ capacity/ability to spend.  Whether recipients have the capacity to use 
transfers in a way that decreases their vulnerability may affect the size and frequency of a transfer 
(Bailey, 2008).  
  Consider other complimentary activities, such as training and other ‘linking’ activities that can 
also promote the program objectives. If the object is to provide larger transfers for investment 
purposes, it may be useful to provide additional support to help people manage their finances, 
save, open bank accounts or lines of credit with local stores. 
  Be cognizant of seasonal as well as post-disaster variation. Setting the market wage can be 
complex as it can vary throughout the year and may fluctuate during the immediate post-disaster 
period and the post-emergency aftermath. Similarly, attention must be given as to whether there is 
sufficient local employment during the aftermath/recovery/longer term rehabilitation periods. 
Transfers must not crowd out market income-earning opportunities.   71
5.5.1  Quantity 
The size of transfer during an emergency is indicative of prioritization, need and external resources 
rather than a country’s wealth. For example, Pakistan paid 7-48% of the average income per capita in 
cash transfers; Sri Lank 3% and the Maldives 1.3-4.5% and from the case studies, it is difficult to find 
a concrete reason behind these decisions. The table in ANNEX IV shows the variety in size of 
transfers provided across different programs. While the literature is cautious about providing (cash) 
transfers that are too large, the lack of evaluation of their impacts on livelihood, makes it difficult to 
be certain whether transfers are sufficient in many of these circumstances. 
 
If the size of transfers is adequate, safety nets can yield profoundly positive results. In the Maldives, 
rations were assessed to be adequate. Beneficiary assessments found that around eighty percent of 
highly affected households said that provisions of rice, sugar and water were enough to meet needs. 
Six months after the tsunami, employment had recovered and household income was already higher 
than before the disaster. Rates of food insecurity returned to pre-tsunami levels within a year. In a 
second example, monthly payments of $60 for six months were paid to households affected by the 
Bam earthquake. This was provided rapidly through previously existing channels: the local Welfare 
Organization, which was able to register vulnerable groups: female-headed households, orphans, the 
elderly and the disabled immediately after the earthquake. The renaissance in small-scale trade and a 
growth in the number of shops and stalls is evidence of the success of the program. 
 
However, this can also be an incentive for double dipping and adverse effects, so some caution 
needs to be exercised in providing large or lump-sum payments. In Somalia in 2003, the one-time 
cash grant of $50 to vulnerable households suffering from acute food insecurity was less effective. 
The post-distribution survey showed no evidence of misappropriation or of cash going to support the 
war economy, but the one-off distribution provided only short-lived relief and soon after, levels of 
debt and distress were rising again. Lump-sum cash payments can also create problems of adverse 
incentives. After the Tsunami, there were reports of people destroying their houses in order to benefit 
from the full cash housing compensation.  The level of transfer can also lead to double dipping. In 
Afghanistan, families were paid $100 to encourage IDPs to return home. The program was susceptible 
to double-dipping and there were numerous cases of returnees returning again via a different route. 
However, the $10 payments per person for a similar project after the Bam earthquake, avoided this 
problem.  
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  Consider all the households’ expenses, including debt repayments and business costs. The 
general rule in the literature is to provide just under enough to achieve goals but avoid 
dependency. Yet, the concern to avoid creating dependency seems to result in too low payments in 
practice: Household expenses are often underestimated and the cost of re-establishing micro-
enterprises, or the levels of household debts to repay and often not even considered Lumpy grants 
also need to be sufficient: following the Tsunami the amount given was not enough to buy new 
boats so consequently grants were spent in other ways. “These underestimates compromised 
effective recovery and many households were only able to regain their livelihoods (or re-launch 
their enterprise) after a succession of grants from several agencies.” (Adams, 2005. Emphasis 
added). 
  Ensure objectives (and the subsequent size of transfer) are in line with household spending 
priorities.  
  With cash grants, the key question to setting an initial value of transfer is to decide whether the 
cash transfers are consumption grants or investment grants. This means considering whether 
the purchases households will make with the grants will reduce vulnerability in a way that can 
protect against future shocks and disasters. In Niger, focus groups requested cash transfers 
should be 20-40% of the annual average income of the target group (Bailey, 2008).  
  Food rations tend to meet the standard food basket for emergency assistance, of 2100kcal/day. 
  Cash-for-work wages tend to be set just below the market wage rate, so as not to upset the 
local labor market by crowding out local opportunities and upset. However, the variation in 
households’ income means that there are often households willing to work for any given wage 
(Barrett and Clay, 2001). 
  Be cognizant of the problems of fluctuating size of transfers. The disparity between transfers 
paid in ‘normal’ years and the higher amounts in a post-disaster situation may create subsequent 
problems both in terms of encouraging adverse incentives, inequity and social discord. 
5.5.2  Frequency, timing and duration 
“The principles of stability, predictability, and timing of an intervention may be as critical to social 
protection intervention effectiveness as the resource transfer itself” (Maxwell et al, 2008, 5). 
Predictable, stable transfers are essential to help recipients assess their willingness to take risks, which 
will help reduce their vulnerability to future or impacts of current shocks. 
 
Yet there seems to be little or no consensus as to the ideal timing and frequency of transfers, which 
reflects the heterogeneity of households’ preferences. Deciding the timing and the frequency can only 
partially influence how households are spend their transfers.   73
  Recipient preferences tend towards larger, infrequent transfers, rather than smaller, regular 
transfers. This enables them to make investment choices. However, Bailey suggests that the 
returns to investment-promoting lump sum transfers are likely to be lower with the ultra-poor as 
they will have a lower ability to manage larger sums of money (Bailey, 2008). 
  To meet basic needs objectives and immediate needs, transfers tend to be frequent and small 
(to meet minimum food consumption) – whether food or cash transfers. In the short to long term, 
they may support consumption levels, but they must be for a sufficient duration that they can build 
resilience. Bailey observes that short term cash transfers have limited impact on reducing 
vulnerability to shocks and disasters (Bailey, 2008).  
  On the other hand, for livelihood recovery, or compensation and insurance mechanisms, 
grants in the immediate aftermath of natural disaster are more likely to be a one-off 
payment 
  Payments before/during the hungry season are most likely to be used for consumption and to 
arrest the need to accumulate debt, larger payments can be more easily used for purchasing 
livestock when prices are low. Payments after the harvest are more likely to be used for 
repaying debts.  There was no agreement among focus groups in Niger as to the ideal time for 
paying transfers. 
  One-time payments are for ‘one-off’ or start-up aims for example to encourage repatriation, 
replace lost assets and meet emergency needs. Materials for re-building houses are usually 
distributed in one go. Disadvantages of one-off payments are: (i) relief provided from lump sum 
transfers may only be short-lived relief (i.e., not appropriate for overcoming acute food insecurity); 
(ii) as one-off payments tend to be larger, it can create adverse incentives for recipients to seek full 
compensation; (iii) lump sum payments can encourage double-dipping (multiple claims).  
  Lumpy payments are for larger investments that take place over time or payments that need 
monitoring for example, providing cash to rebuild homes in installments. 
  For safety nets ex ante, transfers are likely to be regular in order to support and protect 
livelihoods in the event of a natural hazard. 
  Evidence from Niger suggests that one to two installments can help spread risk, whereas small 
installments discourages investment. 
  Assess the impact on livelihoods. Low-income groups with few employment opportunities may 
require a longer-term commitment in order to help people rebuild their livelihoods. For the most 
vulnerable and most in need, cash grants should be extended to the medium term, while less 
vulnerable households are phased out of the program.  
  Inevitably, in the short run, delivery frequency also depends on institutional capability to 
distribute transfers. In Ethiopia, it was decided that the government administration could   74
realistically make deliveries every two months. It requires an accurate assessment of how long it 
will take to transfer money, the signing off period and to anticipate where the obstructions might 
be. Inadvertently, providing larger sums less frequently, affected how recipients spent their money. 
 





Small, regular    Supports consumption but may not help 
build resilience to future shocks. 
Emergency assistance 
(post shock) 
Regular    Can meet immediate needs, but consider 
needs in the medium to long term and 





  Negative incentives to access cash; 
  There must be a ready supply of 
assets/materials locally available; 
  Households may have other needs, other 
than the program objectives; 
  Linkages are important – maybe skills 
training, etc. to encourage diversification 
in small businesses. 
Building resilience to 
shocks / Livelihood 
recovery (longer-term, 
post shock) 
Larger, regular    Long term cost; Negative incentives,  
  Recipients must have the capacity to 
make use of large-sum payments 
  Timing will effect what the transfer is 
spent on: eg. pre-harvest, some prices of 
some investment assets (e.g. livestock 
may be low); post-harvest and debts can 
be re-paid; 
  Other programs will need to support the 
effectiveness of the cash transfer. 
 
5.5.3  Where and how to deliver payments 
There is a plethora of ways to deliver transfers and where to establish delivery points and the decision 
will depend up on which system is already established and pragmatism. There are current examples of 
cash transfers being delivered on anything from mules to helicopters, while delivery points include 
banks, post offices, local administrative offices, rural shops and in Kenya, even mobile phones. Areas 
with a developed banking system have used banks to distribute cash. This minimizes transaction 
costs, should mean a more timely delivery of transfers and helps promote savings. It will not be 
feasible in less developed areas. . Uppermost too, should be the opportunity costs that this incurs 
for recipients and the costs to the administration – and there may be a trade-off in this. As many of 
the issues are universal for all safety nets, this section draws on experiences in both crisis and non-
crisis situations.  
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Deciding upon where to deliver transfers involves a trade-off at some level between convenience 
for the recipients and costs for the implementers. While corruption was in general an immense 
problem in Indonesia, providing cash a transfer through post offices was relatively secure. In India 
and Lesotho where infrastructure is relatively established, pensions are delivered through post offices 
and each pensioner has a post office account. The Lesotho scheme is flexible, however, and in remote 
areas without post offices, pensions were issued at local shops by post-office officials.  Even where 
there is an incomplete rural banking system, mobile banks can be used to ensure secure payments. 
Harvey (2007) reports an increasing number of successful pilot schemes.  Other methods of delivering 
payments securely include UNHCR which used a process of iris recognition, in Afghanistan to 
encourage IDPs to return home. Grants provided to flood victims in Mozambique in 2000, were 
delivered by a private consulting firm. Recipients were issued with checks at distribution sites and 
commercial bank tellers were on site to cash the checks, under the protection of a local security firm 
and quite frequently, the army is used to guard payments, in non-conflict situations. Distribution sites 
offer opportunities for petty trade. For example, around pay points for Lesotho’s Old Age Grant, there 
was lively trade and Basotho pensioners were engaged in making goods such as woven baskets, 
clothes and Vaseline to sell at the monthly collection days.  
 
In envisaging the implications of selecting a particular delivery site, the following should be 
considered: 
  Access to other resources and services: Payment points in market centers may be further for 
recipients to travel to collect their transfers, but it may give them access to more commodities, 
encourage the use of public services, such as health services; or an opportunity for them to sell 
goods.  
  Stimulating the local rural economy: On the other hand, establishing payment sites in remote 
areas close to recipients’ homes can support local shop-owners and help stimulate rural markets.  
  Ease and convenience: Suitable sites are natural gathering places or convenient for distribution: 
these include schools, local warehouses, local administrative offices.   
  Try to maintain equity in delivery. Recipients that spend more of their income on collecting the 
payment than others, retain proportionately less to meet for example, consumption needs. In 
Swaziland, SCUK provided for the cost of transport to collect the payments so that it did not 
diminish the value of the transfer (Devereux and de Jere, 2008).  
  Preventing marginalization. Practices such as handing transfers to men can marginalize women 
or reinforce social disparities. Confronting norms can make these groups even more vulnerable if 
improperly handled or when the implementing agent changes.   76
  Distance and costs for different target groups: The distance of payment sites from recipients’ 
homes is more significant for certain groups. For example, if female-headed households are being 
targeted, it may be more appropriate for the implementers to shoulder the delivery costs and 
deliver closer to recipients’ homes. As an example, in Lesotho, some pensioners (all over 74 years 
old) were walking for several hours to collect their pension, waiting times could be up to three 
days and some spent almost half of their pension on transport to and from payment sites. Such 
issues would also be particularly relevant to women with children. (see below)  
  Simplicity: High-tech solutions for delivering transfers such as mobile ATMs with fingerprint or 
iris recognition, or mobile phones can speed up delivery times and overcome high transport costs, 
but in reality can lead to a host of problems and immense delays, as they did in Kenya. In the end, 
simple solutions such as a bank teller driving to villages to deliver cash in envelopes may be more 
effective. 
 
Table 9.  Selecting the payment site: advantages and disadvantages 
  Advantages  Disadvantages  
Rural 
payment sites 
Cheaper for recipients to collect – 
fewer transport costs 
Less time-consuming to collect 
Can stimulate very remote markets 
May be easier to save transfer (if it is 
cash) 
Higher delivery costs 
May be difficult to spend cash 
transfers due to less choice/supply 





Better access to a range of 
commodities 
Lower delivery costs 
Lower market prices  
Access to larger markets for recipients 
participating in petty-trade and small 
businesses 
Higher collection costs  e.g. 
accommodation costs, transport costs 
(especially for food transfers) 
More time-consuming to collect 
May  dampen local village trade 
Transfer is more likely to be spent at 
once 
May be higher security issues 
 
5.6  Institutional management and coordination 
“The implementation of disaster risk reduction…. requires political support, financial resources and 
engagement of all the stakeholders: line ministries, civil defense and emergency services, local 
governments, private sector and civil society.” (Demeter, 2007, 5).    77
 
One of the main shortcomings of both the Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina Tsunami - two events that 
caught authorities unawares and involved a huge influx of organizations offering assistance - was the 
need for proper planning prior to the disasters and effective coordination in the aftermath
31. 
“Coordination, not competition or confrontation, is necessary among organizations to ensure even 
coverage of beneficiaries, uniformity in the packages provided and consistency in meeting local and 
national building codes, as well as international standards.” (Kennedy et al, 2007, 31). Good 
coordination is paramount, so as to avoid government departments need to know who is doing what 
and be prepared for how they will manage the influx of assistance. 
 
A useful analogy is to think of “risk layers”. Each layer needs to be identified and an appropriate 
government role assigned to manage each one to ensure that there is no overlap or contradictions in 
programming. (Skees et al, 2005). Skees et al, apply this to managing agricultural risk for disasters, 
but it can help more broadly – both in planning programs to address different levels of risk and then 
organizing management of individual programs. 
  It is necessary to give considerable attention to coordination and communication, using pre-
established lines of communication where possible, so as to capitalize on existing experience 
and to avoid the cost of establishing new bureaucratic structures. 
  Political struggle between departments must be minimized, or at very least understood: 
Political endorsement from the top is critical: the agency cannot succeed without the strong buy-in 
and support of government and ministries, including local governmental and non-governmental 
sectors and the private sector. This may be difficult if ministries have to negotiate with each other 
and feel their traditional areas of autonomy are being infringed upon (McMahon, 2006).  
  Effective management and coordination of recovery and rehabilitation efforts will not only help 
avoid overlap, but also create openness and transparency in order to minimize corruption, so 
helping maintain confidence in the recovery and rehabilitation process. 
  Indonesia and Sri Lanka established specific agencies to plan, coordinate, and administer the 
reconstruction work. Such agencies can provide a valuable vehicle but need to be well mandated 
and ‘lean’. They can act as a conduit of information for safety net implementers, providing a link 
to other activities, supplying data that may be useful particularly in targeting, and assisting in 
monitoring activities (see Box 3). 
  Stakeholder coordination is important so as to avoid duplicating efforts. It requires working with 
the community, other government departments, NGOs and donors. 
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  Focus on the community and government administration in localities is paramount. Not only 
are programs obstructed because too little attention is paid to effective communication with local 
areas, but in a crisis, it is the community and the rural administration that are the first to respond. 
Moreover, the communication has to be effective in both directions. 
   ‘Getting it right first time’. Re-setting standards, amending criteria and regulations in order to 
adjust to available resources and materials, causes confusion and delays in providing assistance. 
Additionally, this undermines confidence in the operations. To minimize these disruptions, 
requires sufficient planning and better assessment of the scale of the problem and availability of 
materials. 
  Disaster management approach needs grounding in policy and legal framework in order to 
demonstrate political commitment and formalize the institutional set-up. Following the Tsunami, 
Sri Lanka passed the Disaster Management Act (2005).  This established a National Council for 
Disaster Management, headed by the President and Prime Minister and the Ministry for Disaster 
Management and Human Rights, which was responsible for developing a road map for disaster 
preparedness to help Sri Lanka in the future. While countries at the policy level are treating 
disaster more as part of the development process, there is still inadequate focus on livelihoods and 
encouraging community participation in disaster management activities (World Bank, 2004). 
  Rehabilitation agencies can be formally established in the legal code. “It is important that 
assignments of functions and responsibilities among government agencies and other organizations 
are mutually accepted and formalized explicitly through disaster legislation, implementation 
arrangements or a national disaster management plan that carries the force of law.”
32 
 
Box 3.  The role of post-disaster rehabilitation agencies. Source: McMahon et al, 2006 
McKinsey was involved in organizing the rehabilitation exercise in Indonesia and Sri Lanka after the 
Tsunami. They advocate the use of reconstruction agencies. To avoid becoming an additional level of 
bureaucracy, these agencies should focus on six core activities and their approach must combine careful 
planning combined with fast decision-making skills. The six identified activities are: 
  Planning and policy making , including process standards and mapping; 
  Reviewing, generating and approving projects; 
  Building local capacity; 
  Removing bottlenecks. Develop a simple process for problem-solving, such as import problems; 
  Monitoring and evaluation. An information center for collecting, tracking and analyzing information; 
  Disseminating information. Organizations “must liberally share” to increase efficiency and confidence. 
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5.6.1  Program timeliness 
The speed at which a safety net program can be launched depends upon how prepared the country is, 
i.e. whether they have an established safety net in place already, the accuracy in assessing the size of 
the problem as well as practical aspects such as capacity, banking system, size of country, extent to 
which infrastructure has been damaged, etc.. Save the Children (2008) and the World Bank (2007) 
both estimate that a new safety net takes at least four to six months to establish. Again, this section 
considers a few guiding principles for ensuring timeliness in delivery of transfers: 
  In theory, cash should be the quickest resource to transfer to localities and distribute (see 
section 5.2.1 above. Compared with food and in-kind transfers, there are fewer hurdles to 
overcome, such as transportation, importing, checking at customs, storage, all of which can delay 
transfers and risk the food turning bad before it reaches its destination. Cash transfers can be 
provided through other means even if the banking system is inadequate: In Somalia, remittance 
companies are able to distribute cash in local areas.  
  But there are caveats to this recommendation. Consider how to change the modus operandi. If 
the banking system is inefficient, or there is not the accounting and cashier capacity at local level, 
then these can all cause immense delays to making transfers which would be inappropriate to 
introduce in an emergency situation. Above all, cash transfers are not always suitable and may not 
necessarily meet the required needs. However when designing safety nets ex ante, these issues 
should not detract from challenging the status quo of in kind transfers.  
  The case of Ethiopia’s PSNP illustrates that it is possible to make structural changes in the 
provision of assistance and it re-emphasizes the importance of establishing safety nets ex ante 
rather than reactively, in order to allow space for testing and improving delivery, before 
being confronted with a major shock. 
  Program designers also need to think creatively about how to ensure timeliness. What are the 
other available resources that can be drawn upon? In some contexts, the army may be a simple 
effective way of delivering transfers in the short-run, whereas new government departments with 
responsibility for organizing deliveries may lack experience and authority. Moreover, a variety of 
delivery methods can be used and may be more optimal than a single delivery system across the 
whole country.  
  This relies on thorough knowledge of the affected area, the size, differing environments, 
capacities and needs and a good grasp of local and informal transfer systems. When 
implementing ex ante safety nets, challenge the way ‘business has been done’ and reflect on any 
systemic changes that could improve upon the conventional methods for delivering assistance. 
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5.6.2  Monitoring and evaluation 
The main purpose of an M&E system is to establish whether the transfer is reaching the intended 
beneficiaries in time and of the right type and quantity. Strong internal controls help avoid fraud in a 
program. A monitoring system must also look at changes in negative and positive coping strategies of 
recipients. Regarding targeting, the issues are whether the geographic targeting is appropriate, 
whether the groups in greatest need have been correctly identified and whether the objectives are 
being achieved (WFP, 2006).
33 Beyond this, an M&E system can provide information to the public 
and program participants, in order to improve performance and is also a necessary forward-looking 
tool, to learn lessons from experience and improve future programs.  
 
However, the paucity of available evidence on the effectiveness of transfers and safety net programs 
limits this opportunity both to improve current programs and to learn for the future. Challenges mean 
an M&E system is often side-lined, particularly in the face of an emergency. And these challenges 
look set to continue. Some of these challenges, which apply particularly to post-disaster programs are 
as follows (drawn from Fengler, McKeon and Fahmi, 2008; Parker, 2008, O’Donnell, 2008): 
-  Time-consuming;              -  Difficulty  of  establishing  baseline  data; 
-  Difficulty of establishing a control group;   - Unstable environment after natural hazards;     
-  Costly;                   -  Requires  good  capacity  to  be  effective  and  accurate; 
-  Multitude of diverse agencies and agendas;  - Lack of donor trust in government (eg Myanmar); 
-  Abundance of agencies and funds makes it difficult to track progress (eg Indonesia). 
 
It is also affected by exogenous factors: in Indonesia, the abundance of agencies and funds made it 
difficult to track progress, while in Mynamar, the lack of donor trust in the government led to a 
shortage of funds to effectively monitor recovery and reconstruction (Fengler and McKeon, 2008). 
This section offers some guiding principles of establishing a monitoring and evaluation system, and 
which draw on former impact analyses.
34, 35 
 
General approach and focus of an M&E system 
  Follow a ‘good enough’ approach in the short term. This is not a ‘second best’ approach to 
M&E, but is about ensuring a rapid response while recognizing that there is room for 
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34 For an overall guide to Monitoring and Evaluation, see Grun, 2006 and Amin and Goldstein, 2008; for a compendium of 
impact evaluations see CARE’s Evaluation e-Library: http://icarenews.care.org/evaluationlibrary/; a guide on M&E issues is 
the ProVention Sourcebook, http://www.proventionconsortium.org/?pageid=62; On accountability and impact measurement, 
see the Emergency Capacity Building Project: http://www.ecbproject.org/what/accountability  
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improvement. With respect to M&E, it advocates simple tools that are essential, quick and 
appropriate for the situation (Baker, 2008; see also Oxfam’s The Good Enough Guide, 2007). 
  Ultimately  a balance of quantitative and qualitative approaches, deductive and inductive 
approaches and with an emphasis on participation is necessary (O’Donnell, 2008). 
  Keep the scope of the system manageable by keeping a realistic, limited but well-defined focus, 
when deciding phasing, actors and the range of indicators. 
  With regard to poverty and livelihoods, a lesson learned after Hurricane Mitch was that more 
attention is needed to scale up programs and disaster recovery analysis needs to be better 
linked to assessments of social protection structures (Cristoplos, 2008). 
  Again, in Hurricane Mitch, there was little effective monitoring of community rebuilding and 
development. To improve this in the future, gender and socio-cultural factors need to be 
measured, and data needs to be disaggregated across age and gender, as large differences 
were observed between the two group types (Cristoplos, 2008).  
  “Opt for early preparedness - more often than not tracking systems are created as an after-
thought” (Amin and Goldstein, 2008a). Trying to institute this at a later stage can be even more 
complex and confusing  
  Consider using pre-existing mechanisms for the M&E system. Linking to broader procedures 
and institutional structures can enhance the system’s value, reduce costs and help coordination. 
 
Sustainability of an M&E system: The need for ownership and openness 
  Sustainability must be planned from the get-go and international sponsors of the system should 
have a clear exit strategy from the beginning. “Too often, systems are donor-driven and die out 
with the exit of humanitarian actors and donors… “(Amin and Goldstein, 2008a) 
  Institutions matter! High level government buy-in is essential as well as government ownership 
to ensure sustainability of the mechanism.  
  Leadership and good staff capacity are necessary – including a rolling training program to 
overcome the problem of staff turnover. 
  Establishing trust in the system and methodology is crucial for sustaining it and without 
which all efforts can be undermined.  
 
Data: collection requires a pro-active approach and should be accessible 
  An initial evaluation of the trade-off between data quality and costs is necessary. 
  Data collection requires a pro-active approach: there should be incentives to submit and use 
data and minimal costs to doing so; costs could be attached to non-participation and there should 
be wide publicity through mass media.   82
  A decision must be reached as to how available and open the data will be, keeping in mind that 
this is one way of building trust and maintaining support and remembering that information-
sharing is a public good. Data should be publicized in a usable format 
  The location of an M&E system is important and is often underestimated – it can be helpful to 
be located close to decision-makers (Amin & Goldstein, 2008a). Although beware the need to 
strike a balance between access/influence for decision-makers (upwards) and proximity and 
dissemination to the public and program participants (downwards). 
5.6.3  Security 
Security of both recipients and distributors needs to be assured – and the desirability of and relative 
invisibility of cash makes this an especial concern with cash transfers. Insecurity can increase 
participants’ physical vulnerability: people know when payments are made and who has cash. 
Women, the elderly and disabled may feel particularly at risk. It can become a prominent issue if 
social capital has diminished following a crisis (this is particularly relevant to complex emergencies).  
 
  Beyond increasing fears among the already vulnerable, there are other ramifications of this,: 
Recipients can be prompted to spend their transfers immediately: this raises the cost of 
transporting goods back home (rather than from the local area), and withdraws some of the 
flexibility of providing cash transfers –reducing the overall effectiveness of the program. 
  If the security situation becomes severe, it may be necessary to deliver transfers in-kind, and/or to 
provide transfers to the whole community – again compromising the effectiveness of the program. 
  If security is assessed to be a potential problem and is not addressed at the start of the program, 
higher costs may need to be spent subsequently, on providing escorts for the transfers and 
guarding the distribution system.  
 
Ways to improve security:  
  Minimize distances recipients have to travel to and from payment sites; 
  Establish payment sites within small community areas, where social ties are likely to be stronger; 
  Consider timeliness of payments as a security issue, which can impose additional cost and 
vulnerability on recipients; 
  Utilize the army or police force to guard delivery of transfers and payments – but be wary if this 
will add to social tensions; 
  Discuss security concerns and options with communities – and establish community-driven 
initiatives to safeguard transfers;   83
  Consider a banking system (including post office savings and credit options in local shops), so that 
recipients can both safeguard and store their money. 
5.6.4  Opportunity costs 
It is imperative that access costs for recipients are not excessive. Collecting transfers can have 
substantial travel, accommodation and childcare costs for beneficiaries, as well as work foregone. 
Delays in delivery can have similar costs. In emergency situations, this issue may be even more 
critical as people may have lost access to cash and services they previously used to collect their 
transfers. In the short-run, implementation agencies may find that transfers are easier to deliver in 
central areas as people may be congregated in central locations, and less dispersed amongst remote 
villages, but delivering in more remote locations can also be helpful in encouraging participants to 
return to their homes. Administrative costs too must be kept low, although again, in the early post-
crisis stages, delivery costs may be unavoidably and necessarily higher. 
5.7  From development to relief to recovery  
Another advantage of safety nets is that they can be designed to expand and contract as needed and so 
can assist in the recovery process as well as be part of a risk reduction strategy. If implementation 
arrangements and budget can be scaled up rapidly to meet unanticipated circumstances safety nets 
may be counter-cyclical and serve an insurance function (Alderman and Haque, 2006). They can even 
serve as a bridge between the various stages from pre- to post-disaster. 
5.7.1  Planning 
One of the main lessons from the case studies is that response to natural hazards can be effective 
where there are well-defined management plans which are essential for high-risk countries. The 
argument here is also to integrate hazard response into the general development policy and plans. 
This needs to be effected at all levels – national risk-prone governments, regional organisation and bi-
and multi-lateral donors.  
 
The need to ensure programs are scalable is key for response to natural disasters. In high risk areas, 
safety nets in place ex ante, must include disaster risk mitigation as one of their longer term 
development objectives. This creates space for planning how to scale up a program – either in 
coverage (targeting) or size and type of assistance – which departments will be involved and how 
communication and resource transfer lines will flow. 
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Relief activities must be established within a longer term project cycle, so that there can be a 
seamless transition from relief to development and also to accommodate emergency operations which 
are now conceptualized in a longer term context. One such example is shelter. The lessons learned 
from the Pakistan earthquake and the Tsunami is that shelter provision cannot be seen as a short term 




This requires reorganization in the way that institutions are set up to respond to both disasters and 
development. Traditionally, the relief and development departments of governmental and non-
governmental donor agencies have been separate, with distinct mandates. As we look to a longer term 
response, experience suggests that this is no longer ideal and we need to see more institutional 
integration between relief and development divisions.  
5.7.2  Scaling up and the transition from short- to long-term assistance 
Maxwell et al (2008) identify a number of preconditions necessary for scaling up social protection 
strategies. These are listed here but have been discussed in more detail earlier in this section. 
  Build political support; 
  Embed the safety net in legislation or at least the policy framework; 
  Collect sufficient resources; 
  Establish the institutional transition from emergency response to a longer term institutional home; 
  Ensure that the transition does not jeopardize the transfer of resources; 
  Target the program appropriately; 
  Ensure the timeliness and predictability of the transfers; 
  Combine transfers with a livelihood package and consider other linkages to support households. 
 
Other design issues that also require attention in scaling up include
37: 
  Program objectives may in some circumstances need to be modified. 
  Flexibility: in a scaled up context, the safety net design must still be tailored to an even more 
diverse group of households. This means considering the differing needs of the new groups 
                                                      
 
36 Oxfam’s assessment of the response to the Tsunami was that the time take for home reconstruction was over-optimistic; 
with the multitude often inexperienced actors trying to provide accommodation, the community were uninvolved and had 
little ownership, and this even exacerbated the vulnerability of displaced families (Oxfam, 2008). 
37 Some of these draw on Wahenga (2007) Lessons from Ethiopia on a scaled-up national safety net program. Wahenga 
Brief, No. 14, August. Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Program (RHVP) www.wahenga.net 
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included; ensuring that the design does not conflict with seasonal and livelihood work schedules 
and minimizes disruption to other household activities. 
  Appeals and grievance procedures must be successfully scaled up similarly, with the newly 
included communities educated about and included in processes. 
  Monitoring and information systems must also be adapted to include new populations – as well 
as adjusting some of the evaluation and performance indicators as necessary. 
  The additional responsibilities of staff, their needs and additional capacity need to be 
considered.  
 
Along with the above, further issues to assist the transition from the short to medium and longer term 
safety net assistance 
  Build back better. Livelihood packages and linkages to other programs are a necessary 
compliment in the transition from short term to longer term support and require innovative ways 
for rebuilding livelihoods that are more resilient to future shocks. This can be through standards as 
well as encouraging households to diversify their income: after the Tsunami, Oxfam focused on 
building up Sri Lanka’s coir sector with impressive results that changed the face of the coir sector 
from one for only the very poorest, to one that cultivated a business culture in a women-led 
industry, tripled incomes and improved spending on health and education services (Oxfam, 2008). 
At the same time, in ‘building back better’, beware causing disaffection among non-participants, 
as happened after the Tsunami, in re-building housing in Sri Lanka which left non-affected 
neighbors with poorer quality homes (Kennedy et al, 2007).  
  Part of the role of integrating DRM with development is to stall and anticipate future problems 
(Oxfam, 2008).  While many issues arising out of disaster such as water, shelter, cholera, etc. are 
self-evident, some are more hidden such as HIV vulnerability. They may be managed within safety 
nets later on, but could have been initially addressed at the relief and short-term stages. A pre-
emptive approach to longer term issues will smooth the transition between relief and 
development. 
 
Error! Reference source not found. considers some the issues that need to be considered in an 
emergency plan which focuses on scaling up and adapting existing safety nets. 
5.7.3  Military disengagement and foreign assistance. 
Military assistance from both disaster-affected countries and donor countries often provide vital 
support at the relief stage of emergencies. They have the logistical and human resource capacity to 
deliver on a wide scale, basic needs, provide shelter and reach remote areas. But they do not have and   86
they should not have the know-how to deliver development programs. There are two closely-linked 
challenges: one, to ensure that military operations coincide with the objectives of the civilian-
managed relief operation and second, to build the bridge from relief assistance to longer term 
rehabilitation, recovery and development.  
 
There were mixed responses to the military involvement following the Tsunami. Numerous countries 
sent military personnel to assist in the relief efforts, but this was uncoordinated – both between the 
different national forces and with the civilian relief operations. “[D]espite the presence of 
humanitarian representatives, there was no one available with vested authority to argue, on behalf of 
the humanitarian community, regarding the prioritization of need across the region and the allocation 
of military assets to those areas” (Harkin, 2006).  
  Link the military with the development agency: The military need to work hand-in-hand with 
aid agencies and operating principles need to be established for how and when the military will 
withdraw. Civilian personnel need to be placed within the relevant department and also field 
operations in order to do this. This is particularly difficult in situations when development work is 
conducted through contractors – such as with USAID. 
  Establish a line of command: The aid agency should at all times be ultimately responsible for all 
relief/development operations. Ideally, military agents should be answerable to - even contracted 
by - the development agency, during relief operations. Although the reality of cross-
ministerial/departmental accountability will present a political and institutional challenge. 
  In the longer term, de-link the military from development operations: Both because 
development is seen as a national security issue and with the need to occupy troops not in active 
combat, the military in donor countries is increasingly assuming a development assistance role. 
This hampers the ability of development agents to complete their work and contributes to the 
uncoordinated, unfocused responses. It requires that donor governments ensure that they equip 
development agencies with sufficient capacity – both in physical and human resources - to carry 
out their tasks 
  Overcome the “large gulf” between humanitarian and development agencies (DFID, 2004). 
Donor institutions must evolve as the approach to disaster management shifts from one of 
humanitarian relief to prevention and longer term development. DFID has already begun this 
process. 
5.8  Financing 
There are numerous mechanisms for funding safety nets and as emphasized in other areas of safety 
net design there are opportunities for being more innovative than looking to usual funding sources and   87
mechanisms. As evident earlier we really need to consider types of funding arrangements for two 
different disaster-related programs a) for preventive and ongoing (ex ante) safety nets; and b) for 
emergency safety nets that take place in response to a shock (ex post), although many mechanisms 
can finance both types. The emphasis here is on establishing long term funding, for whereas more 
attention has been given recently to risk reduction, “this has not yet translated into the long term 
investment necessary to decrease future vulnerability” (Maxwell et al, 2008). See also section 5.9 
below. 
 
In 2004, the World Bank estimated that economic losses worldwide from natural disasters in the 
1990s could have been reduced by $280 billion if $40 billion had been invested in preventive 
measures (World Bank, 2005). The fact that some of the poorest nations choose to allocate their 
national budgets to preventive safety nets demonstrates that funding safety nets is a simple (albeit 
difficult) matter of prioritization and commitment.
38 When it comes to natural hazards, this decision is 
complicated by the unpredictability of disasters, hence the use of measuring the risk of and trying to 
assign a probability to a natural hazard. The higher the probability of a shock, the more a government 
should be inclined to fund safety nets, especially when this is combined with a highly vulnerable 
population. Mexico, India and the Philippines have created their own reserve funds for relief 
programs after natural disasters (Gurenko and Lester, 2004). 
For lower risk hazards, there should still be prepared plans to implement safety nets that can draw 
down financing rapidly: emergency international appeals should be a solution of last resort. Funding 
can be flexible and the budget reserved for emergencies – as is the case with Mexico. Funding should 
also focus on the local level – such as through social funds, which have a good track record of fast 
disbursement in response to crises, even when financed externally by donors.   
 
Finally, donor-financing needs to be effectively integrated into national financing systems to avoid the 
problems of parallel mechanisms and enhance government ownership, for example by channeling 
finance directly into governments’ disaster management funds. One concern about the availability of 
ex-post financing is that recipient governments then rely on the soft loans and grants provided by 
donors after a disaster, rather than adopt proactive measures – ex ante- to prevent the impact of 
disasters (CAS, 2009). 
                                                      
 
38 The governments of Lesotho and Nepal both run their own non-contributory old age pensions.    88
5.8.1  Social funds 
Community financing mechanisms, such as social funds provide financing for community-driven 
projects, grounded within and accounted by government structures. Their focus is on local capacity-
building and they are demand driven, led and managed by the local community, NGOs and local 
government needing small scale investments across a diverse range of sectors, predominantly related 
to education, health and water. As they are already established in the government system, and so can 
rapidly access resources – either to locally affect pockets or nationally, and because they work at a 
community level, giving the community responsibility for spending resources, this makes them 
“amongst the most flexible and innovative instruments” (IEG, World Bank, 2006) through which to 
prevent and manage natural disasters.  
 
They have several characteristics that make them particularly useful tools in disasters 
1)  They operate at the community level – they are therefore developed around local knowledge 
and local need and are effected at the first level of response at a disaster; 
2)  As the structure of social funds is decentralized, flexibility is intrinsic to them – which means 
that local areas can adapt the design of programs as best fits local needs; 
3)  The focus on capacity-building is essential for building effective management of and response 
to natural hazards  
4)  They can respond immediately to shock or provide longer-term support, hence 
complementing the need to bridge the short-to-medium-long term approach to disaster 
management that is frequently absent; 
5)  M&E systems are built into social funds. 
 
Malawi’s Social Action Fund is one such example and it was tested during the 2003-5 food shocks. 
Giving local assemblies responsibility for the funds meant districts could pool their funds and decide 
the most appropriate use and spread of resources. This meant that the MASAF safety net design was 
flexible, with local authorities adapting the targeting and size of transfer. In further examples, 
Madagascar, Honduras and Nicaragua, ensured that social funds could be redirected to the most 
damaged areas following cyclones and hurricanes. Following the Pakistan earthquake, the PPAF was 
able to respond immediately. Within one day, disaster relief centers were set up and over 2000 
communities received support and US$220 million was soon delivered to households.  
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In general, social funds are still used infrequently, although they are more commonplace in Latin 
America – where they function in every country - than in Africa, which has around twenty social 
funds.
39 Often they are employed effectively ex post, as a disaster response. In this way, the Honduras 
Social Fund had approved 2,100 projects within 100 days of Hurricane Mitch and just over one year 
later, the fund had financed around 3,400 emergency subprojects – implementing projects at a speed 
four times higher than prior to the disaster. (Grosh et al, 2008) But they are still not fully appreciated 
for their ability to build capacity and strengthen resistance to natural shocks, so as yet, their 
experience in disaster risk management is nascent. 
5.8.2  National Disaster Management Funds 
National disaster funds are managed by the central government and are intended to mitigate the 
negative impacts of natural hazards, by strengthening disaster preparedness and response. There are 
different ways of managing these funds. One such fund is Mexico’s FONDEN (Fondo Nacional para 
Desastres Naturales). It was established in 1996 as part of the federal budget to ensure that funds 
would be available in the event of a natural disaster so as not to divert resources from departments’ 
ongoing programs and as a way to involve state and municipal government in disaster response. It 
also was a relief mechanism, as well as provides a safety net to protect low-income households 
affected by disaster. As it is an ex post mechanism, funds are allocated to whichever area has suffered 
most shocks during the year. This overcomes the politically charged problem of accumulating unspent 
funds, but it is still sufficient to cope with major disasters, such that even when Mexico suffered from 
the Tabasco floods in late 2007, which was said to be one of its worst natural disasters in its history, it 
still did not recourse to international appeal. 
5.8.3  Private sector financing and other mechanisms 
There are several other sources of financing, which while they may not be able to finance safety nets 
entirely, may contribute to the design. Informal transfers and remittances are a crucial coping 
mechanism for the poor to protect against idiosyncratic risk. Remittances alone are possibly greater 
than all foreign direct investment and aid combined (Savage and Harvey, 2007). While intra-
household transfers may dry up following major natural shocks where the community at large is 
affected, external remittances can still be significant as the senders are less likely to be affected. The 
role of remittances needs to be better understood, but at the least, ways need to be found to facilitate 
remittances that flow in after major shocks nets (Savage and Harvey, 2007). This together with the 
                                                      
 
39 Further information on regional use of social funds is available at the World Bank: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/EXTSF/0,,contentMDK:20893987
~menuPK:396384~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:396378~isCURL:Y,00.html   90
contribution of informal safety nets more generally, need to be integrated into a disaster 
management social protection and safety net strategy, to complement the provision of formal 
safety nets.  
 
Public-private partnerships are another source of financing that are still infrequently utilized in 
disaster risk management and social protection. This is a controversial but still under-researched area. 
While their role is limited in terms of providing social safety nets, it may be possible to explore the 
scope for working with the private sector in public works and also, insurance mechanisms.
40 Another 
interesting donor mechanism established to help countries affected by a disaster to coordinate their 
external assistance is the Disaster Management Fund for the Eastern Caribbean Donor Group 
(ECDG). It is not a safety net fund but it is an initiative for ex post disaster management, to 
coordinate the array of external assistance. Particularly noticeable about this initiative is that it is a 
combination not just of bilateral government and multilateral donors, but also of corporations. This 
interplay with the private sector could be a valuable link in assisting recovery of infrastructure.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the problems for middle to high income countries in 
particular, is that the impact of a disaster can have enormous economic consequences for the affected 
area, even if little impact on national growth.  Government intervention must be able to control this 
problem. In Cuba, the government, not the private employer, provides insurance against lost 
production following shocks. Although this is a burden on subsequent public expenditure, it seems to 
work successfully in Cuba, as it means that losses are dispersed across the society, and are not 
concentrated in the affected area, which would compound the negative impacts of the hazards 
(Oxfam, 2004). 
5.8.4  Multilateral donor funds 
There are a number of multilateral funds for financing disaster response but they tend to focus on 
relief efforts. If they prove to be effective they could be adapted to finance disaster prevention 
strategies. The UN Central Emergency Response Fund aims to provide funding for immediate life-
saving assistance at the onset of a humanitarian crisis. The Common Humanitarian Fund was to 
improve planning, prioritization and timeliness of response. The Consolidated Appeals Approach, like 
the CERF requests pledges from donor countries, but this time for broader development objectives 
following emergencies. Such initiatives account for less than ten percent of annual official 
                                                      
 
40 Of the US$65 billion of damage from natural disasters around the world in 2003, only US$15.8 billion was insured (World 
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humanitarian funding (Maxwell, 2008). Multilateral funding initiatives are discussed further below, in 
section 5.9. 
5.9  The international context 
There has been general growing attention in disaster risk reduction from the international stage, but 
although it can be implicit to strategies, the role of social protection as one of its pillars has been less 
vocalized.  At a national level a few countries such as Mexico and Cuba have adopted safety nets as 
an integral part of their disaster mitigation policies. At the regional and international level, while there 
is increasing support of multilateral approaches – such as the Association of Caribbean States, the 
Asian Development Bank, the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (1999) and the Hyogo 
Declaration and Framework for Action 2005 - social protection as part of that approach has been 
slower to catch on. This oversight is largely due to the tendency until recently, to regard natural 
disasters as exogenous events in the development continuum, rather than as integral to it. Thus social 
protection, which falls within the development rubric, has barely entered the disaster management 
handbook. 
 
Instead, donors remain responsive to emergency appeals rather than prevention, for three core 
reasons. From a political perspective, preventive mechanisms have little tangible benefit in the short 
term, for politicians. This is exacerbated by media pressure which focus on the disaster as more 
newsworthy (DFID, 2004; Peppiatt et al, 2004). At an institutional level, there is a lack of trust 
between the humanitarian community, actors, donors and national governments which has “limited 
the capacity to link analysis to programming.” The gaps in conceptual analysis, policy, programming 
and funding have led to an emphasis on response rather than prevention. Finally, combined with an 
aid architecture that is slow to reform, this has inhibited merging the boundaries between link relief 
and development (Maxwell et al, 2008).  
 
The above discussion has already emphasized that recovery and rehabilitation requires a long term 
commitment – both political and financial.
41 But this has yet to be to be fully accepted by 
governments, donors and even civil society. The World Bank IEG evaluation observed that the time 
needed to carry out disaster-related lending is consistently underestimated and concludes “the 
development community should engage with disaster-stricken borrowers earlier and stay engaged 
longer.” (World Bank, 2005) After the initial humanitarian phase and once a disaster has left the 
                                                      
 
41 Tearfund advocates that ten percent of all donor humanitarian assistance should be channeled into disaster risk reduction 
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public eye, pledges are frequently dropped and longer term commitments of resources are not 
forthcoming, severely inhibiting the recovery process. This is particularly true if a situation becomes 
politically volatile. Indeed, awareness that donor funding may only be available for a short time, can 
be problematic as there is an incentive for government departments and NGOs to access as much 
money as they can before it dries up. This could lead to higher inclusion errors and greater risks of 
corruption (ref). If fears of malpractice were assuaged governments, implementers and recipients 
could feel more secure that there would be continued access to funding. This in turn might reduce 
some of the moral hazard problem. The key message is that both governments and donors need to 
commit to a vision of long-term funding for the recovery process. 
 
Put the community in the driving seat.  The emphasis needs to be on locally-driven solutions, 
Firstly so that responses are tailored sustainably, to local needs and move away from a blueprint and 
secondly because local people are the first ones to provide assistance when a disaster does occur. 
Houghton, 2007 observed of the Tsunami response that international agencies often erroneously 
overlooked local capacities and that involvement was most effective when enabling, facilitating and 
supporting local actors. 
 
Streamlining procedures is necessary for accessing rapid financing in an emergency, by reducing 
processes for procuring and contracting work for relief and recovery. Some institutions have been 
able to slim down their procedures, but this seems to be implemented ad hoc. The World Bank has 
worked to streamline and reduce its operating processes during crisis and emergency response under 
OP/BP 8.00, so that emergency support and loans can be disbursed rapidly. Organizations should 
have disaster emergency procedures which allow them to automatically operate on a simplified basis. 
Such downsized procedures would require: 
•    modifying procurement rules; 
•    shortening deadlines for bid invitations and sole sourcing; 
•    contracting out; and 
•    providing higher advances as incentive for construction work in harsh, difficult conditions.  
 
Effective, coordinated and sustainable international responses. Despite commitments to the 
twenty-three Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship agreed to by most major 
bilateral donors in 2003, funding for humanitarian emergencies remains arbitrary. Combining this 
with the UN ‘Delivering as one’ approach to development, could make the way for a more integrated 
approach to donors managing natural disaster prevention and response missions. The Tsunami 
revealed the worrying extent of “uneven, inequitable flow of funds for emergencies that encourages   93
neither investments in capacity nor response that are proportionate to need.” Vested and short term 
interests seemed to take precedence as “donors often took funding decisions based on political 
calculation and media pressure” (Houghton, 2007, 40). The UN’s Cluster System Response which 
categorizes relief efforts into nine areas has had some success in improving the coordination. It was 
first used to respond to the Pakistan earthquake in 2005 with mixed reviews.
42 But it may yet emerge 
as one way of improving coordination and knowledge-sharing. 
 
This above issue of effectiveness of donor aid suggests the need for greater transparency and 
accountability in donors’ involvement in disaster relief and recovery work. Despite several initiatives 
to improve the quality of humanitarian work, there is no effective mechanism to sanction agencies for 
failing to meet their provisions. Improved access to information will raise the external pressure from 
the donor media and taxpayers to improve the quality of response (Houghton, 2007; Peppiatt et al, 
2004). The continued emphasis on the outputs rather than the outcomes of emergency assistance blurs 
the results in reporting and puts few demands on project and agency managers to ensure that 
assistance in effective. Maxwell et al identify “skepticism” in the way that donors make their 
assessments and decide to allocate their resources (Maxwell et al, 2008). Donors need policies that are 
more accountable to the recipients of assistance, while at the same time, donors’ parliaments have to 
be educated to ask the correct, challenging questions about what their aid has delivered.  
 
Pooled initiatives These initiatives seem pragmatic and may assuage concerns about delivering funds 
directly to disaster-affected governments but implicitly these face resistance from funding donors. 
National leaders stand to gain political capital from bilateral assistance and are understandably 
reticent to relinquish their oversight, control and expertise by contributing to a pool to finance 
projects. Such initiatives need to improve their credibility, but until they are shown to operate 
effectively, have significantly faster response times and effective capacity to deliver and monitor 
results they are unlikely to receive the resources necessary to do so. Thus, numerous reform processes 
for coordinating assistance face severe challenges – The Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, the 
Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP) and the Action for Learning Network for Accountability 
and Performance (ALNAP). As a whole, the humanitarian community needs to focus more on 
influencing the policy process, advocacy, gaining an evidence base and mobilizing the demand side 
(Maxwell et al, 2008). But if there is hesitancy to develop an integrated disaster mitigation 
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Humanitarian Exchange Magazine No. 37, March ODI. A second UN review of the cluster approach is currently underway.   94
mechanism, then there is still a role for a knowledge bank where national planners and project 
designers can access information and expertise on safety net experiences. 
 
For notes on making the bridge from development to disaster management and relief to recovery, 
see section 5.7. 
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6  Conclusion 
With the human toll from natural disasters each year coupled with the increasing financial cost of 
recovery, there is general agreement that response to and mitigation of natural disasters is insufficient. 
Measures to prevent disaster often fall between two separate disciplines – relief and development 
work, with each seeing disaster prevention as the task of the other. Since the 1990s, efforts to improve 
disaster management have taken numerous forms from national policies to regional coordination 
frameworks to international disaster funds but these tended to look at technical preventive 
mechanisms related to standards and procedures, and left the focus on people and livelihoods to the 
relief and recovery process. It is only more recently that this focus has begun to shift towards one that 
focuses on agency and improving the capacity of households to cope with disaster risk. 
 
This paper made the case for using safety nets to prevent and recover from the impacts of natural 
disaster. Then, it considered some ‘guidelines’ for implementing safety nets either to prevent and/or to 
recover from natural disasters. This conclusion follows the same structure.  
6.1  Why safety nets for responding to natural disasters? 
The relevance of considering safety nets as an essential part of the response to natural disasters is 
based upon (i) a longer term approach to natural disasters which sees these hazards as intrinsic to the 
development process and hence part of broader efforts to reduce vulnerability and alleviate poverty; 
(ii) an assertion that one of many mechanisms to mitigate the impact of natural hazards is to build 
households’ resilience to natural shocks; and (iii) a need to minimize impacts upon the local economy 
and for the poorest countries, the consequences on national growth.  
 
The traditional policy approach to disasters has been disaster risk management. This focuses on 
minimizing human loss and containing damage and economic losses. DRM sees natural hazards in 
isolation – the starting point being the shock itself - rather than nestled in an environment which can 
assist or detract from its objectives. Social protection is a more holistic approach, and while DRM is 
incorporated within it, DRM is lacking in three interlinked ways. It is not particularly focused on the 
poor, nor does it take a contextualized approach that allows a focus on livelihoods, as well as a longer 
term perspective. These three aspects are intrinsic to social policy and social protection. Social 
protection works with the public, the private and the informal sectors. Social safety nets, can work 
through these sectors to focus on individuals, households and communities. The transfers are to 
protect households and individuals but may also have transformative consequences.   96
Natural disasters can be classified according to the type and timing of risks – measured by both 
impact (outcome) and frequency. The two types of natural disaster, geophysical and hydro-
meteorological correspond with the extremes on the risk scale. Geophysical disasters (earthquakes, 
volcanoes, tsunamis) tend to be low risk, but they are rapid onset and have a high impact. Hydro-
meteorological is of two types: rapid onset and extreme (hurricanes and cyclones). The second group 
of hydro-meteorological disasters includes droughts, floods and erratic rainfall. They are higher risk 
(frequency) but usually slow-onset. Even these distinctions are open to challenge, as it is generally 
accepted that climate change is affecting the frequency of rapid-onset hydro-meteorological disasters 
and the impacts of disasters are often poorly monitored, but albeit simplified, this is encapsulated in a 
simplified form in Table 2. 
 
What stands out starkly in this risk matrix is high frequency natural events evolve into disasters only 
in low income countries. The implications of this classification for safety nets are as follows: For the 
low risk, high and rapid impact disasters, safety nets as a preventive mechanism have relatively little 
value because the destruction to assets and buildings and livelihoods is so extreme. To reduce the risk 
of these disasters, ex ante safety nets are probably not an effective tool. However, in the aftermath, 
they are one of an array of important tools for relief and recovery of people and their livelihoods. For 
slow onset hazards, it is necessary to address the underlying poverty and vulnerability as much as the 
shocks that triggered the crisis. Safety nets are a necessary tool to help prevent disaster, as they 
provide transfers, support consumption and help with asset building in order to increase the ability of 
people to withstand these types of shocks.  
 
A lack of political will is one of the main hindrances to implementing safety nets. It is argued that 
they create dependency and are regressive, thus financially unsustainable. While they can win 
political capital amongst the poor, they can lose it among the financial elites. Moreover, they can 
create a demand which politicians are uncertain they can sustain. In Cuba with a well developed 
network of safety nets, “[p]eople basically expect this commitment on the part of the government” 
(Oxfam, 2004). This is precisely their value, because in the long term, this forges a social contract 
between state and citizen, whereby the government – and donors too - can be held to account if they 
fail to protect its people. 
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Box 4.   Summary: The contribution of social protection and safety nets to disaster prevention, mitigation 
and recovery 
To summarize, the contribution of the contextualized dynamic approach of social protection to 
manage disasters are the following: 
1.  It views the development trajectory as an uneven continuum, in which can be distinguished 
different ‘layers’ of risk and into which, natural hazards can fit as endogenous events, that can be 
internalized into planning. 
2.  It focuses on the poor - who are risk averse and can afford fewer chances to move to less 
hazardous situations. 
3.  It views the varying levels of poverty as dynamic, which people can fluctuate into and out of.  
4.  It focuses on people as agents of change – which creates the space for community-driven 
responses. 
5.  It focuses on sustainable livelihoods, recognizing that some require assistance to become self-
supporting, or to maintain their resilience if they suffer shocks. 
This differs from DRM which focuses more at the macro-level and which has a more static unilateral 
approach to natural disaster.  
The major contribution of safety nets is five-fold.  
1.  Prevention is cheaper than cure: Safety nets can help prevent the negative impact of certain 
types of natural shocks from developing into disasters by reducing the vulnerability of 
households. 
2.  They are also a more generic poverty and disaster reduction tool – and so can achieve 
multiple objectives – both poverty reduction and for prevention of certain types of disaster. 
3.  Where operating in a country already, they can be relatively easy to scale up in the event of a 
shock and scale down by altering the targeting and transfer levels; they therefore can 
transition from short term to longer term rehabilitation after a shock. 
4.  They can help create a social contract between state and citizen, where the state can be held 
accountable for protecting its population. 
Safety nets are important in the aftermath of disasters generally, but they are particularly important in 
helping to prevent impact of slow onset, hydro-meteorological disasters. 
 
Therefore the argument is that safety nets must be incorporated into risk strategies. Safety nets need to 
be part of the risk prevention policy – for countries exposed to high-to-medium risk hydro-
meteorological hazards. They need to be incorporated as part of the short to long term rehabilitation 
process in disaster recovery plans.   98
6.2  Key issues to approach, design and implement safety nets for natural disasters 
Without a comprehensive understanding of the context in which a safety net is being implemented, it 
is difficult to create an effective program. Section 3 set out to show through the case studies, how 
avoidable mistakes had been made because of a simple failure to properly assess a situation. This is 
more understandable when implementing a safety net – ex post, and at speed. This can be summarized 
in ten key points: 
1.  Three types of safety net for natural disaster were identified: (i) Ex ante safety nets, which focus 
on reducing vulnerability and overall poverty, which in turn increases the resistance of 
households to slow onset and weather-related natural shocks. These can also be scaled up if a 
shock deepens; (ii) Ex post safety nets which are planned in advance to kick into effect after a 
shock and/or in response to certain agreed triggers; and (iii) Unplanned ex post safety nets, 
implemented in response to a sudden, unexpected need.  
2.  This paper advocates using this third type of safety net only if necessary, ex ante and ex post 
planned safety nets should be set in place instead. It urges that states design safety net plans to be 
used in case of a sudden shock, especially in high-risk countries, whilst recognizing that there are 
financial and possibly political costs of doing so. For countries at risk from slower onset and 
weather-related hazards – inevitably low income countries, implementing ex ante safety nets is 
essential for reducing poverty and vulnerability that causes susceptibility to natural hazards. 
3.  Ex ante safety nets to prevent impact of (slow onset) natural disasters are not stand alone 
mechanisms, but are really synonymous with safety nets for poverty reduction and asset 
protection and therefore need to be integrated into poverty reduction policy and safety net 
programs. Linkages to other services such as income generating projects or remittances, are 
particularly important particularly at the pre-disaster and in the medium-long term recovery 
stages. Safety nets alone are also by not sufficient for disaster reduction. In most contexts they 
must work in tandem with other approaches such as early warning systems
43, building regulations, 
flood barriers and environmental protection. Some of these issues were covered briefly in section 
4, but extend beyond the scope of this paper. 
4.  The design of a safety net must focus on the needs of different vulnerable groups within the 
targeted population. This includes the sick, injured and disabled, orphans, carers and female-
headed households – whose needs may be particularly acute in the aftermath of a disaster. 
5.  Ongoing understanding of the contextual situation is necessary, to identify and rectify problems – 
particularly when programs have been set up in haste. 
                                                      
 
43 See Peppitatt et al, 2004, for more on integrating early warning systems into psrogramming and project design.   99
6.  As the local community holds the most knowledge of the local situation, community participation 
in the design and implementation process. In general safety nets should be as decentralized as 
possible in order to be best suited to the local context. 
7.  Safety nets are sensitive mechanisms – small ‘tweaks’ to the design can have significant effect on 
impacts of the program. Although they share a common structure, they cannot conform to a 
blueprint and must be tailored to the needs of the community, hence the need for substantial 
community involvement to help shape their design. 
8.  While the design structure of safety nets is largely consistent, there is considerable scope for the 
particular characteristics. Project designers can be more ‘creative’ in their approach – resisting 
conforming to a few landmark programs and paying more attention to the nuances of the 
individual situation. Focusing on the ‘build back better’ approach to disaster recovery can help 
this – so that for example, ways to create more durable or profitable livelihoods can be found 
9.  Baselines, monitoring and evaluation are crucial to safety nets, with respect to problem 
identification, impact evaluation and lesson-learning. The system requires mechanisms that 
provide horizontal and vertical linkages between and across administrative layers and enable 
systematic information-gathering, analysis and follow-up of targeting and appeals in order to 
strengthen transparency and accountability (Wahenga, 2007).  
10. Instituting safety nets as part of social protection for managing disaster risk, requires policy 
changes, media interest and donor commitment. 
6.3  Key issues for the design and implementation of safety nets for natural disasters 
Natural disasters and poverty are bound in a mutually reinforcing crisis cycle. Building the resistance 
of people and their livelihoods to disaster requires addressing the underlying poverty. At the policy 
level, they need to be seen as part of the problem of poverty. At the program level, they need to 
become embedded as manageable events within the project cycle. At the institutional level, the 
development and humanitarian arms of affected governments, donors and NGOs need to be better 
integrated.  
 
1.  Context. A thorough understanding of the context is essential to good design, without which, 
programs tend towards blueprints rather than a contextualized program. Safety nets can falter 
particularly during targeting, due to lack of knowledge about the population. Section 3, explored 
six factors that should frame the design of safety net programs following a natural event.  
2.  Policy environment. Ideally safety nets for disaster risk reduction, should be embedded within 
national policy. Lessons from ex ante safety nets in Bangladesh illustrated this. The government   100
had implemented a series of changes to the agricultural structure of the country, which when 
coupled with social safety nets, meant the poorest were less vulnerable to subsequent floods. 
3.  Strong analytical basis. It is important to establish an effective early warning system, cost-benefit 
analysis, environmental assessment, rapid response assessment. 
4.   Differentiate  between  vulnerable groups. SSNs need to be tailored to the needs of different 
groups, differentiated for example, by income, livelihood, and by capability (such as disabled, 
pregnant and nursing mothers, female-headed households, the older generation and orphans). 
Also give attention to the needs of host communities to minimize friction and ensure that they do 
not adversely suffer due to incoming migrant groups. 
5.  Infrastructure and human capacity will influence how to organize and deliver transfers. Lack of 
capacity should not detract from achieving long term shifts in how business is done. Training, 
upgrading and re-planning exercises must be ongoing. 
6.  Programs should make use of and strengthen existing safety nets, management and delivery 
mechanisms where appropriate. 
7.  Disruption to the affected and host groups should be minimized. It may be better to shelter 
disaster-affected groups on/near their original plots of land rather than re-house them away from 
the affected areas, but to ensure (Kennedy et al, 2007). This highlights how the type of assistance 
in the emergency phase can assist the recovery and rehabilitation phase, underscoring again, the 
need for a pre-planned safety net strategy.  
8.  Consider how to involve other potential safety net actors: informal safety nets – such as 
encouraging ease of access to remittance transfers; utilizing the private sector.; etc. 
9.  Institutional management. The implementing department must be well mandated to implement the 
program and sufficiently empowered to foster coordination rather than competition with other 
departments. The implementation of safety nets should be as decentralized as possible, so that 
local administrations can tailor the program to local need. Plans must include management and 
coordination of external donors after a disaster. 
10. Targeting should involve the community as much as possible, including through the appeals 
system. There is a trade-off between cost and effectiveness of targeting.  
11. Transfers: Cash is advocated where possible although it should be noted that in several 
evaluations, participants say they prefer a combination of cash and in-kind transfers because this 
can fulfill a variety needs. 
12. Delivery is concerned with timeliness, frequency, and quantity. This may need to be flexible to 
meet different needs, particularly with large scale safety nets and so that they can be scaled up in 
certain areas when a shock occurs. Security and cost to recipients are also important issues, 
particularly in the aftermath of disasters.   101
13. M&E is crucial at all stages of the safety net. This is rarely sufficiently resourced and inhibits 
improving the current program or building a knowledge bank of effective practices. 
14. Financing: There are a number of financing options for a safety net. Nationally, there are 
interesting innovations with revolving disaster funds in Mexico. There may be options for public-
private partnerships, also. At the international level, coordinated safety net disaster funds, can 
provide more accountability for donor money than haphazard emergency appeals. 
15. The shift from the relief to recovery and rehabilitation. On the design side, this involves 
reconsidering changing the type, quantity, targeting and scale of transfers and requires linking to 
other programs and services. On implementation, it requires reassessing how the safety net is 
implemented – such as demilitarizing relief and integrating relief and development agents. 
16. Phasing out a safety net can face resistance where it has become perceived as an entitlement. 
Firstly, it is necessary to manage expectations and precede the safety net with a strong 
information campaign that informs recipients as to the purpose and proposed duration or 
entitlement to the transfers from the start. Secondly, programs should be phased out gradually, by 
offering other lines of support such as income-earning opportunities, employment schemes and 
credit. 
17. The role of governmental and non-governmental donors. (i) Without some accountability or 
sanctions in disaster management, we may not see effective protection of those vulnerable to 
disaster. (ii) Natural disaster also has to be incorporated into risk management policies, with 
safety nets as part of that risk reduction policy, as DFID has begun to do. (iii) An ethos of 
coordination not competitiveness needs to be nurtured within the donor community. 
 
The main observation from the case studies validates previous findings that natural disasters are not 
simply the result of ‘natural’ forces. On the human development side, the factors are poverty and 
vulnerability, and on the structural side, insufficient early warning systems (or capacity to react to 
them) and lack of preventive infrastructure such as flood barriers and building standards. This paper 
focused only on the former. The characteristics of safety nets makes them a good mechanism for 
addressing the poverty factor and also to help people and their livelihoods to recover in the aftermath.  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia lag behind South America in establishing safety nets. In Asia structures 
are being put in place including at the regional level, whereas in Africa they are particularly 
insubstantial. Although they are increasingly on the agenda, uptake of safety nets rapidly is a hefty 
challenge and there are some champions – Malawi and Ethiopia. South America and the Caribbean 
are far ahead, with a social safety net welfare system functioning in each country, which makes it far 
easier to integrate into a disaster reduction and mitigation policy. This welfare system is an important   102
part of disaster response, as Oxfam observed of Cuba’s effective disaster risk management strategy, 
because it means that people do not enter the system when they are affected, but are already part of 
the system and can be more easily monitored and accounted for when a shock occurs (Oxfam, 2004). 
 
Countries should be encouraged to build up their own forms of resistance to natural shocks, which can 
be accountable not just to donors, but to the society. Cuba’s impressive approach to risk management 
appears to be embedded in the social and institutional fabric of society (Oxfam, 2004). Safety nets and 
disaster management plans should continue to be lobbied for among governments, although this will 
take time to establish in each country. Donors need to be cognizant of this reality and also provide a 
stimulus and structure with which countries can build up their safety net portfolio. 
 
Ex ante safety nets can come about in two ways. Firstly as a concerted policy decision, as with 
Ethiopia’s PSNP which was “the first attempt of the humanitarian community to approach risk in a 
social protection fashion, determining in advance of a crisis…intervening with mechanisms that are 
then able to avert or mitigate a crisis before it occurs.” (Maxwell et all, 2008). While this approach is 
advocated in this paper, empirically, emergency safety nets are usually the catalyst for long term 
safety nets. “Experience shows that major disasters trigger changes in national institutional and 
legislative systems and offer the prospect to get political commitment for long lasting improvements.” 
(Demeter, 2007, 2). So disasters can provide the impetus to institutionalize safety nets both to address 
chronic poverty and to protect against and scale up when the next disaster strikes – as occurred with 
India’s MEGS and the Bangladesh VGD program. The simultaneous occurrence of natural disasters 
and the implementation of safety nets creates need for and generates government commitment to 
deliver protection for its citizens and this builds the social contract, by which government can be held 
accountable for doing so.  
 
Preparations for this paper also revealed a number of gaps in the literature that require further 
research. This paper exposed once again the weakness in knowledge and understanding of how to 
implement safety nets and in the translation from the drawing board to the field. This requires more 
rigorous data collection and analysis of the safety nets that are currently run or being piloted, which 
can draw attention to innovative safety net designs. More evidence needs to be gathered about the 
impacts that safety nets have had in both preventing and recovering from natural disasters. A careful 
review of the results of surveys being undertaken in Aceh and Pakistan for example, will be 
worthwhile. Measurement of disasters continues to be registered in the negative in terms of lives lost 
and infrastructure damaged, rather than lives saved and crises averted, hence it is even more difficult 
to broadcast the safety net success stories. Linked to this, measurement of costing and cost-benefit   103
analysis of preventive measures need to be improved (Maxwell et al, 2008). The contribution of 
public works to natural disaster reduction needs to be more comprehensively assessed, in particular. 
Safety net ‘champions’ need to be identified and lessons learned from experienced countries as to 
how and what they did to successfully lesson the toll of natural shocks on their population. Some 
aspects of safety nets may provide opportunities for engaging with the private sector, but so far these 
are little known or considered. There is scope for improving the role of the informal sector with 
regard to both prevention and mitigation of natural disasters and efforts need to go into encouraging 
and complementing them during smaller shocks and in times of crisis. 
 
To establish safety nets ex ante and plan for safety nets ex post, requires improving experience-
sharing and expanding knowledge for different safety net programs, effective design and planning and 
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ANNEX I  Case studies 
AI.1  Bangladesh: Cyclone Sidr, November 2007 
On November 9, 2007, Bangladesh’s advanced warning system for tropical cyclones tracked an 
intense storm heading towards its south-eastern coast issued a ‘great danger’ signal. Sustained 
wind speeds of up to 210kph were predicted within 74km of the storm’s center as well as a coastal 
storm surge. Bangladesh’s Cyclone Preparedness Program went into action. Its 44,000 pre-
organized volunteers were mobilized to implement a community-based warning system utilizing 
megaphones and other modes of communication. 
 
Three million people were evacuated and 1.5 million were accommodated in cyclone shelters by 
the time the cyclone hit early on the evening of November 15th. From November 13th, cash, rice 
and house-building grants were issued under the National Disaster Management strategy. Within 
one month, $217 million was received from the international community, (despite no formal 
appeal). The focus of attention was on female-headed households (at least five percent of the 
population). Government relief programs and Most NGOs provided relief in kind, while national 
organizations waived loan payments owed by those affected. Of the fifteen national and 
international organizations that provided assistance, only four provided cash (two provided one-
off bereavement compensation, and Grameen and ASA temporarily suspended installment 
payments from borrowers). A monitoring and evaluation system were also prepared and in place. 
Background 
The Bangladeshi government had been faced with repeated floods every three years. It embarked 
on a multiple-pronged and long-term strategy to reform the country’s susceptibility to these 
events. Not all of its mechanisms for risk management were so calculated: for over a decade it had 
been committed to a long-term liberalization plan for the rice market structure, which helped ease 
the impacts of the 1998 floods. When faced with a poor harvest and insufficient food aid in 1997, 
it embarked on a shorter term plan to a) maintain the food markets and b) provide assistance if 
needed. 
1.  It accelerated its liberalization plan, by continuing to encourage private sector imports of 
rice by decreasing import tariffs and caps on rice imports and expediting the customs 
process. These both stabilized local prices, but made it profitable for traders to import rice 
from India. By sustaining this open policy to private imports of rice, prices did not 
increase too much, once the floods began. The share of the private sector to the rice 
market at this time was six times the government’s contribution and the government had 
reduced its previous reliance upon public sector interventions. 
2.  The government also had the foresight to recognize that in the face of recurrent floods, the 
current agricultural practices were unsustainable. It made a structural change in 
Bangladesh’s agriculture. It increased investment in the boro winter crop in order to 
decrease the country’s dependence upon the flood-susceptible monsoon season crop. By 
expanding the private market sector also, the markets developed quickly and could 
respond to the shortfall in production.  
3.  It also continued to provide government assistance to affected households when needed 
through its safety nets. The government still distributed rice to flood-affected households 
through its two programs: immediate relief through Gratuitous Relief (to 16.2% of 
affected households) and ongoing support for the poorest through Vulnerable Group 
Feeding (41.5% of households). 
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AI.2  Ethiopia: The 2008 food emergency 
Following a poor harvest in late 2007 and the failure of the first rains in February-April 2008, 
WFP nutritional surveillance activities noted exacerbated rates of malnutrition. The alert was 
even raised early on, where the late 2007 rains had failed in the southern areas. Several types of 
people requiring food assistance have been identified: (i) drought affected areas outside PSNP 
woredas experiencing serious malnutrition, (ii) PSNP participants in drought-affected areas; (iii) 
non-participants in PSNP drought-affected woredas . The food needs for Ethiopia in 2008 are 
double that of a non-drought year. This year, 380,000MT (approximately $300 million) are 
required to meet emergency needs. 
 
To meet the needs, Donors have pledged an additional US$ 60 million in cash (US$9.8 million 
from DFID and $50 million from the World Bank) and approximately 60,000MT in grain 
(19,000 from CIDA and 40,000MT from WFP’s Global Resources. This will provide those in 
hot-spot areas with three months of additional food and participants in drought-affected PSNP 
woredas (without serious malnutrition) will receive an additional two months of resources. Those 
outside PSNP woredas will be covered by the Emergency Appeal. 
The Productive Safety Net Program 
Ethiopia’s PSNP employs approximately eight million food insecure citizens annually across the 
four major food insecure regions and two city-states in the country. Employees are paid with 
food and/or cash in return for work on community-based public works activities for up to 6 
months of the year. Public works are based on the communities’ Watershed Development Plans. 
Activities include environmental rehabilitation, improving agricultural productivity and 
improving access and services for the community. The program year begins in January; 
payments are monthly and are expected to be completed by the end of July. Labor-poor 
households, which included the sick, the elderly, children and pregnant and nursing mothers, 
may receive ‘direct support’ instead of working on the public works. In pastoral regions, the 
program runs for nine months of the year, due to the extended food shortages in these areas. 
 
The program has two types of contingencies. The larger contingency component that is in the 
process of being set up is to meet transient food insecurity and respond to longer-term needs by 
establishing a fully scalable program (discussed below). The other contingency that has been 
available throughout the program gives regions access to twenty percent additional resources as a 
contingency each year. This allows them to employ additional people if there is a high demand 
for the program or extend the length of months that any one household/individual is covered by 
the program. Of this twenty percent, seventy-five percent is held at regional level and twenty-
five percent at district, or woreda, level.  
 
Targeting is conducted in September, preceding the start of the PSNP cycle in January. This 
who, and for how many months each participant will receive transfers for that year. After three 
months of transfer, there is a retargeting exercise to correct any exclusion errors and to verify 
whether those already on the program need an increase or decrease in months or type of transfer. 
The contingency funds are drawn on to meet these additional resource needs. In reality, the huge 
numbers of chronically food insecure households combined with the pressure on resources to 
limit participants in the program, means that each year the contingency funds are used in several 
regions de facto to increase the caseload – as a buffer, instead of being reserved for a re-targeting 
exercise in a critical year. Unused contingency funds in one year run over to the next and are 
only ‘topped up’ to the twenty percent of that year’s base costs. This creates an incentive to 
spend the contingency each year. To a very limited extent therefore, the program is therefore 
already scalable, or at least, expandable to meet the most desperate needs.   115
AI.3  Pakistan: Earthquake, October 2005 
The Pakistan earthquake affected two main areas of northern Pakistan, Azad Jammu and Pakistan-
administered Kashmir (AJK) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). This is a 
mountainous area of approximately 5.7 million people (World Bank, 2005), densely populated in 
the agricultural areas with poor links to main urban areas, which is especially isolated in the winter 
months.  
 
There are mixed livelihoods patterns for the rural population. While most households work on 
farmland, despite the limited potential of agriculture in the area, livelihoods are predominantly 
cash and market-based. Agriculture acts as a safety net for better-off households but is a more 
permanent income stream for the poorest. Remittances are widespread and one of the most 
important sources of income representing 34% of income in 68% of households in AZK and 25% 
for the poorest 20%. The average monthly wage is Rs 4,000 (US$67) in rural areas. 
 
Basic services and utilities are low. There are a number of state transfers aimed at the poorest, 
which are administered by local committees. The Zakat cash transfer delivers Rs200/month 
(US$3.4 in 2005). The Pakistan Bait-ul-Maal is a collection of cash and wheat subsidy schemes, 
of which the largest is the Food Support Program, aimed to assist the poorest households with 
food purchases. It provides Rs3000 per year (US$50.30 in 2005). Therefore, compared to the 
average monthly wage, these transfers are extremely low. Moreover, levels of corruption and 
patronage are believed to be high within the program. There are also a number of micro-credit 
programs. But there is an absence of public social protection which can provide reliable income 
support. Poorer households survive on subsistence agriculture, shop credit and informal transfers 
from the community. 
 
On October 8
th, 2005, a major earthquake took place over a 30,000km
2 area, northeast of 
Islamabad. The event measured 7.5 on the rector scale and was followed by over 2000 seismic 
aftershocks, leaving 200 million tons of debris. 73,000 people were killed, 69,000 were severely 
injured, 128,000 were injured, and 3.5 million people were left homeless. Women and children 
were the largest groups affected, as well as the disabled and orphaned children. Infrastructure was 
badly damaged: with the destruction of 80% healthcare and most educational facilities and 
destruction or damage to 60,000 homes and 6,400km. On the economic front, the earthquake was 
projected to have a negative 0.4% effect on GDP and a regional decrease of 10% productivity in 
NWFP and 50% in AZK. In AZK alone, 80% of standing crops were destroyed and over 50% of 
arable land became unusable. There was huge disruption to rural and urban livelihoods, with 
initial losses of 33% in agriculture, 60% in the manufacturing industry, over 50% losses in both 
trade and transport. The dependency on informal employment, remittances and secondary sources 
of income was such that lost employment was likely to have a profound effect on the levels of 
extreme poverty for households.  
 
By October 10
th, the Federal Relief Commission was created to coordinate all response. Two 
weeks later the Earthquake Rehabilitation and Recovery Authority was formed. The military 
response was immense and effective, although initial relief response was slow. International 
agencies and donors responded slowly due to a combination of factors: some were not operating in 
Pakistan and so lacked knowledge of the area; there were poor relations with the government; 
commitments were already stretched following the Tsunami and the Sudan crises; and the military 
were reluctant to release maps or satellite images because of the conflict zone. After three weeks a 
National Action Plan was released.  
 
Several other issues affected the type and speed of response. The earthquake followed local 
elections and a period of change in local administration. Aside from the military government at the 
time, there has also been an ongoing military presence and a history of armed groups in both areas. 
Indeed, attacks and killings were ongoing even in the aftermath of the earthquake. Poor weather 
hampered the medium term efforts, as snow began in November severely limiting access to   116
mountainous areas. The priority was to build shelter and then look for labor, although men were 
reluctant to leave women and children in camps in order to take paid work. After an initial 
disruption, informal remittance and networks were rapidly re-established.  There was also a large 
return of national and international migrant workers who brought cash with them.  
 
Under the Livelihoods Support Cash Grant (LSCG), the World Bank provided a Rs 3000 (US$ 50) 
monthly cash transfer to the 250,000 most vulnerable households for six months. The Food 
Support Program continued, although relief and recovery programs were not given, given the 
number of NGO programs in place. On a longer term basis, during the following winter, 
agricultural inputs were provided and while 85% of displaced people had already returned to the 
villages, Oxfam observed that only 17% had even begun to rebuild their homes. The LSCG was 
extended for six months. House reconstruction was slow, partly because a large number of the 
affected had been tenants. Under the ERRA’s livelihood project, only 7 out of 26 projects had 
begun. Less than two years after the earthquake, international agencies withdrew their expatriate 
staff because of the deteriorating security situation.  
 
The LSCG became popular and continued – giving weight to the argument that crises can provide 
the political opportunity for the introduction or expansion of social protection programs. There is 
little evaluation of the impact of various programs – such as to how markets functioned following 
the quake, particularly meeting the demand for particular assets such as seeds and livestock; 
whether the agricultural training was effective; and the wellbeing of women under the different 
schemes. Some activities were criticized for being gender biased, for example encouraging women 
in sewing and embroidery rather than other opportunities, including agriculture. 
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AI.4  Indonesia: Tsunami, December 2004 
 
Prior to the Tsunami on 26
th December, 2004, Aceh province of Indonesia had a population of 
four million across 57,400 km
2 area. Production of oil and natural gas accounted for 40% of 
Aceh’s Gross Regional Product, while agriculture contributed 32%, although 47% of employment. 
While its oil and gas resources made it one of the richest provinces in Indonesia it was also one of 
the poorest. Its growth was lagging and manufactures were in decline due to conflict and under-
investment, poor infrastructure and market access and a lack of diversification of economic 
activity. Even prior to the Tsunami, poverty was widespread, with an estimated 28.5% (1.2 million 
people) below the poverty line. Since 2002, the Department of Social Welfare has run KUBE, a 
social fund program which targeted 40% of the population, although operations were restricted 
because of a shortage of community volunteers on which it was dependent. Some areas of Aceh 
also had access to the community-funded Kecamantan Development Program. 
 
The Tsunami on December 26
th, 2004 left 4% of the population of Aceh dead (130,736 people) or 
missing (36,804 people) and 504,518 people (13%) displaced. On the West coast, over one quarter 
(64,644) of farmers was dead or missing. The young and old were disproportionately affected, 
with women affected in a ratio of 3:2, compared with men. The cost of damage assets across 
multiple sectors (social, productive, infrastructure and others) was US$2.9 billion. 15% of homes 
were destroyed and 60,000ha of agricultural land were affected. Fishing was the worst affected 
industry, 300,000 lost their entire income resources, with damage or the loss of two thirds of 
boats, over one quarter of ports, harbors and landing sites rendered inoperable and the aquaculture 
along the coast on which much of the fishing depends permanently destroyed or damaged – a loss 
of $400million. The economic loss of the Tsunami was estimated at $1.5 billion, equivalent to 
32% of GRP. 
 
Despite the security situation inhibiting the response of international agencies, safety nets were 
instituted quite rapidly in the form of cash-for-work activities, clearing debris. A back-to-school 
program was launched in January – it was patchy at first but recovered well, with 83% enrollment 
across all ages.. WFP provided 629,314 people with monthly food rations and a UNDP program 
provided 16,000 people with livelihood support. The Uang Lauk Pauk was a relief cash allowance 
for the three months following the Tsunami.  Just as the president had declared the relief phase 
over on March 4
th, the medium-term recovery and reconstruction operations were hampered by a 
huge earthquake off Nias in March 2005, which disrupted the livelihoods of 90% of the 
population. An estimated 80,000-110,000 houses needed to be rebuilt, but by November, on 
16,205 had been completed with another 13,225 in progress. The KDP was extended to the whole 
province on Aceh and Nias Conflict continued to hamper the recovery process and only in August 
was a ceasefire signed. By January a minority of the population still needed assistance, the 
livelihoods support program had increased up to 44,000. 
 
As the recovery phase took pace, daily wages overtook agricultural wages as the primary source of 
income, although humanitarian aid remained one of the top five sources of income, alongside 
trade and services. Some quarters criticized food aid for the slow recovery of agriculture. There 
were cases of corruption, conflict over land ownership, problems with contractors. Despite these 
delays, by November 2006, 26% of the population was below the poverty line, versus 28.5% prior 
to the Tsunami. Inflation was down to 8.1% from 41% in October 2005. Yet following needs 
reassessments, requirements for support rose again – either due to exclusion during the first round 
or mis-assessment of the level of damage. 
 
Observation of the Indonesia case showed that cash-for-work programs could not reach all the 
needy population, particularly female-headed households and other groups which are typically on 
the fringes of society – and who continued to experience extreme poverty. It points to the 
importance of targeting the particularly susceptible population groups in a crisis.  
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The Government was already operating a number of social safety nets, introduced following the 
1997 financial crisis. These predominantly covered food subsidies, cash for work, educational 
scholarships, subsidized healthcare and a community social fund scheme. In the wake of the fuel 
price rises in 2005, further social transfers, particularly subsidies and the first national Direct Cash 
Transfer scheme (the Subsidi Langsung Tunai) were introduced. The SLT was retained and 
extended to 16 million people in 2006. The main post-Tsunami government transfer was Uang 
Lauk Pauk (ULP) which was a daily cash allowance  of US$0.32 (in 2005 value) provided for nine 
months from the recovery phase to half a million displaced people. Another Government 
allowance was the JADUP, a daily transfer of US$3.25 per household although distribution was 
extremely intermittent. Other programs were non-government run cash-for-work programs, 
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AI.5  Niger: Drought and Food Crisis, 2005
44 
Shocks, such as droughts, floods, pest attacks, health epidemics and economic shocks have been 
very common in Niger.  Over the past 12 years, Niger has experienced three severe droughts, two 
of which were associated with food crises (1997-98 and 2004-05). In 2005, an estimated 2.4 
million Nigeriens were affected by severe food shortages, with more than 800,000 of these 
classified as critically food insecure (USAID FEWSNET 2005). Although, the 2004-05 food crisis 
was not of the scale of the 1968-74 or 1983-84 famines, the gross mortality rate reached 1.5 
deaths per 10,000 per day in certain regions, and the child mortality rate reached 4.1 deaths per 
10,000 per day. 
 
More than 50 percent of Niger’s population is estimated to be chronically food insecure, with over 
40 percent of the total population suffering from extreme chronic food insecurity (e.g. per capita 
caloric consumption of less than 1800 kcal/person/day). In addition to chronic food insecurity, 
much of Niger’s population suffers from seasonal and transitory food insecurity evidenced by the 
annual hungry season (soudure) and the frequent shocks. These shocks not only have an 
immediate impact on households’ food security, but can also have longer-term consequences and 
leave households in debt or without the necessary assets to guarantee a minimum level of 
production. In addition, food insecurity is aggravated by high incidences of rural poverty, which 
translate at the household level into low purchasing power, lack of access to food by vulnerable 
groups, rampant malnutrition, and poor access to health facilities.   
 
Since the Sahelian famines of the 1970s, a variety of governmental and non-governmental 
institutions have been established to prepare for and respond to food crises in Niger.  The Niger’s 
Food Production Office (Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger - OPVN) was established in order 
to manage the purchase and sale of staple cereals (millet and sorghum) in the country.  In 1998, 
the GoN created a new structure for managing food crises, the National Body for the Prevention 
and Management of Food Crises (Dispositif National de la Prevention et la Gestion des Crises 
Alimentaires, or DNPGCA) with the objective to reduce food insecurity by ensuring better 
coordination among the various organizations. In addition, there are a number of non-
governmental and international actors involved in the prevention of and response to food crises. 
These include non-governmental organization, such as Africare, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, 
and WVI; international bodies (WFP, FAO, UNICEF), regional structures (i.e., CILSS) and 
donors (ie, the European Union, USAID’s Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET). 
 
Despite important efforts and available climatic, production, price and food security data, the 
national, regional and international early warning systems were not able to predict in an accurate 
and timely manner the magnitude, scope and location of the food crisis in 2005 which caught 
national policy-makers and the international community by surprise. In one sense, the major cause 
of the crisis was the extremely low level of household income, which leaves many households on 
the brink of serious malnutrition even in years of normal harvests and prices. The additional 
shocks in 2005 that tipped the balance from risk to reality of a food crisis were:  
 
o  losses in food production and incomes for those farmers whose late 2004 harvests were 
affected by drought and locusts; and  
o  a sharp rise in food prices in Niger as of March-April 2005, which reduced household 
access to food for all net purchasers.  
 
 
In 2007, the GoN has developed a national contingency plan for food security and nutrition with 
the participation of a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors to improve the 
functioning of its emergency response interventions. The document outlines the strategies 
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priorities (including early warning indicators, i.e., cereal deficit, food prices and severe 
malnutrition) for the Government and development partners in preventing and managing food 
crises in the country. The overall objective of the plan is to minimize the impact of food crises by 
ensuring households’ access to staple foods and protecting their assets, mainly via the national 
security stock and emergency cash resources (i.e., general food distribution, FFW, CFW, 
subsidized sales, seed distributions). However, there is still lack of agreement regarding the 
relative effectiveness of safety net interventions in Niger.   
 
Safety Net Interventions during the 2005 Food Crisis 
 
In 2004/2005, the government response’s to the food crisis, with support of non-governmental 
agencies and international organizations, consisted mainly of a range of emergency schemes:  
 
(i)  Food aid for direct emergency distribution in three types of programs:  vulnerable 
feeding programs; Food for Work (FFW) programs; and cereal banks. Vulnerable 
feeding programs during the crisis included (i) general distribution programs, which 
provided general rations to entire communities, regardless of gender, age or 
nutritional status; and (ii) therapeutic feeding programs, which involved providing 
intensive curative care for severely malnourished recipients, primarily children under 
5. FFW programs during the crisis provided food aid (usually to all households in the 
community) in return for work on community-based infrastructure projects, such as 
demi-lunes in community pastures or farm-to-market roads. Finally, in some 
communities, food aid was provided to replenish the stocks of existing cereals banks, 
or new cereal banks were created (in addition to an initial stock); 
 
(ii)  Sale of cereals at subsidized prices. The GoN sold approximately 40,000 MT of 
subsidized cereals in Niamey and other regions between February and June 2005 
(WFP 2005b), with 12,750 MT sold in February-April 2005, and 30,000 MT sold 
between April-May 2005; 
  
 
(iii)  Provision of “Cash-for-Work” (CFW) programs to raise the purchasing power of 
affected households in targeted areas and Seed Vouchers and Fairs (SVFs),  in 
particularly food insecure areas.  In the SVFs, participants were provided with 
vouchers (worth a specific amount) to purchase the seeds; seed sellers included 
farmers and/or traders in the area.  The primary idea behind the SVFs was to mitigate 
the medium-term impact of the food crisis by providing households with seeds for the 
next harvest.  However, rather than importing seeds, the seed fair sought to facilitate 
exchanges between buyers and sellers.  
 
 
However, several problems hindering the effectiveness of the programs used were identified.   
First of all, the targeting mechanism is not accurate.  There is only some indication at village level 
of the areas that are more affected by the drought.  There is no provision for the selection of the 
households for the subsidized sale and food distribution.  Secondly, the safety nets programs used 
are not implemented for a sufficient period of time to allow poor households affected by the crises 
to recover their initial level of consumption or assets.  Lastly, improvements are also need in the 
monitoring and response mechanism and in the design and implementation of safety nets 
programs. 
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ANNEX II  Targeting mechanisms: strengths and weaknesses 
Table 10.  Types of targeting: strengths and weaknesses 




economic areas or 
livelihood zones with a 
high concentration of 
affected people 
The Initial basis for most 
targeting, which is then 
refined 
Use exclusively when  
  The majority of those in 
the area are affected 
 Social/political/security 
conditions do not allow 
more refined targeting and 
there is a large population 
in need of assistance 
  The costs of refined 







Is a quick, 
inexpensive 
targeting 







data – which 
can be cost 
effective 
Can help the 






and can distort 















needs of the poor 
Household/Individual 
targeting 
Selection of groups, 
households, or 
individuals considered 
to be the most 
vulnerable in the 
community 
Use when there is a 
significant difference 
between those who require 
assistance and those who 
do not within a community 
It is useful if there if 
program implementers have 
in-depth knowledge and/or 
presence in the area 
Use during stable 
situations, when there can 










as nutrition, or 
recovery 
It can be difficult 
to distinguish 
between needy 
households in an 
emergency 
Transfers may be 
shared and 
therefore not 
meet targets and 
objectives 
It can lead to 
resentment from 
excluded groups 
and could even 






individuals are selected 
by those external to the 
community using 
observable indicators 
such as nutrition status 
Useful for nutrition 
interventions, such as 
therapeutic and 
supplementary feeding 
Good for administering in 
institutional programs – 
such as school-feeding 
Helpful in conflict 
situations when an external 
decision-maker is required 
When the emphasis is on 
rapid delivery and 
community-based targeting 




can be low 
Administrative 
costs can be high 
Difficult to 
verify if there is 




selected may not 
accurately reflect 
vulnerability in 
the area, thereby 
leading to   122
cannot be established  exclusion errors 






The community selects 
households or 
individuals to participate 
in the program. 
Typically religious 
leaders and elders, local 
committees or local 
authorities are part of 
the selection team  and 
they may develop 
criteria for eligibility on 
the program 
Use in stable situations, 
when social structures have 
not be disrupted 
Use in longer term crisis 
situations – where it will 
continue for several months 
In the long-




usually have a 
far better 
understanding 
of needs and 
vulnerability in 
their area 






















households decide for 
themselves whether they 
will participate in the 
program – such as 
food/cash-for-work 
programs and subsidies 
This is useful if community 
targeting would not be 
effective or might lead to 
conflict within the 
community 
It can be used when full 
rations for the entire 
community are no longer 
necessary 
Also when recovery and 
protecting livelihoods is the 
primary objective 
If the project 
can capture all 
those that it 
wants within 
the criteria, 
there is a low 
risk of 









needed to know 
exactly how, 
where and with 
what to target 
people so that 
they self-select 
The program 




wants to be 
included 
 
Source: Targeting in emergencies, WFP, 2006.       123
ANNEX III  Summary of disaster risk management strategies 
Table 11.  Strategies and Arrangements of Social Risk Management 
Arrangement  
Strategies 
Informal Market-based  Public 
Risk Reduction
    Less risky production  
  Migration  
  Proper feeding and 
weaning practices  
  Engaging in hygiene 
and other disease 
preventing activities  
 
  In-service 
training  






  standards  
 
  Good macroeconomic 
policies  
  Pre-service training  
  Labor market policies 
  Labor standards  
  Child labor reduction 
interventions  
  Disability policies  
  AIDS and other 
disease prevention 
Risk Mitigation  
Portfolio  
 
  Multiple jobs  
  Investment in 
human/physical/real 
assets  
  Investment in social 
capital (rituals, 
reciprocal gift- giving) 
  Investment in 
multiple 
financial assets  
  Microfinance  
 
  Pension systems  
  Asset transfers  
  Protection of poverty 
rights (especially for 
women)  
  Support for extending 
financial  
  markets to the poor 
Insurance  
 
  Marriage/family  
  Community 
arrangements  
  Share tenancy  
  Tied Labor 
  Old-age 
annuities  











Risk Coping  
    Selling of real assets  
  Borrowing from 
neighbors  
  Intra-community 
transfers/charity   
  Sending children to 
work  
  Dis-saving of human 
capital 
  Seasonal/temporary 
migration  
  Selling of 
financial assets  
  Borrowing 
from banks  
 
  Disaster relief  
  Transfers/Social 
assistance  
  Subsidies  
  Public works 
Source: Jørgenson  & Holzmann, 2000.  124
ANNEX IV  Profiles of safety nets for natural disasters, 2000-2008 
A sample of safety nets and income support following recent disasters (by Government, donors, international organizations & NGOs) 
 
Transfer Objective/target group  Transfer: Size Transfer: Type Transfer: Frequency Transfer: Duration Target Number
 
1990-2002, Afghanistan 
Encourage repatriation, UNHCR  $100/person + 300kg wheat  Cash and food  One-off  One-time  3 million people 
 
1998, Guatemala & Nicaragua, Hurricane Mitch 
Hurricane Mitch Agricultural support Program 
(Rehabilitation) 
$30 + package of seeds, 
fertilizer, grain, spray pumps 
Cash grant + 
agricultural inputs 
One-off  One- time. Cash given to 
women. Inputs to men 
17,000 households 
 
2000, Mozambique, floods 
‘Rebuild lives’ and ‘jumpstart economic activity’ for 
flood-affected rural families, USAID 
$92  Cash grant  One-off  One- time  106,000 households 
 
2002, DRC 
Road & school rehabilitation  $120    -  -  800 households 
 
2003 Iran, Bam earthquake 
Welfare Organization (among other government cash 
transfer programs) 
$60   monthly  Six  months 5,800  households 
Encourage returnees, UNHCR (?)  $10/person    One-off  One- time   
 
2003, Cambodia 
Encourage returnees  $50/adult and $25/child    One-off  One- time  370,000 
 
2004, Serbia 
Home reconstruction  CHF 50    monthly    11,000 households 
 
2004, Tsunami 
Affected households, UNDP  $300 total/household  Cash for work    Six-eight months  46,000 households 
 
2004-5 Tsunami, Sri Lanka
45 
Livelihood Support cash grants Vulnerable households, 
GoSL 
US$50  Cash grant  2 installments  Four months  200,000 families 
Assistance package to tsunami-affected households  $50/month followed by  
$3.75 cash + food 
Cash Monthly  Two  months 
Four months 
880,000 households 
Beneficiaries of WFP’s Vulnerable Group Feeding in 
tsunami-affected districts in Sri Lanka, WFP 
$1.50/person, based on local 
market value of food 
Cash transfer  Weekly  Four months  12,000 people (3,300 
households) in 3 
districts 
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Cash for affected Households  $39, $77 or $115, depending 
on damage 





2004-5 Tsunami, Aceh, Indonesia 
Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) – Social fund 
to decrease poverty, strengthen local govt. and local 
institutions, GoI 
a) $50,000-$150,000 
b) $50/ household 
Community grants Single payment     
Tsunami-affected separated and orphaned children, 
UNICEF 
$44/child to caregiver  Cash grant  Monthly  Three months  1,300 caregivers 
(1,700 children) 







Grants to restart livelihoods, Oxfam   $500/household (approx) + 
seeds, fertilizers, machinery + 
rehabilitation of contaminated 
land 
Cash  Single payment    6,000 households 
Purchase of non-staple foods to supplement food relief 
for Tsunami-affected households 
Rph 3,000 per day ($10 per 
month) 
Cash allowance  Rations     
Support to hosts of 2 or more IDPs in 11 sub-districts in 
Aceh, SDC 
$98 Cash  Single  payment    7,239 host families 
1) Tsunami-affected households – for assets, education 
and services,  
2) Livelihoods cash grant for particularly vulnerable 
people, including women, single-headed households, 
eldery and disabled; 
3) Group grants to bring people together to jointly 
invest in assets such as a fishing boat or to fencing for 




Cash  Four tranches    1) 6,900 households 
2) 3,000 people 
3) 150 groups of up to 
120 people each 
 
2004-5 Tsunami, Somalia 
Meet basic needs of the poorest and most destitute  $50(based on cost of food, 
sugar, oil & water for 
humans/livestock) 











One- time payment 
600,000 households 
Death & injury compensation  Death: US$1,667/member  Cash grant  Single payment  One- time   
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Injury: US$250-1,250  Cash grant  Single payment  One- time 
Livelihood Support Cash Grant – to support livelihoods 
and immediate needs for the most vulnerable, GoP. 
US$50 Cash  grant  Monthly  Six months  250,000 households 
Support affected livelihoods, Save the Children  $190  Cash grant  One-time  One-time  5,100 households 
Recovery of small businesses, Save  Up to $380 per business  Cash grant  One-off payment  One- time  375 village shops 
 
2005, Kenya Isiolo drought 
Destocking/Restocking, invest in productive assets, 
Save 
$435/Household Cash  transfer  One-off One-off  750  households 
 
2005,2006 Malawi, Erratic rains 
Food and Cash Transfers project to assist households 
who had not received food assistance during the crisis – 
3 regions, Concern 
Food rations + cash transfers  Cash and food  Monthly  Four months  5,050 households 
 
2005 Food crisis, Niger 
Meet immediate needs, avoid coping strategies, restock 
herds, IFRC 
$240/household (40 days’ 
ration) 
Cash  One-time payment  One-time  5,713 households 
Disaster risk reduction: reduce chronic vulnerability 
pre-shock. Installments preferred over smaller regular 
transfers to enable investment & spread risk. CARE 
$178  Cash  Two installments      
 
2005 Hurricane Katrina, United States 
1. Immediate needs for survivors 
2. Temporary housing, property repair/replacement 
1. $2,000 
2. Up to $26,200 
 
 
    
 
2005 onwards, Consumption support and asset protection, Ethiopia 
Productive Safety Net Program  $4.4/person/month or 
15kg/person/month 
Cash for work 
Food for work 
Every two months  Six-eight months/year  7.6 million people 
 
2006 Drought, Somalia 











2007-8, Swaziland, Drought 
Emergency Drought Transfer Drought-affected 
households – Consumption protection and livelihood 
support, Save UK 
$70 one-off (livelihoods) 
Half food requirement in food 
+ half (approx $4.5) in cash 
transfers  
Cash and food  One-off + food + cash  Six months  7,500 households 
 
2007-8, Returnee households, DRC 
Voucher fairs for returning households to purchase non-
food items at local markets and fairs. UNICEF & CRS 
Cash and vouchers  Cash and vouchers One-off   Six months  740 households 
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ANNEX V  Some guidance for implementing social safety nets ex ante 
 
In summary, the adequacy of response depends upon: a) prepared response plans; b) effective 
early warning systems; and c) the capacity to implement the plans. 
A number of important lessons about ex ante decision-making were drawn from the Bangladesh 
and Ethiopia case studies and is summarized below. See section 4.3 for more details and 
questions to consider. 
General 
1.  Establishing effective safety nets requires a long-term commitment 
2.  Safety nets must be scalable, to cope with future shocks. 
3.  Shocks affect different socioeconomic and livelihood groups differently. There is a need to 
better understand these nuances in order to adapt programs to better meet the variations in 
need of different groups of people.  
4.  Protective safety nets complement a preventive approach, including construction standards, 
regulations and policy structure. Safety nets operate best in tandem with other complementary 
activities and policies, so consider what other risk mitigation measures are needed. 
Planning 
5.  A national emergency plan is necessary in order to respond to shocks throughout the country.  
6.  Poorly planned safety nets can lead to additional risks for participants. It is necessary to 
consider and mitigate other issues that may arise as a consequence of participating in a safety 
net  such as increases in private debt or school dropout rates.  
7.  The EWS must trigger a clear course of action in the disaster mitigation strategy including 
scaling up safety nets and activating other mitigating mechanisms. 
8.  Awareness of where internal political dimensions may impede progress needs to be 
anticipated in program design and areas of responsibility and accountability need to be clearly 
defined.  
9.  Early warning systems must be responsive to various types of shocks and different levels of 
vulnerability.  
Implementation 
10. Monitoring and regularly updating information is vital in order to effectively plan and 
achieve program objectives. 
11. Establish reliable funding sources so that there is less dependency on reactive and unreliable 
emergency appeals. A multilateral mechanism similar to the Global Facility for Disaster Risk 
and Recovery (GFDRR), which predominantly focuses on infrastructure and coordination 
projects, might be worth exploring for safety net and social protection responses to natural 
hazards. 
12. Ensure that procedures of both donors and implementing agents can be modified and 
simplified in the event of a crisis to speed up response times. 
13. In many cases, national food reserves will still be required in case of emergency needs. 
14. Confidence in the SSN response assessments is required so as not to double efforts or prevent 
effective coordination between stakeholders.   128
ANNEX VI  Lessons learned: Contextual issues 
 
 
I Defining the narrative 
  Reassess the prevailing narrative of the situation and consider the alternative options for 
safety nets that this uncovers. This requires triangulation of information: recipients’ 
preferences, market analysis and needs assessments. 
  Consider the motivations for choosing a particular type of transfer and if other types are 
preferred and better suited, whether donors and governments will provide these. 
  Prioritize local knowledge and consult the community on all aspects of safety net design 
  Be cognizant of other sources of risk that may be affecting the community and either 
respond to or beware exacerbating these issues in the safety net design. 
 
II The importance of full information 
  Without an excellent grasp of the operational conditions of the situation, the design may 
fudge issues, be mis-targeted, etc. 
  In reality time pressured assessment will be flawed and interventions will have to be 
modified as better information becomes available – so provision for periodic 
reassessments of recovery and reconstruction operations is desirable 
 
III The political and institutional context 
  Political unrest in particular can upset donor commitments and program implementation 
from external organizations 
  First consider all available safety nets and pre-existent distribution systems, before 
instituting a new system. Also assess whether any local networks and community systems 
that can assist with program implementation 
  Develop sensitivity for the political and administrative dynamics in working horizontally 
and vertically with government departments in order to anticipate and help resolve 
bottlenecks. 
  Comprehend the nature of relations between the administrative or delivery system and 
participants (as well as non-participants) in order to avoid exacerbating existing tensions. 
 
IV The economic context 
  The health of local markets is a strong factor in determining the most optimum type of 
transfer to provide. The vitality of markets during different seasons must be considered: 
some markets may not be accessible at certain times of the year 
  Both a short and medium-term plan should be looking to facilitate the recovery of markets 
and combined with the rehabilitation of infrastructure and supply-side initiatives, cash 
transfers to disaster-affected areas can be a demand-side means to help do so.  
  When markets are not operating due to supply constraints or are inaccessible, either 
physically or in entitlement terms, in-kind transfers may well be the optimum response. 
Contrarily, cash transfers may be helpful in stimulating the supply side. 
  Volatile markets affects the purchasing power of cash transfers – either transfers need to 
keep apace with inflation, or in-kind transfers may be a preferable alternative during 
periods of extreme fluctuation. 
  However, the possible consequences on local markets of a policy: be it a transfer, a 
subsidy or a freeze on prices need to be thoroughly considered 
  Public works schemes can be appropriate in the medium term if there is minimal access to 
employment, but when there is a long-term need to create employment, it flags the need 
for other mechanisms to resolve labor market issues.    129
  If there is a need for an employment generation scheme, it is important that it address 
other needs in the community, such as environmental rehabilitation or building community 
assets, not the notoriously futile ‘hole-filling’ that has been commonplace in the past. 
  There is no blueprint for the size of transfer to give in particular situations. The size of 
transfers is not necessarily reflective of a country’s income level, or the level of transfers it 
had been giving prior to a large covariant shock. Yet seemingly adequate (large?) transfers 
can lead to a successful recovery process - as in the Maldives – or not, as in Somalia. 
Large transfers can lead to incentives for corruption.  
  Perhaps more important, is the size of a transfer relative to context-specific reference 
points. 
 
V The social context 
  Consider who the target group is and what types of needs they have, and obstacles for 
them to overcome. For example, orphans and disabled people will require interventions 
within their own community and as a last resort, institutionalization; food/cash-for-training 
and other capacity building initiatives may be more appropriate responses for women than 
labor-intensive public works.  
  Particularly in conflict situations and complex emergencies, women and children are the 
most affected: up to eighty percent of IDPs and refugees are women and children (WFP, 
2006). This of course influences upon targeting decisions and the type of program that is 
appropriate. 
  Distribution of transfers have to be accessible for all, including women and elderly 
  Decisions about where and how to deliver transfers need to be taken in conjunction with 
the program recipients. 
  It is necessary to take an integrated view of the complete recovery process from 
relief/immediate to long term (Kennedy et al, 2007, 28) 
  Establishing community-based activities has important value for restoring what may be 
damaged social capital and dislocated communities. “Addressing settlement and 
community issues throughout [the process] is as important as providing physical structures 
and addressing individuals’ needs”(Kennedy et al, 2007, 28). 
  Blanket coverage may ensure that the wealthier recover more quickly, which may be 
advantageous for the economy, in stimulating businesses and providing employment, 
although, this cannot be to the exclusion of the poorest and most vulnerable. 
  Community-targeted funds may be useful for reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
community and private assets (road repair and reconstruction of fishing-boats and houses). 
This is one way to implement locally-adapted work programs. In the case of private assets, 
the community can decide which groups of people they preferred to assist first. This is of 
course time-costly and requires considerable training and awareness-raising within the 
community, hence only suitable for longer-term or frequently recurrent safety nets. 
  Universal targeting of the affected population, versus targeting only the poorest affected 
need not be a trade-off, but depends upon the program objective. Different wealth levels 
can be targeted for assistance through multi-tiered programs, in order to help restore all 
livelihoods and maintain the local economy. 
 
VI Safety net design 
  Focus sufficient resources on monitoring, evaluation and a transparent appeals system. 
  Capacity is of critical importance but can take time to build – this is not suite for 
emergency situations, but highlights the importance of training , capacity-building in 
planning, implementation and disaster risk management. 
  The choice of intervention instrument should be based on a pragmatic assessment of local   130
circumstances and not on preconceptions of what works best. 
  Try to avoid multiple, parallel interventions, including financial  institutions. 
  Assign departmental responsibilities  - who is responsible for what (such as targeting, 
distribution, etc.) and how these tasks will be carried out;  
  Establish where timely resources will be mobilized from; 
  Predetermine the overarching objective. The specific objectives will need to be refined at 
the time; 
  Pre-identify what the unknown information is and plan for who and how they will be 
addressed; 
  Establish a time plan of when different actions will be taken. As the Bangladesh case 
demonstrated some post-relief actions can and may need to start during the relief stage, or 
even before a predicted event; 
  Coordinate: between government departments and particularly of local and international 
NGOs and other outside interventions;  
  Establish a monitoring and evaluation system. 
 
VII Livelihood support 
  In order to be effective, the most appropriate response for rehabilitating livelihoods, must 
be weighed against the various logistical and implementation constraints. 
  Assess the need and scope for changes to the type of transfer provided (e.g., a shift from 
food transfers to cash, from frequent to more intermittent payments, etc.) 
  If established livelihood opportunities are limited, consider promoting alternative types of 
livelihood within the community – such as small businesses and household production.  
  Focus on using the community to recover assets and livelihoods: this can have positive 
impacts upon psychological wellbeing after a trauma and on building back social capacity. 
  Livelihood approaches should be used to complement other safety net transfer programs 
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ANNEX VII  Summary of safety net design issues 
Planning safety nets for emergencies 
Box 5.  Planning safety nets for emergencies: A summary 
Some guiding principles 
  Establish a national emergency plan that can respond to shocks throughout the country at 
a national or local level, this takes and time and should be seen as a long term 
commitment; Institutionalize emergency plans and safety nets in legal and policy 
structure 
  Safety nets must be scalable, to cope with future shocks. 
  There must be access to reliable sources of funding 
  Funding and procurement processes must be modified in the event of crisis 
Early warning systems 
   Ensure EWS are responsive to different types of shocks, for varying levels of vulnerable 
citizens. 
  An EWS must trigger a clear, timely course of action 
 
 Capacity to implement plants 
  Be conscious of the internal political relations which may impede progress. 
  Monitoring and other data must be regularly updated 
  Safety nets can only be implemented as one part of a disaster management strategy. 
 
Understanding the context: How context informs and influences safety net design 
Box 6.  Understanding the context: How the context informs and influences safety net design 
Contextual Issue  Safety net design feature 
7.  Defining the narrative & determining the 
type of natural event (slow/rapid onset) 
Framing objectives and goals; deciding transfer 
type; duration of assistance 
8.  Defining the narrative & knowledge of 
the demographics 
Type of transfer 
9.  Geographic & demographic spread of 
event 
Targeting 
10.  Socio/politico/economic 
circumstances 
Assistance, targeting, delivery 
11.  Infrastructure & human capacity Implementation & delivery
12.  Resource availability & 
international context 
Size, type & duration  
 
Design and implementation 
A good safety net program should be: appropriate and well –balanced with the country’s other 
policies; coverage should be adequate to include those most in need; it should be fair and 
equitable; it should maximize the benefit to the target group by being cost-effective; if it is 
incentive compatible, it will encourage positive changes in household behavior; it should be 
fiscally and politically sustainable; and dynamic, in that it evolves over time. These are useful   132
guiding principles although in designing short run safety nets in an emergency, some of these 
characteristics may be relaxed (Grosh et al, 2008). 
 
  Capitalize on existing effective mechanisms as much as possible 
  Consider how safety net activities will need to transition from the short to long term.  
  It will require contingency plans to scale-up existing mechanisms in the event of disaster 
and plans to deal with the ways that existing mechanisms might become disrupted.  
Deciding the implementing agent 
Box 7.  Safety net design: How to decide the implementing agent 
 Understanding the context: How the context informs and influences safety net design 
  Be cognizant of government commitment to the program – particularly at  the various 
levels of within the civil service. How committed to the program are different levels of 
government? How close is the program to the treasury/senior ministries? 
  Be aware of the tensions between different departments involved and seek ways to 
mitigate these tensions 
  Conduct an institutional analysis to (i) understand the institutional history; and (ii) 
evaluate capacity 
  Which departments have sufficient human resources to manage the program and how can 
the skills of other departments be utilized? 
  How can coordination and communication be fostered between government departments 
and other implementing agents 
  How can the community contribute to knowledge and management of the safety net at the 
local level?  Consider how to involve the community and make use of their knowledge 
and social capital, in as diverse ways as possible in the program design and 
implementation. 
  Are there tensions and competition between the government and communities and 
government with donor/technical assistance that can be assuaged 
  Is there an ongoing training program for implementers– including sharing best-practices, 
field visits for central-level staff and coordination meetings? (In Somalia, implementing 
organizations were required to attend a 2-3 day training every 6-7 weeks, to discuss 
problems and share experiences (Majiid, 2007). 
Choosing the type of instrument: Cash, kind or vouchers? 
The choice for a type/types of transfer will require triangulating recipients’ preferences, the 
economic appropriateness and the practical reality of implementing a particular transfer.  
 
Box 8.  Safety net design: How to select the transfer 
Some guiding principles 
  Cash transfers need to be mainstreamed in disaster preparedness systems as in-kind 
transfers still tend to be the norm during emergencies. 
  The choice between transfers, need not be rigid – recipient surveys suggest that a mixed 
basket may be preferred and most useful.   
  Consider the program’s objectives and which type of transfer will best achieve this. Is it 
better to use/improve existing safety nets transfer systems or implement a new one. 
  Assess the household preferences for different transfers, including variation in 
preferences across the target group, and why; and how they will best use the transfers to 
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  Balance preferences with a thorough knowledge of local markets – including supply, 
access (throughout the year), market stability, price fluctuation, etc. 
  Establish the transfer type will best protect against future natural disasters – are there 
standards to maintain, local resources to protect, etc. which promotes a particular transfer? 
  Evaluate the capacity to deliver the desired transfer and how this can be improved, 
including how the community can be involved in the delivery of transfers. 
  Determine the risks of providing a particular transfer and how they will be overcome. 
  Program flexibility  is necessary to be able to adapt the program as the situation changes 
– will transfers 
  Is there any conflict in the area that may be exacerbated by a particular type of transfer?  
  Are the risks of corruption, extortion, patronage and elite capture greater if cash (rather 
than in-kind) transfers are provided? 
  Are there genuine concerns that if cash is provided, it will not be spent on goods that will 
meet the program’s objectives (e.g. house-construction, food and basic needs, livestock re-
stocking or target groups such as children, etc.). 
Economic issues 
   Will a particular type of transfer help stimulate local markets?  
  Is there sufficient cash in circulation and are markets well-stocked?  
  Are prices steady?  
  Who will bear the cost of price fluctuation (recipient or provider?  
  Will the transfer impact upon local/national prices?  
  Are markets accessible, including by the poorest? (i) Physically; and (ii) In term of 
purchasing power 
  Regularly monitor markets, recipient preferences, and impacts (on participants and non-
participants) to observe any changes 
  What is the speed with which assets need to be replenished: will providing cash transfers 
take too long to re-build a local market in the asset? 
  Will markets continue to be accessible, throughout the duration of the program, even 
during seasonal changes? 
 Questions about the target group 
  Which transfer will provide the most flexibility for recipients and maximize household 
choice?  
  How can this be achieved, while still meeting program objectives? 
  Have recipients been adequately consulted about their preferences and the costs to them of 
a transfer? 
  Which type of transfer will incur the least cost for recipients? (i) in time costs and (ii) 
financial costs (e.g. due to transport, childcare, etc.) 
  Are there any disincentives (e.g. production disincentives) to providing cash or in kind 
transfers? 
Implementation and resource issues 
  Which transfer is the most efficient to distribute – in both the short and long term? 
  Which transfer will minimized discrimination, political manipulation, fraud, diversion, 
adverse incentives and moral hazard? Is some level of diversion acceptable and even 
beneficial? 
  Can the transfer help safeguard against future natural disasters, for example, by ensuring 
standards are maintained 
  What is cost effective for and the preferences and donor and/or government? This will 
inevitably be a consideration.  
Public works/workfare and other conditional transfers 
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opportunities in circumstances where there are few. 
 Is there a lack of (unskilled labor) employment opportunities for households – either in the 
aftermath of, or to protect against a natural hazard? 
 Can the workfare activities build skills and assets to help prevent natural disasters?  
 Is there a need to help clear up after a disaster, to restore infrastructure and repair/rebuild 
houses?  
 Will the public works distract from other livelihood opportunities?  
 Do any particularly vulnerable groups need direct (unconditional) support? 
 Can some vulnerable groups contribute to non-labor intensive community activities? 
 Is there any need to make transfers conditional on participation in other programs, such as 
health, or registration activities?  
Targeting 
The importance of targeting is to maximize the benefits for those in need of support and to 
minimize wastage and program costs. This is particularly difficult when there is an imperative to 
act quickly and this makes it even more important not to overlook the balance between non-
partisanship, local knowledge and pragmatism. Achieving perfect targeting has to be offset by the 
costs of carrying out extensive targeting exercises. The very concept of targeting risks being seen 
as a top-down exercise, and the agency of affected communities must be explicitly recognized in 
program design. 
 
Box 9.  Safety net design: Targeting - Who, how and what 
Who to target An effective emergency/rapid needs assessment (ENA/RNA). Rapid 
assessment of the situation is an imperative, followed by continuous and rigorous tracking of 
the situation. This will help advance response times to hazards. 
  What are the program objectives? Short-term to meet basic needs, or longer-term to 
rehabilitate livelihoods?  
  What information sources will be drawn upon (e.g. FEWSNET, Vulnerability Analysis 
Mapping, local organizations, informal church networks, etc.) – that can help establish 
geographic target areas, or be used to cross-check targeting?  
  Conduct an effective emergency/rapid needs assessment (ENA/RNA).  
  Are the most vulnerable included – are they even visible to implementers? 
  Is there a need and resources to include the less vulnerable? 
  In post disaster situations, targeted groups usually are (i) those that have lost household 
labor, (ii) those that have lost assets; (iii) those that are most destitute. 
  Are there various safety nets that can cater for differently affected groups, for various 
lengths of time? 
  Can the safety net be multi-tiered to target different wealth groups? 
  Beyond the core target group, who else will the safety net also assist? 
  Is universal targeting appropriate or necessary in the immediate to short-term? How this 
will be refined in the medium term, as the support moves from relief to recovering and 
rebuilding livelihoods, needs to be carefully planned. 
Especially vulnerable groups and the community These groups include the disabled, sick, 
elderly, orphans and other vulnerable children and women headed households. Particularly 
after a severe shock in particular, it may include psychologically traumatized people. 
  Is there a good understanding about the different types of vulnerable groups in the 
targeted area? 
  Is the safety net sufficiently flexible to meet their needs, is the safety net accessible for 
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  Does the monitoring and evaluation system adequately include different vulnerable 
groups? 
  Will vulnerable groups receive direct support? Can they contribute to community 
activities in any way (if the program involves workfare)? 
  Can the safety net help empower vulnerable groups (e.g. giving transfers to women)? Will 
there be any adverse effects of this? 
  How can the community be given ownership over their relief and recovery strategies? 
How to target: Timing and re-targeting 
 Targeting processes will alter according to whether the situation is a slow-onset disaster, or 
an unexpected event.  
  Following a rapid-onset event targeting is likely to be particularly difficult in the initial 
stages, due to the loss of trained human capacity, damaged infrastructure, and destroyed 
records and data. 
  How will the targeting process adapt as post-emergency recovery progresses from the 
short to longer term, as needs and target groups change? Are the geographic areas still 
appropriate? 
  What is the plan and frequency for re-targeting? 
  Are the targeting criteria still valied – do they need to be adapted to local conditions as the 
situation changes? 
  What is the goal for improving targeting over time (for longer run programs)? 
  What are the sources of information for targeting. Are they sufficient and are they being 
monitored over time? 
  If targeting with migrants and IDPs, are the local population still protected? 
  Utilize all available sources of information: vulnerability assessments, EWS reports, local 
organizations and networks (such as church networks) in order to develop targeting 
criteria; 
  Cross-check information once selection criteria has been agreed (through field visits and 
house-to-house surveys. 
 What to target 
Deciding the targeting method will be a balance between cost, efficiency and effectiveness. 
In a disaster situation, the simplest targeting mechanisms are those which do not require a 
verification process. self-targeting mechanisms and universal coverage of the affected 
population. The advantages and disadvantages of various targeting mechanisms as they apply 
to hazard situations are summarized in the Annex. 
Targeting errors:  
  What level of inclusion and exclusion errors will be tolerated 
  Three options to help alleviate inclusion errors are:  
(iv)  Factoring this in to calculations of need and increasing transfers accordingly; 
(v)  Minimize possible leakage in the program design. For example targeting children 
through school-feeding, mothers and babies at health centers and the sick/injured 
in hospitals; 
(vi)  Thorough monitoring, frequent re-targeting and an effective, trusted appeals 
system. 
Designing the targeting process 
  What ongoing targeting assessments are planned? 
  What pre-existing safety nets and data mechanisms are there that can help with the 
targeting? 
  Where, how and when will participants be identified most easily? 
  How will the verification process be strengthened over time? 
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  How can the community be involved at all levels of the targeting process? 
  Are community expectations being managed?  
  When will re-targeting take place? And at what intervals thereafter? 
  Is the targeting process transparent? Are possible loopholes for corruption avoided?  
  What will be the costs of targeting – for the implementing structure and for potential 
participants 
  Strike a balance between inclusion and exclusion errors. Consider how to improve upon 
the relief-phase targeting processes where inclusion errors may be more acceptable; 
  Plan targeting decisions assuming full resources are available, but prepare to adapt if 
resources are reduced or delayed and communicate this to stakeholders; 
  Ensure targeting is “a conscious and integral management activity at all stages of the 
program cycle” and that targeting is informed by critical situation analysis; 
  Budget the costs of targeting, including training, registration, monitoring and community 
sensitization; 
  Plan flexible targeting, that can respond to changes in situations, household composition, 
vulnerability 
  Develop a dissemination plan of the targeting criteria and mechanism, once it has been 
clearly defined; 
  Design a monitoring mechanism, plan re-targeting exercises and a data-collection system. 
The costs of targeting 
  Initial, administrative costs 
  Recurring costs 
  Implicit costs 
  Incentive costs 
  Political costs 
  Beneficiary opportunity (‘transaction’) costs 
 Payment 
There is considerable variation in the size of transfers offered following different natural disasters 
but no standard proportion of assistance, and little literature calibrating the impacts of different 
levels of transfer. All decisions must be specific to the country and circumstances.  
 
Box 10.  Safety net design: Making payments – how much, how often and where 
Quantity 
  At what level of payment will it be possible to maintain a balance between entrance and 
exit incentives? 
  At what size of transfer will the payment meet the program objective? 
  Is the payment in line with market prices, local labor wages, etc? Does this also account 
for fluctuation? 
  Are the households needs sufficiently being met? Will the size and frequency of transfer 
sufficiently decrease their vulnerability? 
  What other complimentary activities are required (linkages)? 
  Does the size of transfer accommodate seasonal variation, post-disaster fluctuation and 
(possible) volatile prices? 
  Is the size of transfer sufficiently adequate to yield the intended results? 
  Will the size of transfer provide too great incentive for double dipping and create adverse 
effects?  
  What are the other household expenses, including debt repayments and business costs? 
Are objectives (and the subsequent size of transfer) are in line with household spending   137
priorities? 
  For cash grants, is payment for consumption or payment?  
  Will cash wages upset the local labor market? 
  Food rations tend to meet the standard food basket for emergency assistance, of 
2100kcal/day. 
  Will there be any problems if the transfer size fluctuates – eg between crisis and non-
shock times? 
Frequency, timing and duration “The principles of stability, predictability, and timing of 
an intervention may be as critical tosocial protection intervention effectiveness as the 
resource transfer itself” (Maxwell et al, 2008, 5). Predictable, stable transfers are essential to 
help recipients assess their willingness to take risks, which will help reduce their 
vulnerability to future or impacts of current shocks. Yet there seems to be little or no 
consensus as to the ideal timing and frequency of transfers, which reflects the heterogeneity 
of households’ preferences. Deciding the timing and the frequency can only partially 
influence how households are spend their transfers. 
  Recipient preferences tend towards larger, infrequent transfers. 
  To meet basic needs objectives and immediate needs, transfers tend to be frequent and 
small 
  For livelihood recovery, or compensation and insurance mechanisms, grants in the 
immediate aftermath of natural disaster are more likely to be a one-off payment. 
  Payments before/during the hungry season are most likely to be used for consumption and 
to arrest the need to accumulate debt, larger payments can be more easily used for 
purchasing livestock when prices are low. Payments after the harvest are more likely to be 
used for repaying debts.   
  One-time payments are for ‘one-off’ or start-up aims for example to encourage 
repatriation, replace lost assets and meet emergency needs  
  Evidence suggests that one to two installments can help spread risk, whereas small 
installments discourages investment.  
  Lumpy payments are for larger investments that take place over time or payments that 
need monitoring for example, providing cash to rebuild homes in installments. 
  For safety nets ex ante, transfers are likely to be regular in order to support and protect 
livelihoods in the event of a natural hazard. 
  Assess the impact on livelihoods.  
  In the short run, delivery frequency also depends on institutional capacity to distribute 
transfers.  
Delivery Deciding upon where to deliver transfers involves a trade-off at some level between 
convenience for the recipients and costs for the implementers.  
  What are the different options for delivering cash to people? 
  What are the opportunity costs for recipients of a particular delivery point? 
  What are the costs to the administration of a particular delivery point? 
  Is the payment point a convenient place for recipients to converge?  
  Are banking systems or financial transfer mechanisms functioning? 
  Are there any security issues with the collection point, such as cash being seized or do 
people feel insecure? 
  Will the paypoint provide access to other resources and services? 
  Can the paypoint help stimulate the local rural economy and rural markets?  
  Try to maintain equity in delivery. Recipients that spend more of their income on 
collecting the payment than others, retain proportionately less to meet for example, 
consumption needs.  
  Will the distribution of transfers marginalize any groups, or reinforce social disparities? Is   138
it appropriate to confront these norms at this time? 
  What are the costs of collecting the payment (including distance) for different target 
groups?  
  Keep the mechanism simple. Simple solutions may be more effective than high-tech ones. 
TimingThe speed at which a safety net program can be launched depends upon how prepared 
the country is, i.e. whether they have an established safety net in place already, the accuracy 
in assessing the size of the problem as well as practical aspects such as capacity, banking 
system, size of country, extent to which infrastructure has been damaged, etc.. Save the 
Children (2008) and the World Bank (2007) both estimate that a new safety net takes at least 
four to six months to establish. Again, this section considers a few guiding principles for 
ensuring timeliness in delivery of transfers: 
  In theory, cash should be the quickest resource to transfer to localities and distribute.  
  Consider how to change the modus operandi. Cash transfers are not always suitable and 
may not necessarily meet the required needs. However when designing safety nets ex ante, 
these issues should not detract from challenging the status quo of in kind transfers.  
  Safety nets ex ante  are important in order to allow space for testing and improving 
delivery, before being confronted with a major shock. 
  Think creatively about how to ensure timeliness. What are the other available resources 
that can be drawn upon? 
  This relies on thorough knowledge of the affected area, the size, differing environments, 
capacities and needs and a good grasp of local and informal transfer systems. When 
implementing ex ante safety nets, challenge the way ‘business has been done’ and reflect 
on any systemic changes that could improve upon the conventional methods for delivering 
assistance. 
Institutional management and coordination 
 “Coordination, not competition or confrontation, is necessary among organizations to ensure 
even coverage of beneficiaries, uniformity in the packages provided and consistency in meeting 
local and national building codes, as well as international standards.” (Kennedy et al, 2007, 31). 
A useful analogy is to think of “risk layers”. Each layer needs to be identified and an appropriate 
government role assigned to manage each one to ensure that there is no overlap or contradictions 
in programming. (Skees et al, 2005).  
 
Box 11.  Safety net design: Institutional management and coordination 
Institutional management and coordination 
  Are all pre-existing bureaucratic structures and lines of communication being used, where 
feasible?. 
  Is the political struggle between departments being minimized, or at very least 
understood?  
  Is the coordination and institutional set-up helping maintain confidence in the recovery 
and rehabilitation process? 
  Is it necessary to institute a specific agency to plan, coordinate and administer the 
reconstruction work?  
  Are all stakeholders being coordinated so as to avoid duplication of efforts? 
  Is there sufficient focus on communicating with the community and government 
administration in localities? How will you ensure that communication in all direction is 
effective? 
  Focus on ‘Getting it right first time’ 
  Can the disaster management approach be grounded in the policy and legal framework?   139
  Is it necessary to formally embed rehabilitation agencies in the legal code? 
 
Monitoring and evaluation 
The main purpose of an M&E system is to establish whether the transfer is reaching the intended 
beneficiaries in time and of the right type and quantity. Beyond this, an M&E system can provide 
information to the public and program participants, in order to improve performance and is also a 
necessary forward-looking tool, to learn lessons from experience and improve future programs.  
 
Box 12.  Safety net design: Monitoring and evaluation 
General principles 
  Follow a ‘good enough’ approach in the short term. This is not a ‘second best’ approach to 
M&E, but is about ensuring a rapid response. It advocates simple tools that are essential, 
quick and appropriate for the situation. 
  Balance of quantitative and qualitative approaches, deductive and inductive approaches 
and with an emphasis on participation.  
  Keep a realistic, limited but well-defined focus, when deciding phasing, actors and the 
range of indicators. 
  More attention is needed to scale up programs and disaster recovery analysis needs to be 
better linked to assessments of social protection structures in order to restore livelihoods. 
  Gender and socio-cultural factors need to be measured, and data needs to be disaggregated 
across age and gender.  
  M&E needs to be prepared in advance, to institute this at a later stage can be complex and 
confusing  
  Consider using pre-existing mechanisms for the M&E system. Linking to broader 
procedures and institutional structures can enhance the system’s value, reduce costs and 
help coordination 
Sustainability of an M&E system: The need for ownership and openness
  International sponsors of the system should have a clear exit strategy from the beginning.  
  High level government buy-in is essential as well as government ownership to ensure 
sustainability of the mechanism.  
  Leadership and good staff capacity are necessary – including a rolling training program to 
overcome the problem of staff turnover. 
  Establishing trust in the system and methodology is crucial for sustaining M&E, and 
without which all efforts can be undermined. 
Data: collection requires a pro-active approach and should be accessible 
  An initial evaluation of the trade-off between data quality and costs is necessary. 
  Data collection requires a pro-active approach: there should be incentives to submit and 
use data and minimal costs to doing so, as well as wide publicity through the media. 
  Information-sharing is a public good – emphasis should be on providing data. 
  The location of an M&E system is important– There is a balance between access/influence 
for decision-makers (upwards) and proximity and dissemination to the public and program 
participants (downwards). 
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Security 
Box 13.  Safety net design: Security 
 
  Do recipients (from all groups) feel secure about collecting their payments? Is the 
effectiveness of the transfer being compromised because of their behavior around 
collecting the transfer? 
  Are there any alternatives to overcome potential security problems? 
Ways to improve security 
   Minimize distances recipients have to travel to and from payment sites; 
  Establish payment sites within small community areas, where social ties are likely to be 
stronger; 
  Consider timeliness of payments as a security issue, which can impose additional cost and 
vulnerability on recipients; 
  Utilize the army or police force to guard delivery of transfers and payments – but be wary 
if this will add to social tensions; 
  Discuss security concerns and options with communities – and establish community-
driven initiatives to safeguard transfers; 
  Consider a banking system (including post office savings and credit options in local 
shops), so that recipients can both safeguard and store their money. 
Planning 
One of the main lessons from the case studies is that response to natural hazards can be effective 
where there is a well-defined management plan and they are essential for high-risk countries.    
 
  Is hazard response being integrated into the general development policy and plans?  
  The need to ensure programs are scalable is key for response to natural disasters.  
  In high risk areas, safety nets in place ex ante, must include disaster risk mitigation as one 
of their longer term development objectives.  
  Relief activities must be established within a longer term project cycle 
  Is there institutional integration between relief and development divisions? 
Scaling up and the transition from short- to long-term assistance 
Box 14.  The transition from relief to recovery and from ex ante to ex post safety nets 
In general 
  Build political support; 
  Embed the safety net in legislation or at least the policy framework; 
  Collect sufficient resources; 
  Establish the institutional transition from emergency response to a longer term 
institutional home; 
  Ensure that the transition does not jeopardize the transfer of resources; 
  Target the program appropriately; 
  Ensure the timeliness and predictability of the transfers; 
  Combine transfers with a livelihood package and consider other linkages to support 
households. 
  Build back better.  
  Adopt a pre-emptive approach to longer term issues to smooth the transition between 
relief and development.   141
Other design issues that also require attention in scaling up
  Who should control contingency resources? Should resources be held at federal level, in 
order to ensure proper use, despite a commitment to build local administrative capacity 
and to decentralize decision-making? 
  To what scale can the safety net be expanded? Would it be realistic for the risk-financing 
facility in the PSNP to become a nation-wide program to meet all needs in the event of a 
disaster/drought? 
  What shocks can the program prepare for? Are there other shocks that should be 
monitored for in the early warning system? 
  What complementary risk mitigation measures are needed? If a shock is beyond what the 
existent safety net can cope with, what other responses should be triggered? 
  Who will provide timely risk mitigation resources for the safety net? How will additional 
resources be sought and received quickly in future droughts. 
  Can program objectives be modified where necessary? 
  Is the safety net flexible to be fit an even more diverse group of households when scaled 
up?  
  How will appeals and grievance procedures also be scaled up? 
  How will the M&E systems be adapted to include new populations – as well as adjusting 
some of the evaluation and performance indicators as necessary. 
  What are the additional responsibilities of staff, their needs and additional capacity to 
consider?  
The transition from the short to medium and longer term safety net assistance: the 
role of the military and foreign assistance 
  How well is the military coordinating with the development agency? 
  Is there a clear line of command between the civilian relief/development agency and the 
military? 
  What is the process for the military to disengage from development operations? Are 
development agencies sufficient equipped to carry out their tasks – both in physical and 
human resources? 
  How are humanitarian and development agencies going to be integrated? 
Financing options 
There are numerous mechanisms for funding safety nets, and there is considerable scope for more 
innovation in this area. Funding arrangements will differ for the two different disaster-related 
programs a) for preventive and ongoing (ex ante) safety nets; and b) for emergency safety nets 
that take place in response to a shock (ex post), although many mechanisms can finance both 
types. The emphasis here is on establishing long term funding. 
 
Box 15.  Financing options 
Some guiding principles 
  For lower risk hazards, there should still be prepared plans to implement safety nets that 
can draw down financing rapidly: emergency international appeals should be a solution of 
last resort.  
  Funding can be flexible and the budget reserved for emergencies – as in Mexico.  
  Funding should also focus on the local level – such as through social funds, which have a 
good track record of fast disbursement in response to crises, even when financed 
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  Donor-financing needs to be effectively integrated into national financing systems to 
avoid the problems of parallel mechanisms and enhance government ownership. 
Funding mechanisms 
  Social funds: financing for community-driven projects which are demand driven and focus 
on local capacity-building. 
  National disaster management funds: managed by the central government, they are 
intended to mitigate the negative impacts of natural hazards, by strengthening disaster 
preparedness and response.  
  Private sector financing and informal mechanisms: These may not necessarily be able to 
finance safety nets entirely, but they may affect the program design. Informal transfers 
and remittances are a crucial coping mechanism for the poor to protect against 
idiosyncratic risk. The contribution of informal safety nets more generally, need to be 
integrated into a disaster management social protection and safety net strategy, to 
complement the provision of formal safety nets.  
  Public-private partnerships can be controversial but are still under-researched area. It may 
be possible to explore the scope for working with the private sector in public works and 
also, insurance mechanisms.  
  Multilateral donor funds: to date these tend to focus on relief efforts but if effective, they 
could be adapted to finance disaster prevention strategies.
 
The international context 
Donors remain responsive to emergency appeals rather than prevention, for three core reasons: 
(i)  Politically, preventive mechanisms have little tangible benefit in the short term; 
(ii) Media pressure focuses on the disaster as more newsworthy than averted hazards; 
(iii) Institutionally, there is a lack of trust between the humanitarian community, actors, donors and 
national governments which have inhibited merging the boundaries between link relief and 
development. 
 
Box 16.  The role of the international arena 
Some guiding principles for bi- and multi-lateral donors
  Governments and donors need to commit to a vision of long-term funding for the recovery 
process. 
  The community must be in the driving seat 
  Procedures for emergencies need to be streamlined in a systematic way, so that 
procurement and contracting rules are simplified and hence speeded up  
  International response to prevent and recover from natural disasters needs to be effective, 
coordinated and sustainable 
  This requires greater transparency and accountability to both recipients and donors’ 
taxpayers. 
  There may be opportunities also for pooled funding initiatives 
  A central knowledge bank where national planners and project designers can access 
information and expertise on safety net experiences may help coordination and innovation 
in natural disaster management. 
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This paper makes the case for why safety nets are an important tool 
for  managing  the  risk  of  natural  hazards. The  use  of  safety  nets  is 
advocated both ex ante, to prevent and mitigate the impact of natural 
disaster  and  ex  post,  to  cope  with  the  impacts  of  natural  shocks. 
Firstly, the paper explores the implications of contextual factors to be 
taken into account in the design of an effective safety net system to 
respond to the needs generated by natural disasters. Learning from the 
responses to a number of recent natural disasters, a typology of the 
different types of natural hazards which require different approaches 
to reduce their risk is introduced. Secondly, the paper considers some 
“guidelines” for improving the design and implementation of safety 
nets either to prevent and/or to recover from natural disasters. Finally, 
some conclusions and recommendations for more effective safety net 
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